I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. This section of the report concentrates on the intelligence community data which the IG report puts in chronological order before the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks. There are eight major data points reported by the IG, including the first cable regarding al-Mihdhar in Malaysia, the discussion between CIA and FBI employees about Malaysia meetings, cables regarding al-Hazmi’s travel to the United States and the OIG findings regarding the FBI’s knowledge about Khalid al-Mihdhar and the Malaysia summit meetings held by major Al Qaeda leadership and their affiliate, Jemmah Islamiyyah, which are a Salafist group based in Indonesia. The FBI OIG found that the CIA did not share significant pieces of this information with the FBI and that al-Mihdhar had a U.S. visa and that al-Hazmi had traveled to Los Angeles. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Five, Part Three (Factual chronology regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. This section of the report concentrates on the intelligence community data regarding two Al Qaeda operatives, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi while in San Diego, California. This section of the report covers both al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi entering the United States thru Los Angeles, their connection to a Saudi government employee, Omar al-Bayoumi, their association with an FBI asset beginning in May 2000 and information gleaned from the FBI asset. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Five, Part Three (Khalid al-Mihdhar & Nawaf al-Hazmi In San Diego

In this section of the report, I read from the The FBI Office Of The Inspector General Report, Chapter Five, Chapter Two, Section C: FBI detailers to the CIA Counterterrorist Center. This area details the FBI agents tasked to the CIA's Counter-terrorism center unit, Bin Laden Issue Station "Alec Station". A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, the report describes background information relevant to the interactions between the CIA and the FBI and the ways in which they exchanged intelligence. The chapter begins with a discussion of the CIA’s authority and mission, organization, forms of communications, and ways in which the CIA passed intelligence to the FBI. It also discusses the role of the FBI’s employees who were “detailed” to work at the CIA. The section im reading from is Chapter Five: Two September 11 Hijackers: Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi: Chapter 2 Part B: Background on the CIA. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Five: Two September 11 Hijackers: Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi: Chapter 2 Part B: Background on the CIA

