Meloni Pushed A New Fascist Law — And Handed The ICC All the Evidence It Needs

Right, so Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s brass neck in the face of international condemnation really is quite something: being accused of complicity in genocide one day and deciding to launch a crusade against Muslims the next. In the same week she confirmed she’d been denounced to the International Criminal Court, Italy’s self-proclaimed defender of civilisation decided the burqa was the gravest threat to national security. Not corruption. Not organised crime. Fabric. The new “cultural crimes” law bans full-face veils, polices Muslim marriages, and monitors mosque funding — all packaged as a defence of Italian identity now. It’s the familiar European formula: fear dressed as order, repression dressed as reform. Meloni calls it patriotism; history calls it something else. This is fascism with a bureaucratic grin, a government writing its prejudice into law while congratulating itself for keeping the country safe from the people it’s persecuting. Well its not going well for her.
Right, so Giorgia Meloni’s government have just introduced a draft law that would ban full-face Islamic coverings such as the burqa and niqab in all public spaces across Italy. The proposal came directly from her party, Brothers of Italy, and was presented as part of a wider “security package.” The text prohibits any garment that conceals the face in public institutions, schools, universities, or retail spaces, and sets financial penalties between three hundred and three thousand euros for violations.
According to the official presentation and media reports published, the bill is justified as a measure to protect “Italian identity” and prevent “Islamic separatism” and “cultural crimes.” Senior figures in Brothers of Italy used those exact terms in their public statements. There is no precedent in Italian law for that kind of terminology. The framing is ideological rather than legal. Italy already has a 1975 law that forbids face coverings in public without “justified cause.” That law was originally designed for anti-terrorism purposes and already covers any legitimate security concern therefore.
When asked about this, Imam Massimo Abdallah Cozzolino of the Zayd Ibn Thabit Islamic Centre said that legislation of this type already exists and questioned the purpose of the new proposal. No government official offered a gap in the legal framework or data to justify duplication. The original law has been sufficient for half a century now.
Therefore the function of the new bill is therefore not enforcement but signalling. It targets a visible Muslim practice and reframes it as a matter of national security. At a time when Meloni is in the legal crosshairs over complicity in genocide, backing the self-proclaimed Jewish state against the majority Muslim people of Gaza, she’s decided full on Islamophobia is a good look now. The fascist leader of Italy no longer hiding it it seems. Each time such a measure is introduced in Europe, the pattern is the same: security language used to normalise exclusion.
The draft refers to phrases like “cultural crimes” repeatedly, alongside “Islamic fundamentalism” and “Islamic separatism.” None of these terms have meaning in the Italian penal code. The invention of “cultural crimes” transforms difference itself into an offence and you don’t get much more racist than that.
This linguistic shift places the bill in a long European lineage though. France’s 2010 face-veil ban was justified as protecting “living together.” Denmark’s “ghetto laws” were introduced to promote “integration.” Each used the vocabulary of unity to legislate uniformity. Meloni’s version follows that trajectory, but with a distinctly nationalist tone. The claim that such steps are necessary to preserve cohesion is not supported by evidence. Italy’s Muslim population, estimated at around 2.6 million people or roughly four percent of the population, has shown no record of political separatism or collective violence.
The context of Meloni’s party is crucial to understand here of course. Brothers of Italy is the successor of the post-war Italian Social Movement (MSI), founded by figures from Mussolini’s regime. Meloni began her political career in the MSI’s youth wing. The party’s current leadership still uses the fascist-era slogan “God, Homeland, Family.” The continuity is direct. The bill therefore cannot be separated from that ideological background. The state is once again defining cultural pluralism as a threat to the nation.
The draft bill is broader than the headlines about veils as well. It introduces new prison sentences of up to seven years for arranging or coercing marriages “through religious or cultural pressure.” It criminalises so-called “virginity testing” with custodial penalties. It also requires all religious organisations without a formal agreement with the Italian state to disclose all sources of funding, especially those from abroad, and stipulates that public funds will be available only to groups that pose “no threat to the state.” Well the legislation itself by its very existence has already decided they are threats surely?
