There is no Free Lunch

Insured May Limit the Extent of UM Coverage Acquired

You Only Get What You Pay For

Post 5068

Sonya Harness was employed as a home health nurse with Volunteer Staffing, Inc. On July 10, 2021, Ms. Harness was injured in a two-car collision while driving her vehicle in connection with her employment. She later sought uninsured motorist benefits under a business automobile liability policy issued to her employer.

In Sonya Harness v. John Mansfield et al., No. E2023-00726-COA-R3-CV, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Knoxville (April 30, 2025) resolved the dispute.

FACTS

Arguing that the uninsured motorist coverage in the business policy did not apply to the Ms. Harness' accident, the insurer successfully moved for summary judgment.

At the time of the accident, she was driving her own vehicle, a Chevrolet Trax, within the course and scope of her employment. Ms. Harness had insurance coverage for her vehicle under a personal automobile liability insurance policy issued by Tennessee Farmer's Mutual Insurance Company. Her policy included uninsured motorist coverage. Volunteer Staffing maintained a business automobile liability policy issued by The Cincinnati Insurance Company that also provided liability coverage for Ms. Harness under these circumstances.

The Commercial Policy

By its plain terms, the policy limited uninsured motorist coverage to injuries that occurred while the insured was occupying an automobile specifically listed in the declarations. Because Ms. Harness's Chevrolet Trax was not listed, the insurer argued that the uninsured motorist coverage in the Cincinnati policy did not apply.

ANALYSIS

By statute, every general automobile liability policy issued or renewed in Tennessee must include uninsured motorist coverage. The named insured may reject coverage completely or select lower limits not less than the minimum coverage limits in [he Financial Responsibility Law in a signed writing.

It is undisputed that Ms. Harness was an additional "insured" under the liability provisions of the Cincinnati policy. As required by the statute, the Cincinnati policy includes uninsured motorist coverage with limits equal to the liability limits for bodily injury.

The Coverage Form specifies that each type of coverage in the policy only applies to the automobiles shown as covered. By its plain terms, the policy expressly limits uninsured motorist coverage to injuries that occur while occupying the one described vehicle and Ms. Harness suffered her injuries while driving her vehicle, the Chevrolet Trax not the described vehicle.

The statute mandates the coverage amount. Otherwise, the statute does not explicitly address the scope of the required coverage or dictate the form of coverage. Ms. Harness contended that the statutory requirement is "for the protection of persons insured under the policy" who are injured by an uninsured motorist. And she is an "insured" under the liability provisions of the Cincinnati policy.

The Court of Appeals noted that the statutory language does not guarantee uninsured motorist coverage for Ms. Harness in this instance. Ms. Harness' rights under the policy necessarily depend on the choices and selections of coverage made by the named insured Volunteer Staffing that chose to include the mandated amount of uninsured motorist coverage in the Cincinnati policy. Volunteer Staffing  decided to limit that coverage to specifically listed vehicles and its choices did not contravene the plain language of the uninsured motorist statute.

Because the Cincinnati policy unambiguously limits uninsured motorist coverage to injuries that occur while the insured is occupying a specifically listed vehicle and because Ms. Harness was not in that automobile the statute allowed Cincinnati to exclude from UM coverage. The limitation in the Cincinnati policy appears to be designed to avoid duplicate coverage. As such, it is a permissible limitation under the statute. The Cincinnati policy does not provide uninsured motorist coverage for Ms. Harness's injuries.

ZALMA OPINION

Statutory interpretation by an appellate court must be reasonable and directed to fulfill the intention of the Legislature. Finding that it was appropriate to allow an insured and its insurer to limit its uninsured motorist coverage to named vehicles and limit Ms. Harness' coverage to that she purchased for her own vehicle and not allow her to double the available coverage by recovering from her employer's insurance which the insured refused to purchase. Reasonable interpretation made it appropriate to affirm the trial court.

(c) 2025 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc.

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