9/11 Congressional Committee Edits
AdamFitzgerald911
- 3 / 53
1
1997 Detailed Analysis Of Osama Bin Laden Not Updated
1:24

1997 Detailed Analysis Of Osama Bin Laden Not Updated

9/11 Commission panelist, Bob Kerrey, inquiries about the 1997 Bin Laden analysis from the CIA counter-terrorism had not been updated by 2001. Dr. K (acronym) was the analyst of the paper who works out of the CIA's Strategic Analysis for Terrorism.
2
Abderraouf Jdey Withdrew From First Wave Of Plane Hijackings
1:31

Abderraouf Jdey Withdrew From First Wave Of Plane Hijackings

From the 9/11 Commission, FBI Special Agent New York, Adam Drucker, comments on a tape found in Afghanistan showing an Al Qaeda militant, Abderaouf Jdey on a martyrdom video with other 9/11 participant but withdrew from the operation..
After 15 Months The FBI Unaware Of Khalid al-Mihdhar & Nawaf al-Hazmi Information
1:49

After 15 Months The FBI Unaware Of Khalid al-Mihdhar & Nawaf al-Hazmi Information

The CIA were aware of two known Al Qaeda operatives, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, were inside the United States and who were involved in a high level Al Qaeda summit meeting in Malaysia. However, the CIA with held this information from the FBI even during a June 2001 meeting between a CIA CTC officer and an FBI terrorism analyst in Washington DC. This excerpt is from Carl Levin from the Joint House Inquiry.
4
After The 1998 US Embassy Bombings Should There Have Been An NSC Briefing On A Military Response
2:40

After The 1998 US Embassy Bombings Should There Have Been An NSC Briefing On A Military Response

Tim Roemer, 9/11 Commission, asks James Steinberg (Clinton National Security Adviser) whether or not there should had been a National Security Council briefing regarding a military reaction in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 US Embassy bombings perpetrated by Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.
5
Allied Countries With Growing Fundamentalist Problem Can US Intervene
2:05

Allied Countries With Growing Fundamentalist Problem Can US Intervene

From the Joint House Inquiry, Fred Thompson, asks CIA Director George Tenet, if the United States can intervene on allied countries behalf who have a growing arab fundamentalist problem.
6
Al Qaeda Intelligence Chronology
2:38

Al Qaeda Intelligence Chronology

Carl Levin, Joint House Inquiry, reads the intelligence chronology of Al Qaeda events since the mid 1990's in which had the intelligence been shared with other agencies or acted upon would have prevented terrorist incidents such as September 11th2 2001.
7
An All Out US Military Attack On Afghanistan Was Not Possible
1:30

An All Out US Military Attack On Afghanistan Was Not Possible

From the 9/11 Commission, panelist, Slade Gorton, asks Bush National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, if an all out war against Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was feasible after the September 11th 2001 attacks
8
Are City And Federal Agencies Sharing Information With Each Other
2:19

Are City And Federal Agencies Sharing Information With Each Other

Thomas Kean, co-chair 9/11 Commission, asks the panel of the Office of Emergency Management, NYPD and Port Authority, are getting all data from federal and city agencies relating to counter-terrorism.
9
Are NORAD In Communications With FAA And Have Presence With Its Command Center
0:49

Are NORAD In Communications With FAA And Have Presence With Its Command Center

Jamie Gorelick, 9/11 Commission, asks Craig McKinley (Continental NORAD Regional Commander), if NORAD is collocated with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in regards to communicating information between the two.
10
Are The US Government Creating Open Ended Defiance By Stationing Military In Islamic Countries
2:15

Are The US Government Creating Open Ended Defiance By Stationing Military In Islamic Countries

Max Cleland, 9/11 Commission, asks Dennis Ross (Washington Institute for Near East Policy) whether the United States create the open ended defiance of Islamic jihadists while stationing in Islamic countries and with their military involvement in the first Gulf War in 1990.
11
Are There Al Qaeda Cells Operating Inside The US In 2004
1:55

Are There Al Qaeda Cells Operating Inside The US In 2004

From the 9/11 Commission, Co-chair, Thomas Kean, asks FBI executive assistant director for counter-terrorism, John Pistole, if there are active Al Qaeda cells in the United States in 2004..FBI Special Agent, Mary Deborah Doran, responds that US based Al Qaeda affiliates are being investigated at the time.
12
August 6 PDB Has Old & New Data Based On Ahmed Ressam Interrogation
1:13

