Suchomimus

Satellite imagery showing Russia's blockade of the black sea near Ukraine and the extent of Russian Naval activity. A little video here about Russia’s control of the Black Sea. I saw this image shared on twitter and is from US Navy intelligence. Now, the image quality wasn’t great to beging with—and I expect it will drop in quality once uploaded. But hopefully it is clear enough. So, basically this shows the overall control of the northern Black Sea, current trade and traffic routes and areas of Russian activity. So, the striped pattern is water where Russia is denying access to shipping—they have basically cut off the entire coastline of Ukraine. The green blotches are areas of density of Russian naval activity—we will get into that shortly. First of all, I want to look here. So, at the top we have civilian maritime traffic on February 14 to February 15---a high density of civilian activity around Ukraine’s ports of Odesa and Yuzhny and Mykolaev. Then, if we look at 17-18 of May—gone. There is no civil traffic in Ukraine. The country is entirely cut off from coastal trade routes. This has led to 20 million tons of wheat stuck in Ukraine and this will have a wide-sweeping effect. Not just in the west. The EU said bread prices in Lebanon have increased 70 percent for example. There are calls for NATO and the west to break the blockade—Russia is trying to negotiate lifting of sanctions. But I think it is better to look for an economist or other export to get the ins and outs of Russia’s blockade and its effects on trade and what not. But it’s one of the main reasons that Ukraine needs long-range anti-ship missiles sent. Denmark apparently plans to send Harpoons and a launcher. Britain agreed to send Harpoons—but I think it will take a while to train them and the British ones need integrating onto a suitable platform as they are ship-launched. Now, back to the areas of Russian activity. First of all—Snake Island. Thisd is a key spot for control of the Northern Black Sea. It can be used a staging base for small patrol and attack ships—such as the raptor. It can be used to station SAMs—which we have seen Russia do. At the moment, short range SAMs like the Pantsir have been shown there, but if Russia stations a long range SAM it will allow them a lot of air coverage. It could also—if Ukraine captures it—be used a platform for anti-ship missiles. This will be risky---it’s vulnerable to air attack. But putting a missile like the Neptune on here will greatly increase where Ukraine can hit in the Black Sea. Away from Snake Island—we can see a lot of action in the cenral Black Sea. Some of this will be regular patrols duties—but I suspect that the igh-density areas, in red, are possibly where Russia is launching its sea-based cruise missiles from. Finally, along the coast of Crimea, we see a lot of activity. Some of this I believe will be regular patrols along the coast. We have also seen that Russia carries out training and practices there. But again, this area could be a Kalibr launching point. Kalibr has a range of between 1,500 to 2,500 kilometers. More than enoigh range to strike targets in Ukraine without the need to get ships and submarine closer to the Ukrainian mainland.

A short update from Donbas - Lyman is captured by Russia. Apologies for the sound of rain--a big storm is overhead and it's bouncing off my AC unit. A little update from Donbas region. Some of you may have seen it, some of you may not. So this is the updated war map as of May 27—posted around 12 hours ago. So the situation has likely changed since then. But we can see that Russia has continued its advance south west of Popasna—a key launching point for Russian attacks. They have captured ilovaisk. To the north, Russia has finally captured Lyman with Ukrainian soldiers withdrawing across the Siverskyi Donets river. Russian troops attacked the city on the 23rd, taking full control on the 26th. Siverskyi Donets will be a good place for Ukraine soldiers to mount a defence—Russian soldiers tried and disasterously failed to cross it at a different point. This part of Ukraine is clearly going to be a hive of activity in the coming days. So it is a part of the conflict to keep an eye on.

Su-25 loud fly past, Avdiivka, Ukraine.

