The Report from Iron Mountain (1967) JOHN DOE RELEASED TOP SECRET Report to Public

CONTENTS: Foreword 3
Background Information 8
Statement by "John Doe" 16
The Report of the Special Study Group 18
Letter of Transmittal 18
Introduction 19

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Section 1. Scope of the Study 21
Section 2. Disarmament and the Economy 24
Section 3. Disarmament Scenarios 28
Section 4. War & Peace as Social Systems 30
Section 5. The Functions of War 33
Section 6. Substitutes for the Functions of War 46
Section 7. Summary and Conclusions 59
Section 8. Recommendations 69

NOTES 74

3 FOREWORD

"John Doe," as I will call him in this book for reasons that will be made clear, is
a professor at a large university in the Middle West. His field is one of the
social sciences, but I will not identify him beyond this. He telephoned me one
evening last winter, quite unexpectedly; we had not been in touch for several
years. He was in New York for a few days, he said, and there was something
important he wanted to discuss with me. He wouldn't say what it was. We met
for lunch the next day at a midtown restaurant.

He was obviously disturbed. He made small talk for half an hour, which was
quite out of character, and I didn't press him. Then, apropos of nothing, he
mentioned a dispute between a writer and a prominent political family that had
been in the headlines. What, he wanted to know, were my views on "freedom of
information"? How would I qualify them? And so on. My answers were not
memorable, but they seemed to satisfy him. Then, quite abruptly, he began to
tell me the following story:

Early in August of 1963, he said, he found a message on his desk that a "Mrs.
Potts" had called him from Washington. When he returned the call, a MAN
answered immediately, and told Doe, among other things, that he had been
selected to serve on a commission "of the highest importance." Its objective was
to determine, accurately and realistically, the nature of the problems that would
confront the United States if and when a condition of "permanent peace" should
arrive, and to draft a program for dealing with this contingency. The man
described the unique procedures that were to govern the commission's work and
that were expected to extend its scope far beyond that of any previous
examination of these problems.

Considering that the caller did not precisely identify either himself or his
agency, his persuasiveness must have been a truly remarkable order. Doe
entertained no serious doubts of the bona fides of the project, however, chiefly
because of his previous experience with the excessive secrecy that often
surrounds quasi-governmental activities. In addition, the man at the other end of
the line demonstrated an impressively complete and surprisingly detailed
knowledge of Doe's work and personal life. He also mentioned the names of
others who were to serve with the group; most of them were known to Doe by
reputation. Doe agreed to take the assignment — he felt he had no real choice in
the matter — and to appear the second Saturday following at Iron Mountain,
New York. An airline ticket arrived in his mail the next morning.

4 The cloak-and-dagger tone of this convocation was further enhanced by the
meeting place itself. Iron Mountain, located near the town of Hudson, is like
something out of Ian Fleming or E. Phillips Oppenheim. It is an underground
nuclear hideout for hundreds of large American corporations. Most of them use
it as an emergency storage vault for important documents. But a number of
them maintain substitute corporate headquarters as well, where essential
personnel could presumably survive and continue to work after an attack. This
latter group includes such firms as Standard Oil of New Jersey, Manufacturers
Hanover Trust, and Shell.

I will leave most of the story of the operations of the Special Study Group, as
the commission was formally called, for Doe to tell in his own words
("Background Information"). At this point it is necessary to say only that it met
and worked regularly for over two and a half years, after which it produced a
Report. It was this document, and what to do about it, that Doe wanted to talk to
me about.

The Report, he said, had been suppressed — both by the Special Study Group
itself and by the government INTERAGENCY committee to which it had been
submitted. After months of agonizing. Doe had decided that he would no longer
be party to keeping it secret. What he wanted from me was advice and
assistance in having it published. He gave me his copy to read, with the express
understanding that if for any reason I were unwilling to become involved, I
would say nothing about it to anyone else.

I read the Report that same night. I will pass over my own reactions to it, except
to say that the unwillingness of Doe's associates to publicize their findings
became readily understandable. What had happened was that they had been so
tenacious in their determination to deal comprehensively with the many
problems of transition to peace that the original questions asked of them were
never quite answered. Instead, this is what they concluded:

Lasting peace, while no theoretically impossible, is probably unattainable; even
if it could be achieved it would almost certainly not be in the best interests of a
stable society to achieve it.

