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How a Boeing 727 Was Stolen (And Never Found) We have heard that soneone hijacked an aeroplane but Have you ever heard that an aeroplane had been stolen from airport ? Yes, a massive Boeing 727 was stolen from a airport. Let's talk about it in details. This video was requested by our subscriber DOTTS. If you guys want to request any video then please let me know in the comment section down below. May 25 2003 Luanda, Angola It was 5 pm. Boeing 727 began taxing without communicating with ATC. And entered the runway. ATC tried to contact but there was no response. The aircraft took off and headed southwest towards the Atlancic Ocean. How did it happened? Two men boarded the Boeing 727 which had been grounded and sat idle at Luanda.But all of the passenger seats have been removed. And was outfitted to carry diesel fuel. One man was an American pilot and flight engineer, Ben C. Padilla. And the other was, John M. Mutantu, who was a hired mechanic from the Republic of the Congo. Both of them weren't certified to fly Boeing 727. As well ad Boeing 727 requires 3 crew members to fly. The aircraft was filled with 53000 liters of fuel. With that amount of fuel it could fly around 1500 miles. They tried to find the aircraft. But they were failed to find it. As well as those two men were disappeared with that aircraft. Immediately after its disappearance, American intelligence operators said "the plane mostly likely was taken for a criminal activities such as drugs or weapons smuggling. And it was not even 2 years aftet 9/11 attacks. So security agencies in the US were doubting about that as well. Theories One of the theory is that Padilla and Mutantu accidentally crashed the plane into the Atlantic Ocean. Padilla’s siblings added another twist here, that Padilla had said that if he was ever kidnapped, he would crash the plane into the ground or water. They suggested he and Mutantu may have been forced to steal the plane, and then killed. What if there had been a third person in the plane that no one outside noticed? This one is plausible because a Boeing 727-223 requires a three-person properly-trained crew to fly. Since Padilla had had access to the plane, it is likely he had let someone else in unnoticed. For 14 months, the plane had been grounded at the airport due to multiple paperwork problems. It had accrued over $4 million in airport fees alone and the leasee, TAAG Angola Airlines, didn’t look like they were ever going to pay. So the plane’s owner, Miami-based Aerospace Sales & Leasing, sent Padilla to Angola to repair the plane and fly it to Johannesburg. Aerospace’s owner, Maury Joseph, had found a buyer for the plane’s three engines in Johannesburg. Joseph got Padilla to steal it as part of an elaborate insurance fraud. In his defense about that claim, Joseph has always claimed he could not be paid because he couldn’t prove his plane was stolen. There was some context here; in the mid-1990s Joseph had been charged with fraud and was even banned from heading any company with shareholders. Faced with this new allegation of fraud, he offered himself up to the FBI for a lie-detector test.

1.Victims mobile phone ringing The relatives of passengers tried to call to the victims cell phone and it rang.This was claimed by 19 families. And the cellphone rang up to 4 days"How could it even possible that the plane is crashed and a cellphone survived? OK, for example even if the plane crashed and the cellphone survived, then how can it ring in the middle of the Indian ocean of course there is no network right?If it is really true then for sure the plane is not crashed. 2.The plane was heading for Kazakhstan. Just look at this map and the path of the plane. It shows that it is heading towards the boarder between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Thailand. Instantly after plane have been vanished , Malaysia asked to Kazakhstan to set up search operation. But it got sidelined because the rescue operation only focused on the Indian ocean. So it is possible that plane was crashed somewhere in Kazakhstan. 3. Depressurized cabin This is a new theory that when the plane was at its cruising altitude, the cabin depressurized while captain zaharie shah was using bathroom. And then co-pilot turned the aircraft towards Langkawi airport. Because co-pilot Fariq had earlier graduated from Langkawi Aerospace Flying Academy which was located just 700m from the runway.Just think about it why the plane suddenly turned left and headed towards Langkawi? Of course because he was familiar with that place and he tried to land plane there but because of lack of the oxygen, he suffered from hypoxia.When someone su from hypoxia then their brain someone unable to make clear decision.And at the same starvs of oxygen, rendering he tried to come back to cabin, he might not be able to reach. Then the plane kept travelling west and crashed into the Indian Ocean after running out of fuel.Captain couldn't come back to the cabin. 4.Cracks in the plane According to Malaysia airlines authorities, they found a 15 inch crack in the fuselage of one of its plane, days before MH370 disappeared.The Federal aviation adminstrator insist it issued a final warning two days before the disappearance. But the plane didn't receive any warning because it didn't have the same antenna as other 5.Hijacked for a huge mission like 9/11 Until now, we didn't find any wreckage from MH370. Yes Malaysian authorities told that they found some wreckage of the aircraft in the madagascar sea.But they aren't confident is it of MH370 or not.So the plane could have I been remotely hacked and flown to a secret location for planned mission. we lost 239 people in that incident but they taught a huge lesson to the humanity that we are not yet matured in our technology even we are talking about landing human on moon and mars, we are not yet safe in our own planet.