The OTR-21 Tochka-U "Scarab" ballistic missile system's use in the Ukraine War. SS-21 Scarab is a key weapon in the Ukraine War but has a low CEP (circular error probable) Ukraine has up to 90 Tochka-U launchers and 500 missiles in service and has used them during the war. Most notably, striking Millerovo and carrying a strike on landing ships at Berdyansk. Ukraine also has 50 Luna-M balliastic missiles, but these are in storage and need a overhaul before being ready for combat. So, let’s take a look at the Tochka. The first Tochka missiles entered service in 1975, carrying one of three types of warhead—482 kg of high explosive, fragmentation or even nuclear. The original had a range of 15 to 70 kilometers. And a CEP—circular error probably of 150 meters—more on CEP soon. In 1989, the Tochka-U variant was introduced. The Tochka-U variant had a number of improvements over the original, and it is this which Ukraine operates. Compared to some Ballistic missiles, it has a relatively short range—only between 120km. It has a circular error probable—CEP of between 75 to 95 m. I had no idea what a CEP was when I started researching the Tochka-U, so I had take a dive into that too. It is quite complicated and featured a lot of complicated sums and equations which went well over my head. It was also difficult to find a dumbed down explanation, and the videos on youtube were basically robotic auto-voiceovers repeating what was on Wikipedia. But it can basically be summed up as the radius of a circle where the probability of an impact point being inside is 50 percent of the rounds. So, a missile with 100m CEP—when 100 munitions are fired at the same point, 50 will fall within a circle of 100 m around their impact point. For example. If our CEP is, say, 1,000 meters (1 km), then we can say that if we aim our missile at a given target, there is a 50% chance that the missile will fall within 1,000 meters of it. So, with the Tochka-U and its CEP of 75 to 95 meters—there’s a 50 percent chance that the missile will hit within that range. So, basically, the lower CEP a missile or weapon has, the more accurate it is. This little diagram here visualizes it for the Excalibur guided shell. The M549A1 shell and the M107 at various ranges. So, is 150m good? For this, I checked other ballistic missiles to compare to. So, Tochka U has a CEP of 75 to 95 M. The Scud missile has a CEP of a whopping 1km at 300 km range. The predecessor of the Tochka—the Luna M, had a CEP of 400 meters. The newer Iskander has a CEP of 5-7 meters with optical homing and 30-70 in autonomous use. The OTR-23 Oka has a CEP of 30-150 meters RS-25 – 150-200 meters And a US example—Trident II has a CEP of 90 meters and Minuteman III has a CEP of 200 meters with its original guidance system and 120 meters with it’s improved one. So the Tochka-U is quite accurate. This was demonstrated in the missile attack on Millerovo, which struck its target. The Tochka-U uses inertial guidance, which is why its CEP is lower than the original Tochka. The Tochka-U is road launched, the missile being carried and launched from a BAZ-5921 TEL launcher. In the Tochka-U variant, the TEL vehicle is amphibious. The TEL launcher has a road speed of 60 kilometers an hour. The vehicle has a crew of three and carries a single missile. The TEL vehicle can be ready for launch in just 16 minutes, launch a missile in 2 minutes and be reloaded in 20 minutes. So it is quite a fast system. The missile itself is carried inside the vehicle. To prepare for launch, roof doors are opened before the missile is raised to its firing angle of 78 degrees. This process takes just 15 seconds. The Tochka system is designed to target critical tactics and carry out tactical strikes—missile launch positions, airfields, command posts, artillery batteries—that sort of thing. So, let’s take a look at the technical details of the missile itself. Tochka-U—or the 9M79-1 missile, has wings located slightly forward than the original design. It has a length of 6.4 meters and a launch weight of 2,010 kg. Once fired, the missile can travel at 1.8 km a second—or Mach 5.3. So, let’s have a look at some examples of its use by. On 24th February, two Tochka-Us hit Russia’s Millerovo air base, destroying at least one Su-30SM. On 24th March—the large, Alligator-class landing ship Saratov was destroyed—likely by a Tochka-U missile. So it has proven its worth. So, why haven’t more attacks by the Tochka-U been used on Russian targets. Well, the simple answer is the range. I have used two large Ukrainian cities close to the border as possible firing points---the missiles range will of course be a bit longer or a bit shorter and vary depending on just where the missiles are located and fired from. But for the sake of the video, I am using Kharkiv and Sumy as examples.

The Russian Navy's floating crane SPK-54150 has been seen around Snake Island. It one of many Project 02690 cranes built and served as a ship in the Black Sea Fleet.