August 6 PDB Has Old & New Data Based On Ahmed Ressam Interrogation

James Thompson, 9/11 Commission, asks CIA Director George Tenet, whether all the information of the August 6th Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) if the information is from 1998-1999. Tenet says the PDB is old and new data.
13
At April 30th 2001 Principals Meeting, Paul Wolfowitz Paid More Attention To Iraq Than Al Qaeda
4:00

At April 30th 2001 Principals Meeting, Paul Wolfowitz Paid More Attention To Iraq Than Al Qaeda

From the 9/11 Commission, Tim Roemer asks, Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, about a comment that took place on April 30th 2001, where Richard Clarke would remark about Wolfowitz being more concerned about Iraq than Al Qaeda during the Principals Meeting.
14
Boston Center Reports Flight 11 As A Hijack 20 Minutes Earlier Than NORAD's Timeline
2:50

Boston Center Reports Flight 11 As A Hijack 20 Minutes Earlier Than NORAD's Timeline

Max Cleland, 9/11 Commission, asks Jane Garvey (administrator FAA), that Boston Center recorded American Airlines Flight 11 hijacking as 820am, while NORAD's timeline has the hijacking at 840am
15
Can Reforms Under Robert Mueller Work Better Than Louis Freeh's Failed Reforms Regarding The FBI
4:38

Can Reforms Under Robert Mueller Work Better Than Louis Freeh's Failed Reforms Regarding The FBI

From the 9/11 Commission, Co-chair, Thomas Kean, ass former FBI director, Louis Freeh, if internal reforms will work under director Mueller with respect to the counter-terrorism unit. Freeh took exception that the 9/11 Commission findings were an "indictment" under Freeh's CTC at FBI and remarks that Mueller's idea for creating a separate unit in FBI would not be tolerated by American society.
16
Chances To Kill Bin Laden Were Unsuccessful Due To Various Reasons
1:53

Chances To Kill Bin Laden Were Unsuccessful Due To Various Reasons

From the 9/11 Commission, panelist, Fred Fielding, asks former Clinton National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, why President Clinton had failed to act on killing Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan.
17
CIA Knew Of 'Khallad' Connection To Al-Mihdhar & Al-Hazmi But Didn't Tell FBI While Inside The US
1:02

CIA Knew Of 'Khallad' Connection To Al-Mihdhar & Al-Hazmi But Didn't Tell FBI While Inside The US

From the Joint Inquiry, Carl Levin asks DCI George Tenet why didn't the Central Intelligence Agency notify the FBI that Nawaf al-Hazmi was inside the United States or put both, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi on watchlists even thou the CIA knew both men were with "Khallad" Walid bin Attash at an Al Qaeda summit meeting in Malaysia.
18
Clark Shannon Would Not Share Information With FBI Without Authorization
1:45

Clark Shannon Would Not Share Information With FBI Without Authorization

Carl Levin, Joint House Inquiry, asks Tom Wilshire (CIA Officer behind partition) whether the information from a CIA officer (Clark Shannon) was not shared with FBI agents in Washington DC meeting was withheld because he "had no authority to do so".
19
Closed Airspace Gave NORAD "Chance" But Could Not Have Intercepted Flight 77
1:23

Closed Airspace Gave NORAD "Chance" But Could Not Have Intercepted Flight 77

From the 9/11 Commission, Richard Ben-Veniste questions Col. Alan Scott and Major. General Larry Arnold, over whether NPRAD could have possibly shot down Flight 77 on it's way to Washington D.C and also the mention of close air space comes to light.
20
Could NORAD Have Stopped The 9/11 Attacks Had All Information Received From FAA & Intell Ops On Time
1:31

Could NORAD Have Stopped The 9/11 Attacks Had All Information Received From FAA & Intell Ops On Time

James Thompson, panelist from 9/11 Commission, asks a hypothetical to Ralph Eberhardt, , North American Aerospace Defense Command, would had it have been possible (had they had all the information regarding all four hijacked aircraft) that they have prevented the attacks from ever happening
21
Defense Department Had Inadequate Time To Deal With Al Qaeda Last 8 Years Prior To 9/11
2:02

Defense Department Had Inadequate Time To Deal With Al Qaeda Last 8 Years Prior To 9/11

Bob Kerrey, 9/11 Commission, asks Colin Powell, Secretary of State, how were the 9/11 hijackers able to defeat the national defense of the United States.
22
Did FAA Notify NORAD Flight 11 Hijacking At 840am Even Thou They Reported It As Hijacked At 820am
2:50