Panam 103 arrived at London Heathrow Airport from San Francisco. The crew parked the aircraft on stand Kilo 14. Many of the passengers for this flight had arrived from Frankfurt, on a Boeing 727. The passengers were transferred with their baggage to Pan am 103 which was to operate the scheduled Flight to, Michigan with the stopover at, New York. Passengers from other flights also joined Pan am 103 at Heathrow. Air Traffic controller cleared Fight 103 to push back and to taxi for runway 27R. The aircraft operating was a Boeing 747-121. It was the 15th 747 built. It was delivered in February 1970. The aircraft had completed a total of 72,464 flying hours in 16,497 flight cycles. 18.25 Flight 103 started its take-off roll from Heathrow for its destination New York. The flight was cleared to climb initially to FL120 and Subsequently to FL310. At 18:56, the aircraft leveled off at FL 310 and was above the borderline between England and Scotland. 19:03 Shanwick Oceanic Control transmitted the aircraft's oceanic clearance but it was silent on the other side. In Lockerbie, people heard a rumbling sound like thunder which rapidly increased to deafening proportions like the roar of a jet engine under power. The noise seems to come from a meteor-like object which was trailing flame and came down in the north-eastern part of the town. Two major portions of the wreckage of the aircraft fell on the town of Lockerbie; other large parts, including the flight deck and forward fuselage section, landed in the countryside to the east of the town. panam 103 passengers In totality, 270 souls perished. Onboard the aircraft were citizens of 21 countries, including 190 Americans. Among the Americans on board were 35 Syracuse University students flying home for Christmas after a semester abroad. On the ground, 11 residents were killed when the burning wings plunged into a neighborhood. Parents, grandparents, children as young as 2 months old, and college students returning home from a study abroad lost their lives. Investigation The air crash investigators reconstructed the fuselage. It revealed a 20-inch hole consistent with an explosion in the forward cargo hold. When they examined the baggage containers, it revealed that the container nearest the hole had blackening, pitting, and severe damage. This indicated a "high-energy event" that had taken place inside it. panam 103 disaster The investigators recovered the Fragments of a Samsonite suitcase in which they believed to have contained the bomb. Together they found parts and pieces of circuit board identified as components of a Toshiba 'Bombeat' RT-SF16, radio cassette player, FBI and Scottish authorities worked for hand in hand with the help of the British and American governments. In November 1991, they announced warrants for the arrests of Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah. The British and American governments charged Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah in the case. Their trial in 2000 was held in a Scottish court on a former U.S. military base in the Netherlands. The court acquitted Fhimah and convicted al-Megrahi in 2001, sentencing him to life in prison. He was released in 2009 when he was believed near death from cancer, but he survived almost three more years. On December 21, 2020, US Attorney General William Barr announced criminal charges against an alleged bombmaker. The former Libyan intelligence officer Abu Agela Mas'ud, Kheir Al-Marimi was charged in a criminal complaint. It was because he provided the suitcase with the prepared explosive that was later placed onboard flight 103.

Air Crash Investigation: Miami Air International 293 | A Boeing 737 crashed in Florida Miami Air International 293 was operating a military character flight. The aircraft was destined for Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida. 19:19 The Boeing 737-800 started its takeoff roll with its left thrust reverser inoperative. The takeoff, climb, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. The flight crew set up the approach to runway 10 in the flight management system and briefed setting the auto brake at level 2. 21:22 The Boeing 737 was descending through 13,000 feet which the first officer informed the control tower radar approach controller (RP) The weather was moderate-to-heavy precipitation with the wind from 350º at 4 knots. 21:25:45 The RP controller provided additional weather information to the flight crew. Moderate-to-heavy precipitation was present east and west of the airport. Then he asked the flight crew if they want to stay with the approach for runway 28. Captain “ah yes sir, what- whichever looks better an ah then when I get closer I check how it is.” 21:30 The precipitation was moving east. The RP controller advised the flight crew if they want to land on runway 10. Captain“yeah go ahead let’s do it.” When the Boeing 737 was 7 miles from the final approach fix, the RP controller cleared the flight for an approach to runway 10 and also confirmed with the RA controller that the flight was set up to land on runway 10. The captain called for the Landing checklist. FO “ah…speedbrakes ah armed, landing gear down three green, flaps thirty.” The Boeing 737 crossed the displaced threshold at an altitude of 140 ft Miami air 293 touchdown 1,580 ft past the displaced threshold. Maximum reverse thrust was commanded on the No. 2 engine. The speed brake handle was moved aft to 46° after 4 seconds from touchdown but the airplane did not decelerate. The Boeing 737 crossed the end of the runway and past the displaced threshold. After departing the paved surface, it impacted the seawall and ended up in the shallow water of the St. Johns River. The cabin went dark, and there was no communication from the flight crew. None of the 143 passengers and crew were seriously hurt, but several pets in the cargo hold died. Investigation A Boeing 737 was approaching runway 28. They encountered heavy rain as they began to descent and switched to runway 10 where the weather seemed better. Runway 10 was equipped with wire arresting gear, which essentially shortened the runway's effective length from about 9,000 feet to 7,800 feet. If they had landed on runway 28, they would have a longer runway to stop the aircraft. The approach was not stabilized. When the Boeing 737 was about 1 nm from the displaced threshold, its roll angle dipped to 12° right, and the airplane deviated to the right. This deviation reached 220 ft right of the runway centerline. This means the wind was strong. At this point, the crew did a mistake by not initiating a go-around. They could come back to land after going around or they could divert to another airport. Another mistake was, the captain failed to set the auto speed brakes. They even missed it in the landing checklist. Setting the speed brakes to "auto" would help the spoilers to deploy right after touchdown. Just before touching down, the speed of the Boeing 737 was 164 knots. Which was 11 knots above the nominal approach speed. Again the crew did the mistake by landing the aircraft above the required speed. Miami Air International failed to provide its flight crews with adequate guidance for evaluating braking conditions for landing on wet or contaminated runways. Proper estimates about the conditions would have prohibited the pilots from attempting the landing. The Air Crash Investigation team said that even without those mistakes, the plane would not have been able to stop on the ungrooved runway because of the amount of standing water.