That is the gist of what they say. Behind their qualified academic language runs
this general argument: War fills certain functions essential to the stability of our
society; until other ways of filling them are developed, the war system must be
maintained ~ and improved in effectiveness.

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It is not surprising that the Group, in its Letter of Transmittal, did not choose to
justify its work to "the lay reader, unexposed to the exigencies of higher
political or military responsibility." Its Report was addressed, deliberately, to
unnamed government administrators of high rank; it assumed - considerable
political sophistication from this select audience. To the general reader,
therefore, the substance of the document may be even more unsettling than its
conclusions. He may not be prepared for some of its assumptions ~ for instance,
that most medical advances are viewed more as problems than as progress; or
that poverty is necessary and desirable, public postures by politicians to the
contrary notwithstanding; or that standing armies are, among other things
social-welfare institutions in exactly the same sense as are old-people's homes
and mental hospitals. It may strike him as odd to find the probably explanation
of "flying saucer" incidents disposed of en passant in less than a sentence. He
may be less surprised to find that the space program and the "controversial
antimissile missile and fallout shelter programs are understood to have the
spending of vast sums of money, not the advancement of science or national
defense, as their principal goals, and to learn that "military" draft policies are
only remotely concerned with defense.

He may be offended to find the organized repression of minority groups, and
even the reestablishment of slavery, seriously (and on the whole favorably
discussed as possible aspects of a world at peace. He is not likely to take kindly
to the notion of the deliberate intensification of air and water pollution (as part
of a program leading to peace), even when the reason for considering it is made
clear. That a world without war will have to turn sooner rather than later to
universal test-tube procreation will be less disturbing, if no more appealing. But
few readers will not be taken aback, at least, by a few lines in the Report's
conclusions, repeated in its formal recommendations, that suggest that the long-
range planning—and "budgeting" ~ of the "optimum" number of lives to be
destroyed annually in overt warfare is high on the Group's list of priorities for
government action.

I cite these few examples primarily to warn the general reader what he can
expect. The statesmen and strategists for whose eyes the Report was intended
obviously need no such protective admonition.

This book, of course, is evidence of my response to Doe's request. After
carefully considering the problems that might confront the publisher of the
Report, we took it to The Dial Press. There, its significance was immediately
recognized, and, more important, we were given firm assurances that no outside
pressures of any sort would be permitted to interfere with its publication.

6

It should be made clear that Doe does not disagree with the substance of the
Report, which represents as genuine consensus in all important respects. He
constituted a minority of one ~ but only on the issue of disclosing it to the
general public. A look at how the Group dealt with this question will be
illuminating

The debate took place at the Group's last full meeting before the Report was
written, late in March, 1966, and again at Iron Mountain. Two facts must be
kept in mind, by way of background. The first is that the Special Study Group
had never been explicitly charged with or sworn to secrecy, either when it was
convened or at any time thereafter. The second is that the Group had
nevertheless operated as if it had been. This was assumed from the
circumstances of its inception and from the tone of its instructions. (The Group's
acknowledgment of help from "the many persons. ...who contributed so greatly
to our work" is somewhat equivocal; these persons were not told the nature of
the project for which their special resources of information were solicited.)

Those who argued the case for keeping the Report secret were admittedly
motivated by fear of the explosive political effects that could be expected from
publicity. For evidence, they pointed to the suppression of the far less
controversial report of then-Senator Hubert Humphrey's subcommittee on
disarmament in 1962. (Subcommittee members had reportedly feared that it
might be used by Communist propagandists, as Senator Stuart Symington put it,
to "back up the Marxian theory that was production was the reason for the
success of capitalism.") Similar political precautions had been taken with the
better-known Gaither Report in 1957, and even with the so-called Moynihan
Report in 1965.

Furthermore, they insisted, a distinction must be made between serious studies,
which are normally classified unless and until policy makers decide to release
them, and conventional "showcase" projects, organized to demonstrate a
political leadership's concerns about an issue and to deflect the energy of those
pressing for action on it. (The example used, because some of the Group had
participated in it, was a "While House Conference" on intended cooperation,
disarmament, etc., which had been staged late in 1965 to offset complaints
about escalation of Vietnam War.)