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, the report describes the third potential opportunity for the FBI to acquire information about Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar which occurred in January 2001, when a joint FBI/CIA source identified an al Qaeda operative (Khallad) in photographs of the January 2000 Malaysia meetings that Hazmi and Mihdhar had attended. However, the FBI has asserted that it did not learn of the source’s identification of the al Qaeda operative at the Malaysia meetings until much later in 2001, just before the September 11 attacks. This section of the report describes the events surrounding this third opportunity for the FBI to focus on Hazmi and Mihdhar. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Five, Part Three (Mihdhar’s Association With Khallad, The Purported Mastermind Of The Cole Attack: Background)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, by mid-2000, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) personnel arranged for FBI Legal Attaché (Legat) Office personnel overseas to meet a source who had substantial information on Bin Laden and his operatives and operations. Beginning in 2000, the CIA and FBI began to debrief the source on a regular basis. Over the course of several months, the source frequently was shown photographs and asked to identify people in them. The source described an individual known as “Khallad” as a trusted senior Bin Laden operative with potential connections to the East African embassy bombings. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Five, Part Three (Mihdhar’s Association With Khallad, The Purported Mastermind Of The Cole Attack: Source’s identification Of Khallad)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, the Office of the Inspector General concluded that the evidence shows that the FBI was not made aware that during the early January 2001 debriefing the source identified Khallad in the photographs of the Malaysia meetings. Due to the OIG’s lack of complete access to CIA employees and documents, we were unable to fully examine why the CIA did not inform the New York agents that the source had identified Khallad in the Kuala Lumpur photographs at the early January debriefing. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Five, Part Three (OIG Conclusions Regarding Whether The FBI Was Aware Of The Source’s Identification Of Khallad In The Kuala Lumpur Photograph)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, the Office of the Inspector General discusses the meeting between FBI and CIA at the New York FBI Office to discuss the Cole investigation. Toward the end of the meeting, FBI agent Margaret Gillespie (in the OIG report she is Donna) produced three Kuala Lumpur surveillance photographs and asked the agents if they recognized Fahad al-Quso in any of the photographs. "Donna" said she told the agents that the photographs had been taken in Malaysia around the Millennium. "Donna" said she provided Khalid al-Mihdhar’s name to at least some of the agents present. A New York agent tentatively identified one of the pictured individuals as al-Quso, but he could not make a definitive identification. This caused some participants to question whether the CIA were intentionally with holding information relating to the Al Qaeda Kuala Lumpur Meeting. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Five, Part Four (FBI And CIA Discussions About The Cole investigation In May And June 2001: June 11,2001)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, the fifth and final opportunity for the FBI to locate Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi occur in late August 2001, when it was informed that Mihdhar and Hazmi had traveled to the United States. The FBI learned in August 2001 that Mihdhar had entered the United States in July 2001 and that Mihdhar and Hazmi had previously traveled together to the United States in January 2000. On August 29, the FBI began an investigation to locate Mihdhar, but it did not assign great urgency or priority to the investigation. The New York FBI criminal agents who wanted to participate in the investigation were specifically prohibited from doing so because of concerns about the wall and the procedures to keep criminal and intelligence investigations separate. The FBI did not locate Mihdhar before the September 11 attacks. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section E (Continuing Review Of The Malaysia Meetings In July And August 2001)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, On August 21, Mary (Margaret Gillespie) located the CIA cables referencing Nawaf al-Hazmi’s travel to the United States on January 15, 2000. Mary checked with a U.S. Customs Service representative to the CTC about Hazmi’s and Mihdhar’s travel. She discovered that Mihdhar had entered the United States on July 4, 2001, and had not departed. In addition, she confirmed that Hazmi had traveled to the United States in January 2000. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section E (Discovery Of Khalid al-Mihdhar’s Entry Into The United States)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, On August 23, Donna (Dina Corsi) contacted her supervisor, an SSA who we call “Rob,” regarding the information about Khalid al-Mihdhar’s travel to the United States. As discussed in Chapter Three, Rob was the acting Unit Chief of the UBLU at the time. After reviewing the information, Rob concurred with Donna that the appropriate course of action would be to open an intelligence investigation in New York, Mihdhar’s last known destination in the United States, to locate Mihdhar. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section E (The FBI’s Intelligence Investigation On Khalid al-Mihdhar)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, On August 29, 2001, the FBI’s New York Field Office opened a full field intelligence investigation to locate Mihdhar. The investigation was assigned to a Special Agent who we call “Richard.” Richard was a relatively inexperienced agent, who had recently been transferred to the Bin Laden squad.252 This was Richard’s first intelligence investigation. Richard told the OIG that on August 30, he received a telephone call from Donna in reference to the investigation. He said that Donna said the goal of the intelligence investigation was to locate and identify Mihdhar for a potential interview. According to Richard, Donna did not indicate the investigation was an emergency or identify any other exigent circumstance. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section E (The New York Field Office’s Investigation)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, there were at least five opportunities for the FBI to have learned about Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, including their connection to the purported mastermind of the Cole attack and their presence in the United States, well before the September 11 attacks. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section F (Summary Of The Five Opportunities For The FBI To Learn About Mihdhar And Hazmi)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, the discussion involves the FBI detailees to the CTC who had access to CIA cable traffic and could read the cables that discussed Khalid al-Mihdhar’s U.S. visa, the surveillance of the meetings of al Qaeda operatives in Malaysia, Nawaf al-Hazmi’s subsequent travel to the United States, and the Khallad identification from the Kuala Lumpur photographs. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section F (Use Of FBI Detailees)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, the discussion involves the FBI detailees to the CTC who had access to CIA cable traffic and could read the cables that discussed Khalid al-Mihdhar’s U.S. visa, the surveillance of the meetings of al Qaeda operatives in Malaysia, Nawaf al-Hazmi’s subsequent travel to the United States, and the Khallad identification from the Kuala Lumpur photographs. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section 3 ( Inadequate Procedures For Documenting Receipt Of CIA Information)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, the discussion involves the gaps in the information sharing process that were exacerbated by FBI personnel’s lack of understanding of the CIA’s reporting process. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section 3 (FBI Employees Lack Of Understanding Of CIA Reporting Process)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, the discussion involves information sharing with the FBI which was impeded by the inadequate facilities for the handling of intelligence information in the two field offices most directly involved in the Hazmi/Mihdhar matter. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section 4: (Lack Of Appropriate Infrastructure In FBI Field Offices)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, the discussion involves information sharing with the FBI which was impeded by the inadequate facilities for the handling of intelligence information in the two field offices most directly involved in the Hazmi/Mihdhar matter. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section 4: (The San Diego FBI’s Preliminary Investigation Of Omar al-Bayoumi)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, the FBI Office of the Inspector General review of the Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar chronology revealed no appreciable shift in resources by the FBI’s San Diego Field Office in response to these changed priorities. Because there were no changes in the San Diego FBI priorities regarding international and counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda's presence in the city went unnoticed, even thou some of them had lived quite openly. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section 4: (San Diego FBI’s Failure To Prioritize Counterterrorism Investigations)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, during the summer of 2001, the effect of the various restrictions within the FBI on information sharing – commonly referred to as “the wall” – had resulted in a nearly complete separation of intelligence and criminal investigations within the FBI regarding any information pertaining to Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section 4: (Restrictions On The Flow Of Information Within The FBI)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter, The IG discusses the walls which affected the FBI personnel’s discussions about the Khalid al-Mihdhar information at the June 11, 2001, meeting in New York and the FBI’s decision to open an investigation to locate al-Mihdhar in August 2001. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section 4: (The Effect Of The Wall On The FBI’s Attempts To Locate Khalid al-Mihdhar)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter summarizes the performance of individual FBI employees in the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter. While none of them committed misconduct, we believe that several FBI employees did not perform their duties as well as they could have and should have. We address in turn the FBI employees involved in each of the five lost opportunities. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section 4: (Individual Performances)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter summarizes the performance of individual FBI employees in the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter. While none of them committed misconduct, we believe that several FBI employees did not perform their duties as well as they could have and should have. We address in turn the FBI employees involved in each of the five lost opportunities. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section 4: (Individual Performances)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter summarizes the performance of individual FBI employees in the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter. While none of them committed misconduct, we believe that several FBI employees did not perform their duties as well as they could have and should have. We address in turn the FBI employees involved in each of the five lost opportunities. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section 4: (Individual Performances)

I read from the FBI's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report which was publicly released in June 2006. In this section of the chapter summarizes the performance of individual FBI employees in the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter. While none of them committed misconduct, we believe that several FBI employees did not perform their duties as well as they could have and should have. We address in turn the FBI employees involved in each of the five lost opportunities. The OIG also gives it's final conclusion on the matter. A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks: Chapter Three, Section 4: (Individual Performances & OIG Conclusions)