Air India Flight 182 : Terror in the sky It was early morning when a Boeing 747 was approaching the west coast of Ireland. While cruising at an altitude of 31,000 feet, the plane disappeared from the ATC radar screen. The plane suffered a sudden decompression. It disintegrated and slammed into the Atlantic Ocean killing everyone on board. Investigation 22 June 1985 Vancouver International Airport 13:30 UTC A man named Manjit Singh checked in as M. Singh called to confirm his reservations on Flight 182. The agent refused his request because his seat from Toronto to Bombay was not confirmed. He insisted, but the agent again refused him. The man said, "Wait, I'll get my brother for you." As he started to walk away, she agreed to accept the bag. The agent checked his suitcase and transferred it to Air India Flight 181. CP Air Flight 60 departed for Toronto without Singh. Flight 60 arrived in Toronto. Some of the passengers and baggage, including the suitcase of M.Singh, had checked in and transferred to Flight 182. When the suitcase of M. Singh was passing through the machine, the sniffer was heard to beep. It beeped in a low volume. The officers did not inform Air India because they were not instructed on how to react to such a short beep. Investigators zeroed in on Inderjit Singh Reyat, Talwinder Singh Parmar, Ajaib Singh Bagri, and a man named Surjan Singh Gill. The search warrants were executed at the homes of suspects in November 1985. But the only charges laid were minor ones against Parmar and Reyat involving possession of explosives for the bomb tests. The charges against Parmar were later dropped, while Reyat received a $2,000 fine for possessing explosives. How the plan was executed? Parmar was the founder of Babbar Khalsa. It was a militant Sikh extremist group. The organization aimed to create the independent Republic of Khalistan in what is now India’s Punjab State. In 1981, India charged Parmar with murdering a policeman, which forced him to flee back to Canada. There, he visited Inderjit Singh Reyat, who was an auto mechanic and electrician living on Vancouver Island. Parmar asked Reyat to construct a bomb. 8 May 1985 Reyat bought a Micronta digital automobile clock from a store in Duncan. After a week, he returned to the store to buy an electrical relay to get the buzzer signal to power another device. During that time, Wiretappers recorded nine phone calls between Reyat and Parmar's residence. Due to this activity, the government added Reyat to the list of persons being monitored for terrorist activities. Later he visited a television repair shop, seeking help for a partially disassembled car clock wired to a lantern battery. The next day, he purchased a Sanyo component tuner and left his name and telephone number on the charge slip. He also bought smokeless gunpowder from a sporting goods store, signing "I. Reyat" on the explosives log. June 4, 1985 CSIS agents followed Parmar, where he was watching a test explosion. The person who demonstrated the experimental device was Inderjit Singh Reyat. Johal was suspected of involvement in several aspects of these bombings. The number of his former home was used while purchasing tickets for the two terrorists who carried out the attack. Johal was spotted at Vancouver International Airport by his fellow Sikhs whose families perished in the air disaster. When the investigators studied the debris from Narita. They found the bomb had been housed inside a Sanyo tuner with a serial number matching a model sold only in British Columbia and used a Micronta clock as a timer, which powered a relay with a 12-volt battery to trigger blasting caps to set off a high explosive consistent with sticks of dynamite, all matching items purchased by Reyat. Parmar returned to India and was killed in a gunfight with Punjab Police on 15 October 1992. He has later named the mastermind of the 1985 bombing. On November 15, 2002, Johal died of natural causes at the age of 55. Reyat moved his family to England in 1986. Later he was charged and extradited to Canada and convicted of manslaughter in the Narita bombing. He received a 10 year sentence. In June 2001 Reyat was charged with the Air India deaths and on Feb. 10, 2003, he pleaded guilty. He was released to a halfway house in 2016 and has now been fully released with some restrictions since early 2017. #AirIndia AI182 #Airplane #Aircraft #Boeing #Aircrash

