ContinuouSafety

A runway excursion occurs when an aircraft departs the runway in use during the take-off or landing run. The excursion may be intentional or unintentional. The key safety control barrier is flying a Stabilised Approach and maintaining this condition, which then leads to the landing runway threshold being crossed at the target speed and height. Undesirable State - A landing aircraft is unable to stop before end of runway due to: 1. Touch-down speed is excessive; or, 2. Threshold crossing height is too high and/or the touchdown point is beyond the normal touch down zone; or, 3. Aircraft weight exceeds maximum for prevailing conditions; or, 4. Reported wind velocity or runway surface conditions differ from actual conditions; or, 5. Aircraft system on which landing performance is predicated such as brakes or spoilers malfunctions; or, significant Aquaplaning occurs.

HELICOPTER OPERATIONS WITH NIGHT VISION IMAGING SYSTEMS. The operator shall ensure that, as part of its risk analysis and management process, risks associated with the NVIS environment are minimised by specifying in the operations manual: selection, composition and training of crews; levels of equipment and dispatch criteria; and operating procedures and minima, such that normal and likely abnormal operations are described and adequately mitigated.

The 4th pillar is Safety Promotion. ICAO Annex 19 requires that “the service provider shall develop and maintain a safety training programme that ensures that personnel are trained and competent to perform their SMS duties

Regulation (EU) No 139/2014, Aerodromes Safety, the rule ADR.OR.B.040 Changes, Any change: (1) affecting the terms of the certificate, its certification basis and safety-critical aerodrome equipment; or (2) significantly affecting elements of the aerodrome operator’s management system as required in ADR.OR.D.005(b) shall require prior approval by the Competent Authority. For other changes requiring prior approval in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 (today Reg. (EU) No 2018/1139) and its Implementing Rules, the aerodrome operator shall apply for and obtain an approval issued by the Competent Authority. The application for a change in accordance with point (a) or (b) shall be submitted before any such change takes place, in order to enable the Competent Authority to determine continued compliance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules and to amend, if necessary, the certificate and related terms of the certificate attached to it. The change shall only be implemented upon receipt of formal approval by the Competent Authority in accordance with ADR.AR.C.040. During the changes, the aerodrome operator shall operate under the conditions approved by the Competent Authority. Changes not requiring prior approval shall be managed and notified to the Competent Authority as defined in the procedure approved by the Competent Authority in accordance with ADR.AR.C.035(h). The aerodrome operator shall provide the Competent Authority with the relevant documentation in accordance with point (f) and ADR.OR.E.005. As part of its management system, as defined in ADR.OR.D.005, the aerodrome operator proposing a change to the aerodrome, its operation, its organisation or its management system shall: (1) determine the interdependencies with any affected parties, plan and conduct a safety assessment in coordination with these organisations; (2) align assumptions and mitigations with any affected parties, in a systematic way; (3) ensure a comprehensive assessment of the change including any necessary interactions; and (4) ensure that complete and valid arguments, evidence and safety criteria are established and documented to support the safety assessment, and that the change supports the improvement of safety whenever reasonably practicable.

Foreign object debris (FOD) can be expensive for aircraft operations. Keeping parking stands clean are good money for value and support the success of both, the aerodrome operator as well as the aircraft operator SMS. In this video, the bowtie safety control barrier come alive, highlighting the benefit of people's safety awareness.

Runway safety still one of the main risks. Runaway safety prevention activities are crucial for maintaining the risk level still acceptable.

Winter operations can be hazardous, both on ground and in-flight. This video combines real life with the hazard register.

In safety risk management, there is a point whether to decide to have and use a BowTie diagrams. This video explains the reason for that. Further information: www.mycs.swiss/training

In the present videos it is explained Threats and Consequences within the bowtie methodology. In brief, if we control the Threats in preventive mode, operations will not get the Top Event. Whenever the Top Event activates, Consequences can be minimized in recovery mode.

Hazards identification and Risk Management: Getting started with the bowtie methodology.

In this video is explained the concept of escalation factors. Safety control barriers can fail, so there is the chance to consider an escalation factor as well as escalation factor control.

In this video is explained the concept of safety control barrier.

This video clarifies when the risk level is intolerable, and operations cannot proceed forward and have to be stopped.

The present video describes the correct use of the risk matrix. The risk level should be acceptable at all times. Whenever the risk level is assessed tolerable, the Accountable Manager or delegated person has to authorize the operation. If the risk level is intolerable, operations cannot proceed until the risk level is reassessed to a lower level.,

The ICAO SMS third pillar is safety assurance. In this video it is clarified which elements are within safety assurance.

Assessing the risk with the risk matrix. The risk level can be ALARP, but in recent editions of the ICAO Doc. 9859 SMS Manual, ICAO clarified that the risk level should be acceptable.

Lets briefly review the 4 SSP/SMS ICAO pillars and its 12 elements.

This is an introduction to the Continuous Safety Competence-Based Training LMS. Further information: www.mycs.swiss/training