War diary from a platoon leader from the SS Div. Reich (mot) during the advance on Moscow - Part 10

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Episode 131

The last time we were with Kurt on July 18th his platoon as part of Rgt. Der Führer had been ordered to take the train station at Potschinok where enemy forces were believed to be gathering. Then they were to move to the south and take the nearby lying airport.

During our advance along the road, around noon we suddenly began receiving extremely accurate enemy fire which forced our formation to scatter and brought us to a halt. At the time, the 5th company had been in the lead position and their commander quickly ordered a frontal attack with emphasis being put on the taking out of the enemy artillery batteries. We charged over the open land and received only light small arms fire which had little effect. Without much resistance we managed to take the bank of the Ssosh River.

While the engagement described by Kurt progressed, this order came in from headquarters of PzG 2.

By order of Panzergruppe 2, the Dorogobusch bridgehead should be taken by cooperating battle groups and then secured to the North and East. Division Reich should send a reinforced regiment to the north of the 10th PzD in order to clear the way for that division so that it can begin moving towards Dorogobusch as quickly as possible.

At the river there is only 1 small barge which is already half under water so the process of crossing is slow and we’re only able to take the town on the far bank in the late afternoon. Combing through forested area we skirmish with groups of enemy soldiers, take a number of prisoners and uncover stocks of enemy munitions and supply vehicles that are mostly related to the Soviet anti aircraft guns that had fired on us earlier on the road. In the evening we manage to quickly advance and catch up to Battalion HQ.

When we make use of multiple primary historical sources, such as Kurt’s wardiary, the OKW campaign maps, and the original unit orders, we begin to get a clearer view of how it all fits together. With the taking of the Dorogobusch bridgehead the Smolensk - Moscow highway would be easily cut in both directions and an approach to the Soviet capital could be opened up.

The operational commanders were anxious about these orders as the area had not been adequately reconnoitered by air and enemy strength couldn’t be estimated. That’s why the enemy positions on the map are not marked. Interesting, the question marks, they knew something was there but they didn’t know what.

Kurt writes that the next few days are filled with long marches and constant combat with strong enemy forces. In the evenings the division remains busy securing the territory gained from the enemy.

So the fears from the commanders going into the operation had not been incorrect. The landscape was far marshier than expected, and it turned out that the German maps were terribly inadequate. Roads that were indicated either did not exist at all or turned out to be little more than dirt paths. Expected bridges were in terrible condition and in many cases completely unusable. The advancing troops were often forced out of formation to traverse the natural obstacles in whatever way they could.

Paul Hausser, 2nd SS Panzer Division, Waffen SS