Ethiopian airlines ET302: How pilots struggled to save the plane 05:39:55, They disengaged autopilot. 05:39:57 the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems. At 05:40:00 The AoA sensor sent the information to the planes computer that the aircraft is going to be stalled. Then the anti stalling system pushes the nose down for 9.0 seconds and the aircraft descended slightly. 05:40:03 The aircraft lost the altitude then the Ground Proximity Warning System alerted. 05:40:05, the First-Officer requested runway heading to the ATC. From 05:40:23 to 05:40:31, because the aircraft lost altitude three times then Ground Proximity Warning System alerted. 05:40:27, The captain was in control so he advised the First-Officer to trim up with him. 05:40:44, The aircraft was diving so three times the Captain called “Pull-up” and the First-Officer acknowledged. 05:40:50, They were having problem with the flight control. So the Captain told the First Officer to advise ATC that they would like to maintain 14,000 ft. Captain also told the first officer to inform about the flight control problem. At 05:40:56, The request was approved by the ATC. 05:40:42 to 05:43:11 The left airspeed increased from 305 kt to 340 kt At the same time The right airspeed was approximately 20-25 kt higher than the left. 05:41:20, the right overspeed clacker was recorded on CVR. It remained active until the end of the recording. 05:41:21, the selected altitude was changed from 32000 ft to 14000 ft. At 05:41:30, the Captain requested the First-Officer to pitch up with him and the fo acknowledged. At 05:41:32, the left overspeed warning activated. At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. Then the First-Office replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working. 05:42:10, the Captain asked and the First-Officer requested radar control a vector to return and ATC approved. 05:42:30, ATC instructed ET-302 to turn right heading 260 degrees and the First-Officer acknowledged. 05:42:43, the selected heading was changed to 262 degrees. At 05:42:54, both pilots called out “left alpha vane”. The meaning of Alfa vane is AOA vane. 05:43:04, the Captain asked the First Officer to pitch up together and said that pitch is not enough. At 05:43:20, The aircraft began pitching nose down.Pilots tried it to pull up but the nose down pitch continues, which reached 40° nose down. The left Indicated Airspeed increased, eventually reaching approximately 458 kts and the right Indicated Airspeed reached 500 kts. The last recorded altitude was 5,419 ft on the left and 8,399 ft on the right.

A Chinese airliner with 132 people on board has crashed in the southern province of Guangxi, erupting in a horror fireball across a mountain. The China Eastern Airlines Boeing 737 plummeted rapidly then appeared to have smashed into the hillside near the city of Wuzhou in Teng county. Local media reported rescuers had been dispatched but there was no immediate confirmation of the numbers of dead and injured. Shocking CCTV footage emerged on social media supposedly showing the jet racing vertically towards the ground in the moments before the smash. The plane, flight number MU5735 from Kunming to Guangzhou, is believed to be a Boeing 737-89P, not part of the MAX series which has been dogged by problems in recent years. #china #boeing737

Pakistan International Airlines Flight 8303 was preparing for its regular commercial passenger flight to Jinnah International Airport, Karachi. On board the flight were 91 passengers and 8 crew members. Among them were a Captain, a First Officer, and 6 flight attendants. Flight 8303 took off from Lahore for its 90 minutes journey to Karachi. The en-route part of the flight was uneventful. Area Control of Karachi cleared the flight for arrival procedure and advised to expect ILS approach for runway 25L. When the aircraft was over MAKLI, the crew contacted Karachi Approach and got clearance to descend 3000 ft. To manage the descent and lose the additional height, the crew disconnected the autopilot and selected “OPEN DES” mode via the FCU. Speed brakes were extended. ATC: sir orbit is available But the aircraft continued its descent. Again the approach controller advised the crew to discontinue the approach, but the crew did not follow. Now the aircraft intercepted the localizer as well as the glide slope. Flaps 1 were selected at 243 knots. For better understanding, Approach control cannot see the aircraft in the air, but they can follow them on their radar displays while Towers handle all takeoff, landing, and ground traffic because they are on the top and can see the aircraft. This time the aircraft was communicating with Karachi Approach. For landing, the crew should contact to Tower but they did not. Instead Karachi Approach sought telephonic landing clearance from tower. Without observing the abnormality that the landing gears were not extended. The tower conveyed a landing clearance of the aircraft to Karachi Approach. The aircraft touched the runway surface on its engines. Flight crew applied reverse engine power and initiated a braking action. Both engines scrubbed the runway at various locations causing damage to both of them. The Tower observed the scrubbing of engines with the runway but did not convey this abnormality to the aircraft and instead conveyed to the “Karachi Approach” on telephone. “Karachi Approach” also did not relay this abnormality to the flight crew. The landing was discontinued and a go-around was executed. Both engines failed one by one. Ram Air Turbine was deployed to power the essential systems. The aircraft was unable to maintain required height due to engine complications. The aircrew declared the emergency situation that both engines were lost, and transmitted a “Mayday Call”. The plane crashed in Model Colony, a densely populated residential area of Karachi, just 1340 meters short of runway 25L. 98 people perished including 1 on the ground. Miraculously, 2 people on the plane and 7 on the ground survived with injuries. Investigation The investigation is being conducted by Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Pakistan with the cooperation of Airbus,National Transportation Safety Board United States and Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety France. The preliminary report was published on 22 June 2020. According to the report, the air traffic controller on duty and flight crew's actions were reported to have been contributing factors which ultimately caused the crash. In the report, the Captain was cited as being "overconfident". As well as the report suggest that during the approach, the pilots were preoccupied in a non-operational conversation about the COVID-19 pandemic. This was just a preliminary report. Right now, It is not ok to blame someone for the accident. There might be some technical difficulties in the aircraft. The aircraft remained on ground for 46 days during Covid 19 quarantine, due to restrictions on flying operations. The maintenance records within that 46 days need to be checked to ensure that the aircraft was air worthy. #PIA #flight8303 #pia8303 #aircrash #planecrash #aviation #airplane