Doe acknowledges this distinction, as well as the strong possibility of public
misunderstanding. But he feels that if the sponsoring agency had wanted to
mandate secrecy it could have done so at the outset. It could also have assigned
the project to one of the government's established "think tanks," which normally
work on a classified basis. He scoffed at fear of public reaction, which could

7

have no lasting effect on long-range measures that might be taken to implement
the Group's proposals, and derided the Group's abdication of responsibility for
its opinions and conclusions. So far as he was concerned, there was such a thing
as a public right to know what was being done on its behalf; the burden of proof
was on those who would abridge it.

If my account seems to give Doe the better of the argument, despite his failure
to convince his colleagues, so be it. My participation in this book testifies that I
am not neutral. In my opinion, the decision of the Special Study Group to
censor its own findings was not merely timid but presumptuous. But the refusal,
as of this writing, of the agencies for which the Report was prepared to release
it themselves raises broader questions of public policy. Such questions center on
the continuing use of self-serve definitions of "security" to avoid possible
political embarrassment. It is ironic how often this practice backfires.

I should state, for the record, that I do not share the attitudes toward war and
peace, life and death, and survival of the species manifested in the Report. Few
readers will. In human terms, it is an outrageous document. But it does
represent a serious and challenging effort to define an enormous problem. And
it explains, or certainly appears to explain, aspects of American policy
otherwise incomprehensible by the ordinary standards of common sense. What
we may think of these explanations is something else, but it seems to me that
we are entitled to know not only what they are but whose they are.

By "whose" I don't mean merely the names of the authors of the Report. Much
more important, we have a right to know to what extent their assumptions of
social necessity are shared by the decision-makers in our government. Which do
they accept and which do they reject? However disturbing the answers, only full
and frank discussion offers any conceivable hope of solving the problems raised
by the Special Study Group in their Report from Iron Mountain.

L.C.L. New York June 1967

8

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

[The following account of the workings of the Special Study Group is taken
verbatim from a series of tape recorded interviews I had with "John Doe." The
transcript has been edited to minimize the intrusion of my questions and
comments, as well as for length, and the sequence has been revised in the
interest of continuity. L.C.L.]

HOW WAS THE GROUP FORMED?

...The general idea for it, for this kind of study dates back at least to 1961. It
started with some of the new people who came in with the Kennedy
administration, mostly, I think, with McNamara, Bundy, and Rusk. They were
impatient about many things.... One of them was that no really serious work had
been done about planning for peace — a long-range peace, that is, with long-
rang planning.

Everything that had been written on the subject [before 1961] was superficial.
There was insufficient appreciation of the scope of the problem. The main
reason for this, of course, was that the idea of a real peace in the world, general
disarmament and so on, was looked on as Utopian. Or even crack- pot. This is
still true, and it's easy enough to understand when you look at what's going on
in the world today.... It was reflected in the studies that had been made up to that
time. They were not realistic...

The idea of the Special Study, the exact form it would take, was worked out
early in '63... The settlement of the Cuban missile affair had something to do
with it, but what helped most to get it moving were the big changes in military

spending that were being planned Plants being closed, relocations, and so

forth. Most of it wasn't made public until much later....

[I understand] it took a long time to select the people for the Group. The calls
didn't go out until the summer

WHO MADE THE SELECTION?

That's something I can't tell you. I wasn't involved with the preliminary
planning. The first I knew of it was when I was called myself. But three of the
people had been in on it, and what the rest of us know we learned from them,
about what went on earlier. I do know that it started very informally. I don't
know what particular government agency approved the project.

9

WOULD YOU CARE TO MAKE A GUESS?

All right— I think it was an ad hoc committee, at the cabinet level, or near it. It
had to be. I suppose they gave the organizational job—making arrangements,
paying the bills, and so on — to somebody from the State or Defense of the
National Security Council. Only one of us was in touch with Washington, and I
wasn't the one. But I can tell you that very, very few people knew about
us.. ..For instance, there was the Ackley Committee. It was set up after we were.
If you read their report — the same old tune — economic reconversion, turning
sword plants into plowshare factories... I think you'll wonder if even the
President knew about our Group. The Ackley Committee certainly didn't.

IS THAT POSSIBLE, REALLY? I MEAN THAT NOT EVEN THE
PRESIDENT KNEW OF YOUR COMMISSION?

