Did LOGISTICAL constraints in BARBAROSSA make victory for the Germans impossible in 1941?

Episode 188
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OPERATION BARBAROSSA:
A 21ST CENTURY LOOK AT
JUNE 22,1941
E.1-1

THIS SERIES IS DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY
OF OUR DEAR FRIEND JOHN PRADOS

In cooperation with:
NOISY REALITY

Barbarossa Logistics: Achilles heel of the Wehrmacht

German logistics going to rely on rail transport to move supplies.
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Different rail gauges means Germans have to rebuild rail network as they move East.
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Soviets wreck rails. Op. plan assumed the capture intact of rail lines and rolling stock + German ability to use captured Soviet rail equipment.
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Soviet locomotives bigger, designed for traveling longer distances, around twice that of a European locomotive. Germans have to build more service stations.
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Service stations require trained personnel, train sheds, repair facilities, turntables, water towers, etc. Heavy equipment needed to build all of it.
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Railroad troops had huge shortages of manpower & material.
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Only 1,000 trucks allocated to Eisenbahntruppe.
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German rail decline since 1939.
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Army QMG Eduard Wagner didn't have authority over the the Chief of Wehrmacht Transport, Lt. Gen. Rudolf Gercke. Gercke subordinate to OKW, Wagner, OKH.

• Wagner could tell Gercke what to transport, but could not order him where and when to ship it.
Panzers concentrate Germany’s motorized vehicles.
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TO&E for an infantry division: 942 vehicles (inc. motorcycles) and 1,200 horse-drawn wagons.
• 3 transport regiments for the entire Wehrmacht. 9,000 men and 6,600 vehicles total.
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Could deliver 19,500 tons for limited distances.
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2,000 different types of vehicles in use by the Wehrmacht. 1 million Spare parts!

Barbarossa

Attempt (‘Schell Programme’) to standardize vehicles a failure. No Studebaker.
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Use of many civilian vehicles. Including from captured nations (13,000 French trucks).
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3-4,000 trucks from N. Africa.
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Some trucks were two-wheel drive, not suited for heavy duty. Units suffer 50% vehicle losses that could not be replaced by production.
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Army had 120,000 trucks in Feb. 1940. Already had a shortfall of 2,668 in 1940, losing 2,400/month.
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Rubber shortage reduced vehicle production to 4,000 vehicles/month.
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18th Panzer Division had 111 types of trucks, 96 of personnel carriers, 27 of motorcycles.
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Halder reduced the total number of vehicles allotted in order to try and catch up to what was required.
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More horse-drawn wagons added to TO&Es.
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Integral Transport Capacity – AG North 12,750 tons; AG Centre 25,020 tons; AG South 15,880 tons.
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Each Motorized Division needs 300 tons/day. Existing trucks can only deliver 70 tons/day.
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Primary supply dumps established 100 km from border, then secondary supply dumps 300 km further on.

Halder told by Gen. Georg Thomas (Chief of Defence Economy & Armaments Office, OKW), Fuel supplies “will be exhausted in the autumn, aviation fuel will be down to ½, regular down to only ¼.” Diesel and heating oil to ½.
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Plenty of coal, less oil. Relying more on rail would have alleviated fuel problems.
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Would have meant less wear & tear of vehicles.
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Gen. Thomas: Fuel allows for an initial advance of 7-800 km. 2-3 months active operations.
• Would seem to necessitate an operational pause… at Smolensk.
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Soviets use lower-octane oil that had to be treated before used by German vehicles.
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Could not use captured fuel stocks like they had been able to in W. Europe.
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Only 40,000 of 850,000 miles of roads in the USSR were surfaced, all-weather roads.
• Wear and tear on German vehicles will be a major problem.
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Hitler had a good reason to prioritize economic goals.
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Halder: “I refuse to allow economic considerations to influence the operational direction.”
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Resort to “living off the land” and requisitioning goods and food from the Soviet people for the Wehrmacht necessitates the Hunger Plan to deliberately starve the Soviet people. Helps drive them into the arms of Stalin.

Barbarossa and the Balkans

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David Glantz has argued that the Balkan diversion did not delay Barbarossa.
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A mid/late-June start was always in the plan.
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Divisions used in Yugoslavia replaced 2/3 from OKH Reserves.
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But the invasion of Greece [Op. Marita] did take away some divisions for occupation duties.
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Maintenance losses of vehicles in Greece were significant.
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Those divisions slated for Barbarossa from Greece had to be sent back to Germany to refit.
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2nd, 5th Panzer, and 60th Motorized Divisions were not ready in time, had to be held back until October 1941.
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220 transport aircraft lost in Crete and 4,000 elite airborne troops.
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Balkan operations deepens over-extension of the Wehrmacht.

Barbarossa:

The Key Questions

Did the logistical constraints under which Barbarossa was undertaken mean that victory could not be achieved in 1941?
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Was it a doomed operation from the beginning?
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Was the USSR too big for the Wehrmacht to conquer?