Serbia Locks in Israel Arms Deal — And the Balkans May Explode

Right, so last week, the Israeli defence manufacturer Elbit Systems announced that it had signed a contract worth $1.64 billion with an unnamed European country, the country in question clearly not wanting people to know who they were, the optics of buying weapons that require the sign off of the genocidal apartheid state obviously not being good ones if that country was revealed. Unfortunately for them, it now has been. Within days it has emerged that the buyer is Serbia. For Serbia, this deal is the largest single arms purchase in its modern history. For Israel, it is a desperately needed boost to its arms industry at the very moment it faces accusations of genocide in Gaza before the International Court of Justice and is on the receiving end of significant BDS action, growing from the streets to business boardrooms and government settings. For Europe though, this is a potential unravelling of the fragile peace settlement that has barely held the Balkans together since the 1990s.
So this is not simply another defence sale. It is a deliberate gamble taken at the worst possible moment. Serbia has chosen to bankroll Israel’s genocide economy with the biggest arms deal in its history, and Israel has chosen to export Gaza-tested weapons into Europe’s most fragile peace domain, an arms race in the Balkans the last thing we need to see after what we bore witness to before and in doing so, both countries risk reigniting the very wars Europe thought it had put to bed.
Right, so at first glance, this might appear to be a straightforward act of procurement. Small states buy arms all the time, and Israel has long sold its “battle-proven” weapons abroad, “battle-tested” usually meaning Gaza tested. Yet the scale, timing, and context of this contract transform it from an ordinary deal into something far more consequential. Serbia is not Switzerland, secure in its neutrality and surrounded by stability. It is a state that has yet to reconcile with the past wars of Yugoslav succession, one that refuses to recognise Kosovo, one that cultivates nationalist sentiment at home by invoking grievance and defiance. Israel is not a neutral exporter either. Every major deal requires state approval under the Defence Export Control Law of 2007, making the Elbit–Serbia agreement not just a commercial contract but a state-to-state arrangement, politically sanctioned at the highest levels in Jerusalem.
The transaction therefore embodies more than military modernisation. It symbolises an alignment of logics: Serbia’s opportunistic nationalism, Israel’s war economy, and the shared willingness of both to treat international law and regional peace as expendable. The question, then, is not only why Serbia sought these weapons, but why it did so now, in the middle of Israel’s assault on Gaza. The answer requires taking a look at Serbia’s balancing act between East and West, Israel’s strategy of exporting its conflict model, and the ways in which this deal risks re-igniting tensions in the Balkans.
Serbia’s purchase of Israeli weapons is, above all, about prestige. There is no immediate war threatening Belgrade, no pressing invasion to prepare for. The acquisition of Hermes 900 drones, long-range precision rockets capable of striking targets 300 kilometres away, and sophisticated electronic warfare and command systems is not about defending against realistic military threats. It is about demonstrating that Serbia has re-emerged as a serious power in the Balkans.
President Aleksandar Vučić has built much of his political legitimacy on restoring Serbian pride after the humiliation of the 1990s. The memory of NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign, which destroyed infrastructure and humiliated Belgrade, still shapes the national psyche. For Vučić, being seen to equip Serbia with cutting-edge Israeli systems sends a message to domestic audiences that Serbia is no longer weak. It is a state to be feared and respected.
This helps explain why the Elbit deal is the largest in Serbia’s modern history. A contract of $1.64 billion is staggering for a state of Serbia’s size and economy. It is a conscious political choice to invest in weapons rather than social programmes, in order to make a symbolic statement. It is an insanely poorly timed example of willy-waving in the Balkans. That symbolism is aimed not only at Serbia’s citizens but also at its neighbours. Kosovo, whose independence Belgrade still refuses to recognise, will inevitably see the purchase as threatening. Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Serb entity Republika Srpska frequently threatens secession under Milorad Dodik, will read it as a signal of emboldenment. Croatia and Romania, both NATO members, will interpret it as a reason to modernise further. Thus, even if Serbia never fires an Elbit rocket in anger, the very act of purchasing them alters the psychology of the region. If they buy weapons, others will too and we end up with an arms race in the Balkans, one Israel is helping to stoke.
What makes this reckless rather than pragmatic is the timing. At the very moment Israel is accused of genocide in Gaza, as it is about to push and seize the whole of Gaza, Serbia chose to underwrite its war economy with their help. Instead of distancing itself from a pariah state, Belgrade leaned in, paying billions for drones marketed as “battle-proven” against a besieged civilian population. Vučić is gambling that this show of defiance will bolster his image at home and make Serbia appear untouchable abroad. Yet in reality, it risks destabilising the very region he claims to safeguard.