A Bombardier Q400 was preparing for its regular passenger flight. The flight was destined for Buffalo Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York. Onboard the flight were 45 passengers and 4 crew members. Among the passengers were Two Canadian, one Chinese, one Israeli, and 41 American. All four crew members were American. The crew turned on the pitot static deicing equipment before take off. Then ATC cleared the aircraft for take-off for its 53 minutes flight to Buffalo, New York. The crew turned on the propeller and airframe deice equipment during the climb. The cruise portion of the flight was routine and uneventful. The captain instructed the first officer to get discretion to twelve thousand feet. Less than 1 minute later, a controller from Cleveland Center cleared the flight to descend 11,000 feet. The first officer made initial contact with Buffalo approach control and informed that the flight was descending to 11,000 feet. Then the approach controller provided the altimeter setting and told the crew to plan an ILS approach to runway 23. The captain began the approach briefing. During that time, ATC cleared the flight crew to descend and maintain 6,000 feet. The airplane descended through 10,000 feet. From that point on, the flight crew was required to observe the sterile cockpit rule. The sterile cockpit rule is a procedural requirement that during critical phases of flight, only activities required for the safe operation of the aircraft may be carried out by the flight crew, and all non-essential activities in the cockpit are forbidden. The approach controller cleared the flight crew to descend and maintain 5,000 and 4,000 feet, respectively. Then the captain and the first officer began talking about unnecessary things unrelated to their flying duties. Here's some of their conversation: The approach controller cleared the flight crew to descend and maintain 2,300 feet, which was acknowledged by the first officer. Afterward, while the captain and the first officer performed their duties, they were still having an unnecessary conversation not related to flying duties. Thereon, the approach controller cleared the flight crew to turn left onto a heading of 260° and maintain 2,300 feet until established on the localizer for the ILS runway 23. The captain began to slow the airplane less than 3 miles from the outer marker to establish the appropriate airspeed before landing. The propeller condition levers moved forward to their maximum RPM position. The pitch trim in the airplane-nose-up direction was applied by AP. The control columns moved aft and the engine power levers were advanced. The airplane pitched up; rolled to the left, reaching a roll angle of 45° left wing down, and rolled to the right. As the airplane rolled to the right through wings level, the stick pusher activated. The airspeed decreased to about 100 knots. The roll angle reached 105° right wing down and the plane began to roll back to the left. The airplane’s pitch and roll angles reached about 25° airplane nose down and 100° right wing down and it entered a steep descent. The plane crashed into a house killing all 49 occupants onboard. The impact killed a person inside the house as well. Investigation report: The investigation was done by NTSB United States. According to them, the icing on the aircraft was most likely a key contributing factor, with weather reports indicating icy conditions with light snow at the time of the crash. They added that the probable cause of the crash was the captain's inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew's failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the low-speed cue, (2) the flight crew's failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain's failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air's inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions. #aircrash #CJC3407 #colganair #planecrash #aircrashdocumentary #bombardier