Did FAA Notify NORAD Flight 11 Hijacking At 840am Even Thou They Reported It As Hijacked At 820am

9/11 Commission panelist, Max Cleland, asks Jane Garvey (FAA Administrator) why there was an inaccurate reporting of the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11 on September 11th 2001.
23
Did FAA Security Operations Go To The Intelligence Services And Ask For Airline Threat Situations
0:56

Did FAA Security Operations Go To The Intelligence Services And Ask For Airline Threat Situations

Janet Reno, 9/11 Commission) asks Bogdan Dzakovic (TSA Civil Aviation Inspector) affirmed to the intelligence community on what terrorist warnings are there towards the FAA.
24
Did The FBI Screen Passengers On Board The Flights That Chartered Bin Laden Family & Saudis
1:05

Did The FBI Screen Passengers On Board The Flights That Chartered Bin Laden Family & Saudis

Tim Roemer, 9/11 Commission, asks FBI Director, Robert Mueller, whether or not the FBI have a process in place to screen passengers on the flights that boarded the Bin Laden family and associates shortly after the September 11th attacks.
25
Did The US Have The Presidential Backing For A Military Response To Bin Laden
1:29

Did The US Have The Presidential Backing For A Military Response To Bin Laden

Fred Fielding, 9/11 Commission, asks Madeline Albright, Clinton Secretary of State, if the Taliban had the reason to believe a military strike in response to 1998 Embassy bombings were legitimate.
26
"Dr.K" CIA Chief Of Strategic Terrorism & Analysis Group Did Not Receive KSM Info In June 2001
1:20

"Dr.K" CIA Chief Of Strategic Terrorism & Analysis Group Did Not Receive KSM Info In June 2001

Using the name "Dr.K" to shield his identity, the chief of strategic terrorism assessments alternative and analysis group, is being questioned by Tim Roemer, at the National Commission of Terrorist Attacks (9/11 Commission). The nature of the question surrounds information pertaining to Khalid Sheikh Muhammad to which Dr. K never receives during June 2001 timeframe.
27
FAA Made No Additional Security Measures In Spring & Summer 2001
1:33

FAA Made No Additional Security Measures In Spring & Summer 2001

From the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States , panelist Jaime Gorelick, interviews Cathal Flynn and Claudio Manno (FAA), regarding the FAA and their lack of implementing stricter security measures in the Spring and Summer of 2001, even with intelligence warnings showing airlines are at risk by terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.
28
FAA Report Bojinka Plot Concerns For Overseas Airlines But Not For Domestic Attacks
1:44

FAA Report Bojinka Plot Concerns For Overseas Airlines But Not For Domestic Attacks

Bob Kerrey, 9/11 Commission, sternly questions Monte Belger, Acting Deputy Commissioner FAA, about why the FAA did not act on the 1995 Bojinka plot threat to international and domestic flights.
29
Had The CIA Briefed The Bush Administration Regarding Al Qaeda As Serious Threat?
1:53

Had The CIA Briefed The Bush Administration Regarding Al Qaeda As Serious Threat?

Bob Kerrey. 9/11 Commission panelist, sternly inquiries about why the CIA had not briefed the incoming Bush administration regarding the growing serious military threat of Al Qaeda which was known to the agency since 1996.
30
Had Saudi Arabia Paid Hundreds Of Millions To Al Qaeda In The 1990's
5:17

Had Saudi Arabia Paid Hundreds Of Millions To Al Qaeda In The 1990's

Tim Roemer, 9/11 Commission, asks Mamoun Fandy (U.S Institute of Peace Senior Fellow) whether the claim made by ex-CIA Robert Baer was true, that the Saudi Kingdom had paid hundreds of millions to Al Qaeda during the decade of the 1990's.
31
How Is A Decision Made Between PEOC And President Regarding Shootdown Authority
1:47

How Is A Decision Made Between PEOC And President Regarding Shootdown Authority

9/11 Commission panelist, Tim Roemer, asks Norman Mineta (Transportation Secretary) how a shoot order is authorized between those at the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) and the President.
32
Is Bin Laden Influencing Islamic Communities In The Middle East & SE Asia
4:37

Is Bin Laden Influencing Islamic Communities In The Middle East & SE Asia

From the 9/11 Commission, panelist Fred Feilding, poses a question to Rachel Bronson (Council on Foreign Relations Middle East Studies Director) on the influence of Osama Bin Laden in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, have an effect in the religious communities.
33
Is The Iraq War Creating More Fanatics In Muslim World?
6:43

Is The Iraq War Creating More Fanatics In Muslim World?