Russia captured Popasna and has used it to launch assaults in Donbas. Hello everyone, a little video here on the current Russian offensive in Donbas, as I think it is important and interesting to piece together what is happening as there is a lot of information out there. Especially around Popasna—so I am going to take a look at the assault from Popasna—a key area of the conflict. A key moment was here—in May 7. Russian forces finally captured Popasna after weeks of fighting. Popasna is a town of just under 20,000 people. This becomes an important town as the Russian push north begins here. Popasna is a regional hub containing many roadway junctions and a railway. As we can see on this little map—roads extending north, east and south allowing for easier Russian advances and movement. And the railway—if still in service, can potentially be used for resupply. The battle for Popasna was long, starting on 18th March. Ending May 7. May 13 or 14 – Oleksandropillia fell—a small settlement north of Popasna. The Russian plan appears to be to close the gap around Lyschansk and Severodonetsk, cutting off Ukrainian forces. May 18 and 19 – We see multiple attacks from Popasna—to the north capturing Vrubivka and to the west capturing Druzhba. May 20 and 21 – Russian advances from Popasna continued. Capturing smaller settlements in the region and further establishing control. May 23 and 24 – Myronnivs’skyi fell to the south of popasna 24 and 25 – we see Russia has taken Rozsadky and Svitodars’k with fighting starting in Luhans’ske—the village. Also, we see Russia take Lypove and Vasylivka northn west of Popasna. Finally—the map from May 26 shows the situation as of now. With assaults from Popasna auccessfully having captured a number of Ukraine towns and villages in the past few days. It took a while—but the capture of Popasna was a key victory for Russia. As you can see, it has allowed them advance north, south and to a lesser degree—west. Now, Ukraine has had some successes. On May 25, Russian forces took up positions on the Bakhmut-Lyschansk road which would allow them to cut off supplies to siverodonetsk and continue an attempted encirclement. On May 26—it was reported that Russian forces withdrew, so the key supply route is still open. There was also the failed Siversky-donetsk river crossing. It appears Russia intended to attack from the north and south, but the northern assault failed. Forbes reports that the assault from Popasna involved 106 BTGs. Units involved ar Chechen troops, airborne units and Wagner mercenaries. So, where are they aiming for. It is likely the western push from Popasna is aiming for Bakhmut—13 miles away. Whereas the northern push is intended to encircle Severodonetsk. Severodonetsk is well defended with Forbes reporting at least three brigades. So, does Ukraine need to worry? I don’t know enough to say. I’m far from an expert. But we can see the offensive is slow. It’s not like a Bltizkrieg—Russian progress is slow and they are losing many men, armor and vehicles a day. But Ukraine is also losing troops and equipment. On the other hand, we have Ukrainian forces gathering in the Kherson region and the recently finished battle of Kharkiv. So Russian forces could soon be under assault from other fronts. There is also the fact that Ukraine is getting more and more equipment from NATO. Some good equipmen like the CAESAR and Panzerhaubitze, to replace lost stock. Whereas Russia’s lost equipment is replaced by tanks and vehicles dragged out of storage—many of which are quite old and in poor condition. Russia also seems to have got its logistical supply lines sorted out which works in their favor. But, I guess this is something we are going to have to wait and see. I’m not an expert and don’t know the ins and outs. So I’d rather not speculate too much.

Updated video on Russia sending T-62 tanks to Ukraine. Updated with more information. I thought I would do an updated video on T-62s in Ukraine as my original video was a bit short and didn’t go into the detail I wanted. So, we saw these videos of T-62 tanks been taken out of storage around Rostov and Crimea, and we recently have had confirmation via photos that they arrived in Melitopol and a Telegram source reported T-62s with additional armor in Pologi district. These are old tanks, entering service in 1961 and serving in a variety of wars and conflicts. So, why is Russia bringing out relics? Well, they have lost a lot of tanks. As of May 25, Ukraine claims 1,205 tanks destroyed, captured or abandoned. Oryx has visually confirmed 700. Mainly T-72s. I expect the true number to be somewhere in between. Russia has a lot of tanks in storage---over 10,000 according to the IISS. That number doesn’t take into account their condition. It is likely many of these are of the worst for wear. These photos here are of the 227th military storage base, showing them exposed to the elements—though many here may be scrapped and intended for disposal. So, with so many tanks in storage—why the T-62? It is likely these are going to be supplied to the separatist forces to use, saving the T-72s in storage as replacements for the main Russian army. They could also likely serve as patrol in captured territories---as a sort of deterant against protests, rebellion or sabotage from Ukrainians as local militias or rebellion will likely lack heavy anti-tank weapons. And also be placed at checkpoints. This will free up T-72s from those sort of rear-guard duties to go to the front. I’ve also seen it suggested that T-62s could be activated because of the effect of sanctions. It’s been said that repair of T-72s is difficult because certain components can’t be imported any more. So an older, T-62, could perhaps be activated without the need for difficult to obtain parts. As mentioned, the T-62 is old and outdated. It has many limitations—for example, it’s turret rotation takes 20 seconds to rotate 360 degrees. The Abrams for comparison – 9 seconds. It also needs to be manually loaded, thus requiring a 4 man crew. It is also very cramped and uncomfortable—the T-62 was known to have vibration issues, causing high crew fatigue. Despite it’s age—if used wisely, it could still serve a role. An old tank is still dangerous, with powerful weapons and armor. Kept away from the frontlines and manning checkpoints, it will be fine and will free up the more important t-72s for front line duties. This will give Russia the numbers needed to support its advances while allowing them to secure areas to the rear without tying down more important assets.