A Boeing 737-800 was scheduled for its passenger flight to Norman Manley International Airport Jamaica with the stopover at Miami. The flight took off from Washington and landed at Miami without any notable events. 20:22 Flight 331 departed Miami on a scheduled flight. During the approach briefing, they decided on the straight in approach to runway 12. They had 2 options for landing. Straight in and land on 12 or circle to land on runway 30. They decided to land on 12 with a tailwind, rather than doing a circling approach to runway 30 with a low ceiling. 22:14 The Approach controller cleared the flight to maintain four thousand feet, and on reaching KEYNO cleared for a straight-in ILS approach runway 12, and advised that the wind was now 320 degrees at 15 knots. The crew acknowledged and the Approach controller asked if the crew had understood that the wind was 320 degrees at 15 knots, asking them if they were still able to make a straight-in approach to runway 12. The crew responded that they had received the wind and could make the straight-in approach to runway 12. The captain maintained visual contact with the runway throughout the approach. They were still receiving rain. The first officer was monitoring the tailwind and the tailwind component was dropping as they descended to the final approach fix. At about 550 feet, the captain disconnected the autopilot while leaving the autothrottle engaged. The localizer of the ILS runway 12 was offset three degrees north of the runway track, so it did not bring the landing traffic to the touchdown point, so the pilots using the ILS had to transition to approach and make a very slight left turn to line up with the runway centerline. At about 500 feet, the captain aligned the aircraft with the runway centerline. The aircraft made a shallow right turn from the ILS localizer then a left turn to the track to the runway, and continued the approach, crossing the runway threshold at about 70 feet RA. The aircraft touchdown at 4,100 feet down the runway. The spoilers deployed on the first touchdown. Then the aircraft bounced once and landed again 200 feet down the runway. The plane was 4,600 feet down the runway. Then the crew activated autobrake 3. The first officer applied the reverse thrust but the plane was not slowing down. The captain overrode the auto brake system, applying maximum manual braking on the brake pedals, and selected maximum reverse thrust. He was joined by the first officer simultaneously applying maximum manual braking on the brake pedals. The aircraft exited the runway at 62 knots ground speed and came to rest on the sandy and rocky shoreline area. The cockpit was dark, and the crew completed the emergency evacuation checklist. There was no post-crash fire. The aircraft was destroyed, its fuselage broken into three sections,while the left landing gear collapsed. The right engine and landing gear were torn off, the left wingtip was badly damaged and the right-wing fuel tanks were ruptured, leaking jet fuel onto the beach sand. One hundred and thirty-four passengers suffered a minor injury, while 14 were seriously injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond economic repair and was written off. Investigation The investigation was done by Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority. According to investigators the most probable cause of this accident was that the aircraft touched down 4,100 feet beyond the threshold, and could not be stopped on the remaining runway. The pilots decision to land on a wet runway in a 14 knot tailwind, their reduced situational awareness, and failure to conduct a go-around after the aircraft floated longer than usual contributed to the accident.

An ATR-72 operated by TransAsia was on its regular passenger flight to Magong Airport, Taiwan. Onboard the aircraft were 54 passengers and 4 crew members. The aircraft operating was an ATR 72-500. It first flew on 14 June 2000 and was delivered to TransAsia Airways on 6 July 2000. The aircraft had flown 27,039 hours in 40,387 flight cycles. The flight was scheduled to depart at 16:00 but was delayed due to typhoon Matmo. The en-route part of the flight was uneventful. Magong Airport had a single runway designated as runway 02/20. Runway 02 was equipped with an instrument landing system and a landing visibility limitation for this runway was 800 meters. Runway 20 was equipped with a VOR non-precision approach system with a landing visibility limitation of 1,600 meters. The weather conditions at Magong Airport were poor. According to the aerodrome routine meteorological report, the weather conditions range from the wind of 220 degrees at 17 knots gusting to 27 knots with visibility of 800 meters in heavy thunderstorms with rain. The cloud coverage was scattered at 200 feet, broken at 600 feet with few cumulonimbi at 1,200 feet, and overcast at 1,600 feet. 18:11:17 The aircraft approached Penghu Island. Kaohsiung Ground Control informed the flight crew that the weather conditions at Magong Airport were below landing minima. Because of that, the plane was radar vectored by ATC to enter the hold. Including flight 222, there was a total of four aircraft in the hold waiting for an approach clearance for Magong runway 20. 18:27:38 Still, the visibility was 800 meters. The landing visibility limitation for runway 20 was 1,600 meters. The crew discussed the visibility and tailwind landing limitations for runway 02, which looked better at that time. Then they requested radar vectors for the runway 02 ILS approach. While the flight crew was waiting for the runway 02 ILS approach clearance, the visibility for runway 20 had improved to 1,600 meters. Then the crew of flight 222 requested the runway 20 VOR approach. The approach controller issued radar vectors to the crew and assigned them a lower altitude. 18:55:10 Flight 222 was cleared for the runway 20 VOR approach. The aircraft descended to and maintained 2,000 feet for a while. Shortly before overflying the final approach fix, the aircraft started to descend from 2,000 feet to the crew selected altitude of 400 feet. Now, the selected altitude was reset to 200 feet and the aircraft kept descending. The minimum descent altitude for the Magong runway 20 approach was 330 feet. The flight crew did not discuss the MDA before continuing the approach. The aircraft descended below the MDA. The captain disengaged the autopilot and began flying the aircraft manually. While the crew was trying to locate the runway, the altitude, course, and attitude of the aircraft started to deviate from the intended settings. Both engine power levers were advanced. The aircraft hit the foliage 850 meters northeast of the runway 20 threshold. Due to the high-impact forces and post-impact fire, the aircraft was destroyed. Among 58 persons on board, all 4 crew members and 44 passengers sustained fatal injuries. Nine passengers sustained serious injuries and one passenger sustained minor injuries. Five residents on the ground sustained minor injuries. Investigation Report The crash was the result of CFIT, that is, an airworthy aircraft under the control of the flight crew was flown unintentionally into terrain with limited awareness by the crew of the aircraft’s proximity to terrain. The crew continued the approach below the MDA when they were not visual with the runway. The investigation report identified a range of contributing factors relating to the flight crew of the aircraft. TransAsia's flight operations and safety management processes, the communication of weather information to the flight crew, coordination issues at civil/military joint-use airport, and the regulatory oversight of TransAsia by the CAA.