Max Cleland, 9/11 Commission, asks author Gilles Kepel, whether or not US intervention into Iraq is creating Muslim fanatics around the world as a response to US imperialism in Islamic lands.
34
Is There Any Evidence That Al Qaeda Is Getting Help To Attack The US With Help From Iraq
2:58

Is There Any Evidence That Al Qaeda Is Getting Help To Attack The US With Help From Iraq

9/11 Commissioner, Fred Feilding, asks members f the intelligence community whether or not Al Qaeda is getting any weapons from the Iraqi government.
35
Is US Policy Interfering With Investigating Saudi Arabia Involvement With The 9/11 Attacks
2:36

Is US Policy Interfering With Investigating Saudi Arabia Involvement With The 9/11 Attacks

Lee Hamilton, co-chair 9/11 Commission, asks Lee Woldsky (Boies, Schiller & Flexner Law Form) whether or not the United States had the "political will" to hold Saudi Arabia accountable for being forthcoming on the truth to the 9/11 attacks.
36
Islam Has A Problem With Reform Which Leads To Extremism
4:41

Islam Has A Problem With Reform Which Leads To Extremism

From the 9/11 Commission, noted author Steve Emerson, talks abut how Islam has an "extremist" problem from his opening statement.
37
No Information Was Known To NORAD About Aircraft Being Used As Weapon
2:06

No Information Was Known To NORAD About Aircraft Being Used As Weapon

Richard Ben-Veniste, 9/11 Commission panelist, asks General Richard Myers, Joint Chiefs of Staff, whether they were made aware in 2001 that Al Qaeda were to use aircraft as weapons.
38
Nobody Read That Cable In The March Timeframe
0:46

Nobody Read That Cable In The March Timeframe

From the Joint Inquiry, Carl Levin asks the infamous question to CIA director, George Tenet, whether the information pertaining to Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi entering the United States on US visas. To which Tenet replied nobody read that cable. 2 years later. it was reported that over 50 agents from CIA had indeed read that cable.
39
NORAD Was Not Certain Country Was Under Attack After WTC 2 Hit
1:24

NORAD Was Not Certain Country Was Under Attack After WTC 2 Hit

From the 9/11 Commission, panelist, John Lehman, asks Major General Larry Arnold (NORAD) whether he thought after the airplane impact of the South Tower (WTC 2) the country was under an attack.
40
NORAD Probably Could Not Have Shot Down Flight 77
1:22

NORAD Probably Could Not Have Shot Down Flight 77

9/11 Commission co-chair, Lee Hamilton and panelist, Richard Ben-Veniste, question Major General Larry Arnold (NORAD) if defense jets from Andrews Air Fierce Base would have been able to shoot down American Airlines Flight 77 and if so, who gave the authority for the shoot down.
41
NORAD Was Aware Of Bin Laden Fatwa In February 1998
1:21

NORAD Was Aware Of Bin Laden Fatwa In February 1998

From the 9/11 Commission, Tim Roemer, questions Major General of the Continental US NORAD Region, Larry Arnold. The question surrounds whether NORAD had received briefings regarding Osama Bin Laden's fatwa against the United States and their interests abroad.
42
NYC Response To The Aftermath Of The Collapses Of The WTC Towers Were Exemplary
2:29

NYC Response To The Aftermath Of The Collapses Of The WTC Towers Were Exemplary

From the 9/11 Commission, NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg, reads from a prepared statement on the response of emergency workers and first responders to the scene of the towers collapse zone.
43
Report Of A Gun On American Airlines Flight 11
1:55

Report Of A Gun On American Airlines Flight 11

From the 9/11 Commission, panelist, Fred Feilding, inquiries about a report from the FAA operations center, of a gun being used on American Airlines Flight 11. Bogdan Dzakovic, TSA Civil Aviation Inspector, remarks that the early reports of a gun being used on Flight 11 originated from a "credible source". It is asserted that the person being shot was Israel terrorism special forces, Daniel Lewin, and that 9/11 hijacker, Satam al-Susqami, was the one who had shot him.
44
Richard Clarke's Criticisms Of The Clinton & Bush Administrations Regarding Al Qaeda In Afghanistan
1:32

Richard Clarke's Criticisms Of The Clinton & Bush Administrations Regarding Al Qaeda In Afghanistan