From Israel’s perspective, the Elbit deal is a lifeline. The company, though formally private, is functionally an arm of the state. Its exports cannot occur without government approval, and its marketing strategy depends on advertising weapons as “battle-proven.” That phrase is not metaphorical. The Hermes 900 drone and precision rockets included in the Serbia contract have been deployed extensively in Gaza and Lebanon. As Press TV reported, these are the very systems that have been used to level Gaza’s neighbourhoods, enforce blockades, and carry out targeted strikes that human rights groups describe as indiscriminate and disproportionate.
By exporting them to Serbia, Israel reinforces a grim cycle. Gaza becomes not only a laboratory of human suffering but a showroom for arms sales. Each new assault, each new “operational success,” becomes a marketing pitch to foreign buyers. The destruction of Palestinian lives is rebranded as technological credibility. This is the essence of Israel’s war economy.
The timing is also significant. This year, Israel has faced mounting international boycotts and divestments. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund divested from multiple Israeli firms, including some involved in settlement activity. The World Council of Churches endorsed boycotts of Israeli goods. The British Medical Association severed institutional ties. These actions were part of a wider pattern of global resistance to Israel’s policies in Gaza. Against this backdrop, the Serbia deal allows Netanyahu and his government to claim that Europe still values Israeli weapons. It is a propaganda win as much as a financial one.
Thus, the deal is not neutral commerce. It is a state-sanctioned act of political defiance, an attempt to counter the narrative of Israel’s growing isolation. In Serbia, Israel found not just a buyer but a stage on which to perform its resilience.
Serbia’s choice of Israel as an arms supplier reveals much about its foreign policy too. Traditionally, Belgrade has been close to Moscow. Russia has been its main arms supplier, its UN veto in defence of Serbia’s claim over Kosovo, and its cultural ally in Orthodoxy. But since the war in Ukraine, Russia’s capacity to supply arms has been weakened by sanctions and the demands of its own war effort. Spare parts for Serbian MiG aircraft and Russian tanks have become harder to source. Belgrade cannot rely indefinitely on Moscow to modernise its arsenal.
At the same time, Serbia is not a NATO member. Unlike Croatia or Romania, it cannot simply integrate into Western supply chains. For Vučić, the answer is to diversify therefore. Buying from Israel allows Serbia to acquire Western-aligned technology without formally entering NATO. It gives him cutting-edge drones and electronic warfare systems while maintaining the claim of neutrality. It also provides cover in Brussels. If challenged on human rights or democracy, Vučić can point to Serbia’s contracts with Israel, a close US ally, as proof of engagement with the West as rancid as the optics of that would be.
This balancing act is opportunistic. Serbia wants Russia for the Kosovo veto, the EU for financial aid and accession talks, China for infrastructure investments, and Israel for weapons. The risk, however, is that balancing can only be stretched so far before one or more partners begin to see betrayal. Moscow will not be pleased that Belgrade has poured billions into Israel, an enemy of Iran and Hezbollah, two of Russia’s closest Middle Eastern allies. Brussels will not appreciate that a candidate state is bankrolling a country accused of genocide. And Israel itself may find that selling advanced drones into the Balkans embroils it in disputes far beyond Gaza.
The arms deal is not the only sign of Serbia’s pro-Israel tilt of course. In April of this year, Netanyahu travelled to Hungary to meet Viktor Orbán, despite being under an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for war crimes in Gaza. Orbán not only hosted him with full honours but also announced Hungary’s intention to withdraw from the ICC altogether so he didn’t have to arrest him. For Netanyahu to arrive in Budapest, his plane crossed the airspace of Greece, North Macedonia, and Serbia. All three are signatories to the Rome Statute. All three were therefore obliged to deny overflight or enforce the warrant. None did.
Therefore this act was more than a minor breach. It revealed the hollowness of international law when states choose expediency over obligation. Serbia, by allowing Netanyahu’s flight, aligned itself with Orbán’s Hungary in defying the ICC. As UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese later observed, European states that permitted Netanyahu’s flights, including France and her own home country of Italy, were hollowing out the ICC’s authority. For Serbia, the message was clear: it is prepared not only to buy Israel’s weapons but also to bend international law in Israel’s favour too.
The consequences of the Elbit deal are not confined to commerce or symbolism. They risk destabilising the Balkans in concrete ways here. In Kosovo, the prospect of Serbia operating Hermes drones and long-range rockets is deeply unsettling. NATO forces already maintain a fragile peace in the north. The idea that Belgrade could project precision strikes across Kosovo undermines confidence and could trigger escalation.