The aircraft crashed into the Bwabwata National Park. Search and Rescue was instituted but could not locate the accident site the same day of the crash due to bad weather that developed in the region. The Search and Rescue team only managed to locate the accident site on 30 November 2013 at around 8 amn, in Bwabwata National Park. Due to the high rate of impact with terrain and post- impact fire, the aircraft was totally destroyed and there were no survivors.

Air India Express was operating its air india vande bharat mission flight to Calicut International Airport, Kerala, India. Onboard the flight was 184 passengers and 6 crew members. The aircraft was specially designed for a short-field performance package that allows operators to fly increased payload in and out of airports with runways less than 5,000 feet long. It first flew on 15 November 2006 and was operated by Air India Express since then. The copilot was the pilot monitoring. He obtained the weather of Calicut and alternate airfields. The departure fuel from Dubai was uplifted for Tiruchirappalli, which was the farthest alternate airfield. However, the latest weather update showed that even the closer airfields to Calicut like Cochin and Coimbatore had suitable weather. Calicut airfield was under two concurrent ‘Aerodrome Warnings’ at this time. The first warning was for TSRA and the second warning was for wind speed exceeding 17 kt. Due to these two warnings, a ‘Weather Standby’ was declared by DATCO and the Crash Fire Tenders were specially positioned at ‘Pre-Determined Points’ along the runway. 13:41 UTC The air india flight was cleared for descending to 3600 ft. Then it was cleared for ILS approach to runway 28. The flight was established on the localizer for runway 28. ATC cleared the aircraft to land with reported visibility of 2000m and a trend decreasing to 1500m, winds 280/05 kt in light rain and runway surface wet. Visual contact with the lead-in, lights were confirmed by both the pilots. The wiper on the Captain's side stopped working. The air india express 1344 continued on ILS approach for runway 28 to the prescribed Decision Altitude and then carried out a missed approach as per company SOP on not being able to sight the runway at minimums. The PM completed the After Take-off Checklist while climbing through 3800 ft. Thereafter he sought clearance from Captain to again set up the FMC for ILS approach runway 28. The captain agreed after a slight hesitation. Around the same time, a departing aircraft of Air India requested ATC for permission to depart from Runway 10 although the runway in use was runway 28 owing to the prevailing winds. ATC accepted the request and immediately changed the active runway from runway 28 to runway 10. The DATCO then inquired from Flight 1344 whether they too would like to use runway 10 for arrival, which the captain accepted. The aircraft stopped climb and leveled out at 7000 ft. Then windshield wiper was switched on but the speed of the wiper on the captain's side was slower than the selected speed. At 500 ft AGL the AP was disengaged while the AT remained engaged. The approach soon became unstabilized. The air india 1344 crossed the runway threshold at RA of 92 ft and continued to float above the runway. The plane touched down at 4438 ft on the 8858 ft long runway. AXB 1344 exited the end of the runway at a ground speed of 84.5 Kt and then overshot the RESA, broke the ILS antennae and the fence before plummeting down the tabletop runway. There was no post-accident fire. The impact caused the aircraft to separate into three sections and resulted in 21 fatalities including both pilots. The air india express crash investigation was done by AAIB India. Air Crash Investigation team found the probable cause was the captain, who was a pilot flying, failed to follow standard operating procedures. The captain continued an unstabilized approach and landed halfway down the runway. Even the first officer called for a go-around, the captain did not listen to him. They added that the FO was failed to take over the controls and execute a go-around himself.