These provisions appear administrative, in some cases you might not disagree necessarily, but their cumulative effect is discriminatory. Italy’s constitution allows formal recognition of religions through agreements known as intese. Groups with such accords—Catholic, Jewish, Protestant, Buddhist, Hindu—receive tax benefits and access to state support through the otto per mille scheme. Islam is excluded. Repeated attempts by national Islamic organisations to obtain recognition have been rejected or ignored. As a result, virtually every Muslim association in Italy falls under the “unrecognised” category targeted by the new funding rules.
When ministers claim the clauses apply equally to all faiths, that is legally accurate but substantively misleading. No major Catholic or Protestant organisation is affected. The entire burden falls on Muslims, who will now be compelled to report their donors to the state under threat of losing eligibility for local or regional grants. The law effectively establishes a surveillance regime applied to one religion.
Opposition politicians have described the bill as discriminatory. Pierfrancesco Majorino of the Democratic Party called it hateful and unnecessary. Religious leaders have warned that it will deepen existing hostility toward Muslims. Independent data already shows that Islamophobia is entrenched in Italian society: employment discrimination, housing inequality, and local opposition to mosque construction are widespread. Under those conditions, a law targeting Muslim funding and dress functions as institutional reinforcement of prejudice.
Supporters invoke the language of security and women’s rights but provide no evidence. No statistics link face coverings to crime. The interior ministry has not presented any national security assessment describing veils as a risk. The justification is ideological.
The duplication of existing law without evidential need indicates that the measure’s purpose is symbolic rather than practical. It is designed to communicate identity politics through legislation.
The ideological continuity between the fascist period and the present is not a rhetorical device. The ruling party uses the same vocabulary of national regeneration. The slogan “God, Homeland, Family” was employed by Mussolini’s regime and now anchors Meloni’s campaign branding. Several current ministers have professional backgrounds in organisations that trace their lineage to the Italian Social Movement.
Fascism begins with the claim that diversity is decay. It identifies a population deemed incompatible with the national project and then codifies that exclusion through administrative language. In the 1930s, Italy’s Racial Laws defined Jewish citizens as incompatible with national purity. In 2025, Meloni’s draft law frames Islam as a comparable threat to cohesion. The mechanism is identical: redefine pluralism as disorder and legislate belonging.
Two days before the announcement of the burqa-ban bill, Meloni revealed that she had been denounced to the International Criminal Court for alleged complicity in genocide in connection with Italy’s support for Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. The complaint, filed by lawyers and academics, alleges that Italian arms exports and diplomatic backing contributed to acts violating the Genocide Convention. The ICC has acknowledged receipt but has not yet opened a formal investigation, it bears keeping an eye on because we can all think of a number of European leaders who’s pro Israel positioning throughout the atrocities who we think deserve a day in the dock, but the precedent needs to be set.
Under the Rome Statute, aiding and abetting genocide requires knowledge of the perpetrator’s intent. In previous tribunals such as Karadžić and Kordić, prosecutors used political rhetoric and discriminatory state policy to prove that leaders shared the perpetrators’ hostility toward the targeted group. Meloni’s new legislation, which treats Islam as a cultural danger while she supports Israel’s war on Gaza, fits that evidentiary pattern. She might have just indicted herself even more.
Should prosecutors decide to examine the case, they could argue that Meloni’s domestic policy demonstrates her animosity toward Muslims as a class, providing circumstantial evidence of knowledge and alignment.
The government claims that the ban will protect women’s rights by liberating them from patriarchal control. Women’s-rights groups and Muslim organisations have rejected that argument. The effect of such bans, they explain, is to restrict women’s participation in public life and increase stigma. A woman who chooses to wear a niqab or burqa will be excluded from education, work, and public institutions. The policy removes autonomy under the pretext of protection.