From the 9/11 Commission, panelist Tim Roemer, inquiries to former Clinton-Bush Counter-terrorism czar, Richard Clarke, why he was so openly critical in regards to the Clinton and Bush administrations and how they ignored the Al Qaeda problem in Afghanistan.
45
Richard Clarke's Delinda Plan Not Acted On By Bush Officials
1:49

Richard Clarke's Delinda Plan Not Acted On By Bush Officials

From the 9/11 Commission, panelist James Thompson, asks Bush National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, about the Richard Clarke offering an outline to Rice regarding the plan to eliminate Al Qaeda in Afghanistan called the "Delinda Plan".
46
What Was The Status Regarding Boxcutters At FAA Before Sept 11th 2001
1:27

What Was The Status Regarding Boxcutters At FAA Before Sept 11th 2001

Co-chair of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean, asks the Transportation Secretary, Norman Mineta, about the FAA guidelines regarding boxcutters before and on September 11th 2001.
47
What Specific Reason Was There To Not Put Khalid al-Mihdhar & Nawaf al-Hazmi On CIA Watchlist
1:04

What Specific Reason Was There To Not Put Khalid al-Mihdhar & Nawaf al-Hazmi On CIA Watchlist

From the Joint House Inquiry, panelist, Carl Levin, asks the DCI of CIA, George Tenet, what was the specific reason for not putting two known Al Qaeda terrorists, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, on the CIA's terrorist watchlist.
48
Were Officials Notified Of Khalid al-Mihdhar & Nawaf al-Hazmi Entry Into The US
1:42

Were Officials Notified Of Khalid al-Mihdhar & Nawaf al-Hazmi Entry Into The US

Richard Barr, panelist from the Joint House Inquiry, asks Tom Wilshire, who is behind a partition and is the former Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Issue Station, were officials notified of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi's plans to enter the United States. Wilshire would go on to state that the information cable was simply "missed" at the station, but in reality, it was read by FBI agents Mark Rossini and Doug Miller as well as over 50 other case officers and management from CIA.
49
Where Is Homeland Security Getting Their Strategic & Tactical Analysis From
4:02

Where Is Homeland Security Getting Their Strategic & Tactical Analysis From

Tim Roemer, 9/11 Commission panelist, asks Robert Bonner, Customs & Border Protection Commissioner, where does the Department of Homeland Security receive their strategic analysis from?
50
Whose Responsibility Is It To Track Khalid al-Mihdhar & Nawaf al-Hazmi While In The United States
1:46

Whose Responsibility Is It To Track Khalid al-Mihdhar & Nawaf al-Hazmi While In The United States

Richard Burr, panelist from the Joint Inquiry Into 9/11, asks Michael Rolnice, FBI Special Agent, about whose responsibility was it to track Khalid al-Mihdhar & Nawaf al-Hazmi while they were living inside the United States.
51
Why Put The OEM In WTC 7 Nearby Previous Terrorist Attack Of 1993
2:49

Why Put The OEM In WTC 7 Nearby Previous Terrorist Attack Of 1993

Tim Roemer, 9/11 Commission panelist, asks Richard Sheirer, former director of Office of Emergency Management (OEM), why would they build the OEM office directly inside the nerve center of one of the most targeted buildings in the United States, the World Trade Center.
1 comment
52
Why Was There No Accountability Or Resignation For The Failures Leading Up To Attacks
1:49

Why Was There No Accountability Or Resignation For The Failures Leading Up To Attacks

From the 9/11 Commission, panleist, Tim Roemer, asks Bush National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, why there were no firings, resignations or any accountability within the White House in the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks.
53
Why Didn't The CIA Inform Anyone About al-Mihdhar & al-Hazmi Leaving For Bangkok Into US
2:07

Why Didn't The CIA Inform Anyone About al-Mihdhar & al-Hazmi Leaving For Bangkok Into US

Tim Roemer, 9/11 Commission panelist, asks Cofer Black, CIA CTC Director, why didn't anyone from CIA inform the FBI or State Department about the arrival of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi into the United States.

After 15 Months The FBI Unaware Of Khalid al-Mihdhar & Nawaf al-Hazmi Information

Save
1 year ago
2
News 9/11

The CIA were aware of two known Al Qaeda operatives, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, were inside the United States and who were involved in a high level Al Qaeda summit meeting in Malaysia. However, the CIA with held this information from the FBI even during a June 2001 meeting between a CIA CTC officer and an FBI terrorism analyst in Washington DC. This excerpt is from Carl Levin from the Joint House Inquiry.

Loading comments...