A Boeing 777 operated by Emirates was preparing for its scheduled international passenger flight to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. 282 passengers and 18 crew members were on board the flight. The aircraft involved was a Boeing 777-31H. It was equipped with two Rolls-Royce Trent 892 engines and was thirteen years old, having made its first flight on 7 March 2003. It was delivered new to Emirates on 28 March 2003, and had logged more than 58,000 flight hours in 13,000 cycles before the crash. The Boeing 777 departed from Trivandrum International Airport. Around an hour before landing the crew completed the approach briefings for runways 12L and 30L. The captain briefed to the Copilot that in case of a go-around, flaps 20 was to be selected and they will climb to 3,000 ft. The United Arab Emirates National Center of Meteorology and Seismology issued a moderate windshear warning affecting all runways at Dubai Airport, with a validity from 11:40 to 1:00pm. According to the Captain, prior to this flight, he had experienced similar windshear warnings on ATIS at same airport. Except ATIS there was no additional information from ATC regarding the windshear warning,so he did not believe that the landing would be affected. ATC vectored flight 521 for approach to runway 12L. 7 min before landing An Airbus A321 operated by Air India performed a go around. At that time the wind speed was 12.8 kts. 5 min before landing A Boeing 777 operated by Emirates performed a go around. At that time, the wind speed was 12. 2 kts. 2 min before landing Another Boeing 777 operated by Emirates performed a deep landing. At that time the speed was 6.6 kts. The flight crew of 521 were not informed by ATC of the go-arounds and deep landing. Now flight 521 was cleared to land on runway 12L by ATC which gave the wind speed and direction as 11 kt from 340 degrees. The Captain disengaged the autopilot and continued the approach, with the autothrottle engaged. Because of the reduction in the tailwind component, the airspeed started to increase which resulted in the A/T retarding both thrust levers. Aircraft passed over the threshold of runway 12L at about 54 ft radio altitude. As the Aircraft passed 25 ft radio altitude approximately 300 m beyond the threshold, As designed, the A/T transitioned both thrust levers towards the idle position.The thermals updraft coming from the ground was pushing the aircraft upwards. The Aircraft rolled 3 degrees to the left due to the wind effect and the Captain corrected with right control wheel input of 30 degrees. Then the aircraft banked to right which caused the right main landing gear to contact the runway approximately 1,090 m beyond the threshold. Thinking that, the aircraft did not touch the runway, The Captain pushed the left TO/GA switch. Even the captain pushed the to/ga switch, the thrust levers remained at the idle position because the aircraft had already touched the runway. The aircraft reached at an altitude of 85 feet and started to lose height. The Captain applied the full thrust and increased the Aircraft pitch to 9.2 degrees in an attempt to regain height but it was too late. The investigation was done by General Civil Aviation Authority UAE. According to the investigators the pilots failed to realize the engines of the aircraft remained idle as they tried to take off from a failed landing attempt. The flight crew reliance on automation and lack of training in flying go-arounds from close to the runway surface ... significantly affected the flight crew performance in a critical flight situation which was different to their experience during their simulated training flights. They touched down on the runway and then decided that they wanted to Go Around. Here they made one very critical mistake. The crew failed to realize that after the airplane makes contact with the ground, the systems automatically disables the TOGA buttons.

#tenerifedisaster #KLM 4805 #Panam1736 A Boeing 747 was on its chartered flight to Canary Island, Spain. The flight was chartered on behalf of the Holland International Travel Group. On board the flight were 234 passengers and 13 crew members. The aircraft took off from Schiphol en route to Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain. Another Boeing 747 operated by Panam was on its scheduled passenger flight to Gran Canaria Spain with an intermediate stopover in John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York City. The flight left Los Angeles and landed at JFK without any notable events. Flight 1736 tookoff for Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. Both of the aircrafts were heading towards Gran Canaria. While they were en route, a bomb exploded in the airport passenger terminal. So, the civil aviation authorities closed the airport temporarily, and all incoming flights bound for Gran Canaria had been diverted to Los Rodeos Tenerife. The aircrafts landed at Tenerife with the difference of 35 minutes. While waiting for Gran Canaria airport to reopen, the airplanes occupied so much space parking on the long taxiway. As a result, the taxiway was not available for taxiing. The departing aircraft needed to taxi along the runway to establish and position for takeoff. When Gran Canaria airport opened to traffic, the Panam crew prepared for takeoff but at that moment the KLM 4805 was refueling ahead of them. It took about 35 minutes to refuel the aircraft. Later, the passengers boarded the KLM flight but a Dutch family of four members were missing. Also, a tour guide had decided not to reboard for the flight to Gran Canaria. The KLM was instructed to taxi down the entire length of the runway and make a 180 degree turn to get into takeoff position. The controller asked the KLM crew to report when they will be ready. Then the Pan Am was instructed to follow the KLM down on the same runway and exit the runway by taking the third exit on their left. The crew did not understand clearly as controller had told them to take the first or third exit. The Panam crew successfully identified the first two taxiways but as the cockpit voice recordings, they did not indicate that they saw the third taxiway. It was massive Boeing 747. To exit the runway through taxiways 2 and 3 was practically impossibe. On the other side KLM crew informed ATC that they were ready to take off. The Captain of KLM applied the takeoff thrust. The flight Engineer of KLM tried to stop the captain telling him that Panam was not cleared yet but the captain ignored it. The KLM collided with the Pan Am just as it was taking off. Both of the planes exploded and burst into flames. There were 583 people who died which made it the worst aviation accident ever. There were no survivors on the KLM which was carrying 248 people. Out of 396 people in Panam, 61 were able to survive. The investigation was done by Civil Aviation Accident and Incident Investigation Commission Spain. According to the investigators, the cause of the accident was that, KLM captain Van Zanten tried to take off without ATC clearance. It was certain that he was rushing to leave as soon as possible in order to comply with the strict KLM's duty-time regulations. Another reason was the Interference from simultaneous radio transmissions. When the KLM captain said that "we are going", the ATC replied them OK Stand by for take off, I will call you Simultaneously, Panam co-pilot said that they we're still taxiing down the runway. These messages were not heard by the KLM crew. The Pilots are required to learn Aviation English, which features around 300 words and instructions on when and how to use them. The copilot, flight engineer and crew are given power to challenge the captain's decisions. The words "take off" should never be used in an ATC clearance to avoid confusion with takeoff clearance. This involved changing the name "ATC clearance" for further clarity of the description of the route.

10 Most Unbelievable Aircraft Fatal Crashes and Emergency Landings that are Caught on Camera