T-62 tanks sent to Ukraine. Photographed in Melitopol. Very short video update here. So, it appears that we have confirmation that Russia is dragging ancient T-62M and T-62MV tanks out of storage for use in the war. These videos here shows tanks been moved from storage in Rostov Oblast and Crimea. In 2000, 191 were in active service and 1,929 in storage. In 2013, all of them were allegedly scrapped. This was proven not true as a number were reactivated to supply the Syrian Army. Now, we are seeing them dragged out of storage again. For use in Ukraine. The T-62 is old. First entering service in 1961. It is inferior to other tanks in use in Ukraine in terms of armor and gun optics and it requires a 4-man crew. In addition to the footage of them being transported, we have these two photos showing them arriving in Melitopol. It is unknown if these are going to be replacing lost T-72s with the main Russian Army, or if Russia intends to use them to equip the LPR and DPR forces.

Mi-24 Hinds are being sent to Ukraine from Czech Republic. A little video update about weapons been sent to Ukraine. So today, Czech Republic … or Czechia if you will, announced that it is going to send attack helicopters to Ukraine. These are one of the weapons desperately needed along with artillery, but also one that is difficult to supply as Ukraine uses Soviet-era helicopters, which aren’t used much by NATO overall. Hungary is one—the video you can see is of a Hungarian Mi-24 during excercises. But the Czechs have delivered, announcing that they will send some attack helicopters to Ukraine. Now, the type wasn’t actually clarified, but we don’t need to get the Scooby Gang on the case to solve this one. It’ll be the Mi-24 as that is the only attack helicopter operated by Czechia. Numbers weren’t given, but Czechia has 15 operational. The Mi-24 is quite a well known chopper, serving at the forefront of Soviet forces during the Cold War. At the start of the Ukraine War, Ukraine operated 35 of these. So the Mi-24 is rather old, entering service in 1972, but it is still quite capable and serves in Air Forces across the world. 2,648 were produced. It has quite a distinct design with its tandem cockpit and double bubble canopy. It gives it quite a futuristic appearance I think. The Mi-24 was designed to be speedy. The airframe was made to be streamlined and the undercarriage can be retracted. A modified Mi-24 was the holder of the absolute speed record for helicopters from 1978 until 1986—nbroken by a British Lynx. Unlike other attack helicopters, the Mi-24 combines features of armored gunship and troop transport, able to carry out both roles at the same time. It’s served in many, many, many wars and so is pretty combat tested. From the little known Ogaden War of 1977-1978 to the present invasion of Ukraine. So, let’s look at the numbers. It can carry 8 troops as well as a crew of 2-3. It’s max speed is 335 kilometers an hour and a range of 450 kilometers. It can be outfitted with a variety of different weapons. This includes a 12.7 mm Yak-B gatling gun, various types of rocket launchers and anti-tank missiles. It’s a pretty heavily armed beast. Since Ukraine has experience in operating the Mi-24, there won’t be any training required, so ideally they can be sent almost straight into battle. And a bonus mentioned, here at the end, Lithuania too has announced it is sending some equipment to Ukraine. They are sending 20 M113 apcs to add to Ukraine’s growing supply, 10 military trucks and 10 SUVs which have been modified for carrying demining equipment and demining teams. The military trucks especially will be important as logistics will be one of the key things in this war and Ukraine doesn’t have a massive supply.