Feminist researchers across Europe have documented the same pattern. Far-right and nationalist movements often use the rhetoric of feminism to legitimise racism. By presenting Muslim women as victims who must be saved, governments justify coercive policies as moral duties. The result is greater marginalisation of those women and reinforcement of patriarchal control by the state.
Italy’s constitution protects freedom of religion under Articles 8 and 19. Limitations are permitted only where necessary to safeguard public order. The government has not demonstrated any public-order necessity. Legal scholars therefore expect constitutional challenges if the bill is enacted.
European law provides parallel guarantees. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 10 of the EU Charter protect the right to manifest religion. The European Court of Human Rights’ 2014 judgment in S.A.S. v. France upheld France’s veil ban narrowly, using the rationale of “living together.” The decision remains controversial and has been criticised by UN special rapporteurs as inconsistent with human-rights norms. Italy’s proposal goes further by defining Islam itself as a potential threat, placing its compatibility with the Convention in serious doubt.
Within Italy, the governing coalition’s main partners—Lega and Forza Italia—have endorsed the measure. Opposition parties lack the parliamentary strength to stop it. The European Commission has declined public comment. Legal experts expect the bill to pass before year’s end.
Outside Italy, it has received support from far-right parties across Europe. In the United Kingdom, Reform UK MP Sara Pochin praised Meloni’s approach and urged Keir Starmer to implement similar restrictions “in the interests of public safety.” Pochin’s maiden speech in the House of Commons was on this very issue and her argument was utterly flawed for all of the same reasons Meloni’s bill is. This statement was widely reported and directly links British and Italian far-right rhetoric. The endorsement validates Green Party leader Zack Polanski’s description of Reform UK as a “fascist party.” The ideological pattern is clear: both movements use “security” as a synonym for cultural conformity. If you don’t align with the desired image, then you are a dissident.
Meloni’s bill aligns Italy with an established European trend. France, Belgium, Austria, and Denmark have all restricted Islamic dress in the last decade, invoking national values and public security. These laws have faced sustained criticism from human-rights monitors for their discriminatory impact. The European Union has failed to address the pattern systematically, focusing its rule-of-law enforcement on judicial independence rather than minority rights. So the ongoing silence amounts to tolerance.
This broader context matters because it demonstrates that Islamophobia is no longer an outlier within European politics; it is a consensus. Governments of varying ideologies have adopted the same framework, treating Muslim visibility as a governance issue. Italy’s legislation extends that norm to a country with a deep historical link to European fascism.
Meloni’s presentation of the ban as a feminist reform repeats colonial arguments once used by European powers abroad: the idea that Muslim women must be saved from their own culture. Interviews with Italian Muslim women published by rights organisations confirm that the effect of such laws is exclusion, not empowerment. They restrict access to public education, employment, and civic life. The policy therefore reproduces the same dynamic it claims to dismantle—male and state control over women’s autonomy.
The gendered justification operates as political cover. It presents the law as moral advancement while concealing its true purpose: asserting state dominance over cultural expression.
If passed, the law will likely face challenge in both Italian and European courts. Italy’s Constitutional Court has previously protected religious expression where restrictions lacked evidence of necessity. However, Meloni’s coalition has indicated an intention to reform the judiciary, which could affect independence. The European Court of Human Rights will take years to review any appeal. By the time a judgment arrives, the law will have served its political function: consolidating public acceptance of Islamophobia.
The current proposal reflects what analysts have called “procedural fascism”: the use of legal processes to establish hierarchy while maintaining the appearance of democracy. Elections and courts remain, but the principles they are meant to uphold are inverted. Equality before the law becomes conditional on identity.
Italy’s 1938 Racial Laws followed a similar path, beginning as administrative measures framed as protection of civilisation. They gradually evolved into persecution. Meloni’s “cultural crimes” bill repeats the structure: bureaucratic language concealing ideological exclusion. It represents a continuation, not an aberration, in Italian political history.