In Bosnia, the danger is political emboldenment. Milorad Dodik has long threatened secession for Republika Srpska. With Belgrade visibly rearming, he may feel more confident in pressing the issue. For Bosniaks, the memory of Srebrenica and Sarajevo makes such signals impossible to ignore. The very possibility of Serbian military backing for secessionist moves would shake Bosnia’s fragile balance.
Beyond these hotspots, the deal risks triggering an arms race. Croatia, Romania, less so Hungary given their pro Israel stance I’d suggest, all NATO members, may feel compelled to upgrade their arsenals in response. Thus, a contract signed in Tel Aviv could ripple outward to destabilise the entire region.
The European Union, which has invested two decades in Balkan peace, faces humiliation over this. If Serbia continues to undermine reconciliation while receiving EU aid and accession talks, Brussels will look utterly toothless, but will this story even get reported that widely? You have to wonder with mainstream media these days. The Elbit deal therefore undermines not only Balkan stability but also the credibility of European diplomacy. The knock on effects of this deal, an arms deal with a small state that might otherwise go ignored are so massive we cannot ignore it.
Perhaps the most disturbing element of the Elbit deal is the export not just of weapons but of a doctrine. Israel’s approach to Gaza is based on overwhelming firepower, constant surveillance, and collective punishment in place of political compromise. The Hermes drones and precision rockets are not neutral tools. They embody a way of thinking about conflict, in which negotiation is unnecessary because domination can be achieved technologically.
By selling these systems to Serbia, Israel is transplanting this doctrine into a region with its own unresolved ethnic disputes. The danger is that Belgrade begins to think about Kosovo or Bosnia not as partners for compromise but as populations to be controlled by superior force. Just as Gaza has been treated as a captive zone, so northern Kosovo or Republika Srpska could be managed not through diplomacy but through deterrence and intimidation.
This is how Israel’s genocide economy metastasises. What is tested in Gaza does not stay in Gaza. It is exported to buyers who see in Israel’s dominance a model for their own disputes.
For the European Union, the Elbit–Serbia deal poses a real problem. Can Brussels credibly claim to uphold human rights and international law while a candidate state pours billions into Israel’s arms industry in the middle of a genocide case? If the EU indulges Vučić, it undermines its own credibility. If it confronts him, it risks alienating Serbia further and destabilising the accession process.
So far, the EU has chosen indulgence, but then this news has only just come out, though you have to wonder whether they already knew as well. But this indulgence is unsustainable. As Albanese warned, states that ignore ICC obligations and enable Israel’s war economy are hollowing out international law. The longer Brussels delays, the more complicit it becomes, so now we know about this, they need to act.
There is an unsettling symmetry between Serbia’s past and Israel’s present. In the 1990s, Serbia was accused of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 2025, Israel is accused of genocide in Gaza. Both justified their actions through narratives of victimhood, claiming to be under existential threat while committing atrocities. Both faced international condemnation but sought to launder their reputations through military strength.
For Serbia to bankroll Israel today is thus more than opportunism. It is a meeting of kindred logics. Both states embody a refusal to confront their own crimes, a preference for power over justice, and a willingness to destabilise neighbours in pursuit of nationalist pride.
The Elbit–Serbia deal illustrates how conflicts are not contained but exported. What begins in Gaza does not stay there. The same drones that bomb apartment blocks in Rafah are now being sold to Belgrade. The same rockets that terrorise Palestinians may one day be aimed across the Balkans. Israel, desperate to sustain its war economy under genocide scrutiny, has found in Serbia a willing buyer. Serbia, eager to project prestige, has found in Israel a supplier that will sell without questions.
The cost, however, is borne not only by Palestinians and Israelis but by Europe itself. The Balkans remain fragile. Ethnic tensions remain unresolved. The EU’s peace project remains incomplete. By allowing its war economy to expand into this arena, Israel is exporting instability as much as anything else. By funding it, Serbia is complicit not only in the genocide in Gaza but also in the risk of renewed conflict at home.
The Elbit–Serbia deal is therefore far more than just another arms contract. It is a warning of how Israel’s Gaza doctrine travels, of how impunity spreads, and of how fragile peace can be undone. The only question is whether Europe recognises the danger in time, or whether it will once again sleepwalk into conflict until the Balkans are burning once more.
Having required the sign off of his government however, and clearly Elbit having got it, Netanyahu has recently put on show exactly why he would sign off on such a thing and underlined the grotesqueness of this Serbian deal, by threatening to do to Gaza what the Allied forces did to Dresden at the end of World War II, not only highlighting an incident widely seen as one that should never have happened, but missing the point entirely that he has already done far worse in Gaza already. Check out this video recommendation here to find out all about that media misfire as your suggested next watch.
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