Meloni’s domestic policy has direct implications for her position before the International Criminal Court. Should the prosecutor pursue the complaint filed against Meloni, this law would form part of the evidentiary context. International jurisprudence recognises that discriminatory domestic governance can demonstrate intent or knowledge of persecution abroad. The pattern of state hostility toward Muslims is now formally codified in Italian law.
Therefore by enacting this legislation, Meloni actually weakens her defence at the ICC. A policy meant to assert control internally becomes external proof of ideological alignment with those accused of atrocities abroad.
Across the continent, Islamophobia serves as the binding ideology of populist and far-right movements. Politicians in France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Italy all speak of defending “Christian Europe.” Their coordination extends through shared media platforms, think-tank networks, and campaign funding. The result is a de facto bloc of governments normalising religious discrimination. The European Commission’s reluctance to intervene illustrates the political cost of confronting this alliance.
This drift has tangible effects. It influences asylum procedures, border policing, and foreign relations. Europe’s credibility as a defender of human rights weakens each time a member state legislates prejudice.
Reform UK’s alignment with Meloni confirms that this ideology has an English-speaking counterpart. The party’s call for Britain to follow Italy’s example frames Islamophobia as pragmatism. The lack of condemnation from mainstream political leaders reinforces that framing. When a prime minister remains silent on an overtly discriminatory policy proposed by a European ally, silence becomes complicity.
Italy’s case demonstrates how Islamophobia functions as a mechanism of governance rather than isolated prejudice. It provides governments with an organising principle in moments of instability. By defining an internal enemy, the state diverts attention from economic stagnation and institutional decay. The politics of fear becomes a tool of cohesion. Each iteration reinforces authoritarianism under democratic procedure.
Every authoritarian project leaves a documentary record of its own ideology. Meloni’s “cultural crimes” bill will remain as written evidence of discrimination. In the short term, it may consolidate her support base. In the long term, it will stand as proof of intent in any legal or historical reckoning.
The irony is structural: the same government facing allegations of aiding violence against Muslims abroad is enacting laws that criminalise Muslims at home. The ideological consistency is undeniable.
The question now is whether European institutions will treat this development as acceptable. If the European Union and the Council of Europe remain silent, as I expect they will, they will legitimise Islamophobia as compatible with democracy. That silence would mark a defining moment—the point at which “Never Again” ceased to apply to Muslims.
Giorgia Meloni’s proposed burqa and niqab ban is not an isolated domestic measure. It is part of a systematic transformation of European politics, where Islamophobia is used as an instrument of identity and control. The law is redundant, unconstitutional, and incompatible with the principles Italy claims to uphold. It violates national and European human-rights guarantees and intensifies discrimination against a population already subjected to systemic bias.
By introducing it, Meloni undermines her credibility before international courts and exposes her government’s ideological continuity with Italy’s fascist past. The measure reveals not strength but fear: a state attempting to preserve cohesion by policing culture.
The endorsement from Reform UK shows that this project is certainly not confined to Italy. It is now part of a transnational far-right movement that redefines democracy as uniformity. The same justification—security before rights—is being adopted across Europe. Each repetition erodes the moral foundations of liberal governance and is another step on the road to fascist rule.
Europe once defined itself by the protection of human rights. It now defines itself by their conditionality. The Italian case makes clear that fascism no longer arrives through force; it arrives through law.
And here lies the ultimate reversal: the law Meloni designed to display her authority may yet become the evidence that proves her guilt. It will stand as a record of intent, a legal monument to the ideology it sought to normalise. The very statute written to criminalise others could, in time, help convict its author.
For more on Meloni facing a day in the dock at the Hague and how she’s of all of Europe’s pro Israel leaders has ended up in this position first, setting the precedent so to speak, do check out this video recommendation here as your suggested next watch.
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