Well, I don't think there's anything odd about the government attacking a
problem at two different levels. Or even about two or three [government]
agencies working at cross-purposes. It happens all the time. Perhaps the
President did know. And I don't mean to denigrate the Ackley Committee, but it
was exactly that narrowness of approach that we were supposed to get away
from

You have to remember ~ you've read the Report— that what they wanted from
us was a different kind of thinking. It was a matter of approach. Herman Kahn
calls is "Byzantine "--no agonizing over cultural and religious values. No moral
posturing. It's the kind of thinking that Rand and the Hudson Institute and
I.D.A. (Institute for Defense Analysis.) brought into war planning... What they
asked up to do, and I think we did it, was to give the same kind of treatment to
the hypothetical nuclear war... We may have gone further than they expected,
but once you establish your premises and your logic you can't turn back....

Kahn's books, for example, are misunderstood, at least by laymen. They shock
people. But you see, what's important about them is not his conclusions, or his
opinions. It's the method. He has done more than anyone else I can think of to
get the general public accustomed to the style of modem military

thinking Today it's possible for a columnist to write about "counterforce

strategy" and "minimum deterrence" and "credible first strike capability" with-
out having to explain every other word. He can write about war and strategy
without getting bogged down in questions or morality

10

The other big difference about or work is breadth. The Report speaks for itself. I
can't say that we took every relevant aspect of life and society into account, but
I don't think we missed anything essential...

WHY WAS THE PROJECT GIVEN TO AN OUTSIDE COMMISSION?
WHY COULDN'T IT HAVE BEEN HANDLED BY AN APPROPRIATE
GOVERNMENT AGENCY?

I think that's obvious, or should be. The kind of thinking wanted from our
Group just isn't to be had in a formal government operation. Too many
constraints. Too many inhibitions. This isn't a new problem. Why else would
outfits like Rand and Hudson stay in business? Any assignment that's at all
sophisticated is almost always given to an outside group. This is true even in the
State Department, in the "gray" operations, those that are supposed to be
unofficial, but are really as official as can be. Also with the C.I.A....

For our study, even the private research centers were too institutional... A lot of
thought went into making sure that our thinking would be unrestricted. All
kinds of little things. The way we were called into the Group, the places we
met, all kinds of subtle devices to remind us. For instance, even our name, the
Special Study Group. You know government names. Wouldn't you think we'd
have been called "Operation Olive Branch," or "Project Pacifica," or something
like that? Nothing like that for us— too allusive, too suggestive. And no minutes
of our meetings— too inhibiting.... About who might be reading them. Of
course, we took notes for our own use. And among ourselves, we usually called
ourselves "The Iron Mountain Boys," or "Our Thing," or whatever came to
mind

WHAT CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THE MEMBERS OF THE
GROUP?

I'll have to stick to generalities.... There were fifteen of us. The important thing
was that we represented a very wide range of disciplines. And not all academic.
People from the natural sciences, the social sciences, even the humanities. We
had a lawyer and a businessman. Also, a professional war planner. Also, you
should know that everyone in the Group had done work of distinction in at least
two different fields. The interdisciplinary element was built in

It's true that there were no women in the Group, but I don't think that was

significant We were all American citizens, of course. And all, I can say, in

very good health, at least when we began.... You see, the first order of business,
at the first meeting, was the reading of dossiers. They were very detailed, and

11

not just professional, but also personal. They included medical histories. I
remember one very curious thing, for whatever it's worth. Most of us, and that
includes me, had a record of abnormally high uric acid concentrations in the

blood None of us had ever had this experience, of a public inspection of

credentials, or medical reports. It was very disturbing...

But it was deliberate. The reason for it was to emphasize that we were supposed
to make ALL our own decisions on procedure, without outside rules. This
included judging each other's qualifications and making allowances for possible
bias. I don't think it affected our work directly, but it made the point it was

supposed to make That we should ignore absolutely nothing that might

conceivably affect our objectivity.

[At this point I persuaded Doe that a brief occupational description of the
individual members of the Group would serve a useful purpose for readers of
the Report. The list which follows was worked out on paper. (It might be more
accurate to say it was negotiated)/. The problem was to give as much relevant
information as possible without violating Doe's commitment to protect his
colleagues' anonymity. It turned out to be very difficult, especially in the cases
of those members who are very well known. For this reason, secondary areas of
achievement or reputations are usually not shown.

The simple alphabetical "names" were assigned by Doe for convenient
reference; they bear no intended relation to actual names. "Able" was the
Group's Washington contact. It was he who brought and read the dossiers, and
who most often acted as chairman. He, "Baker," and "Cox" were the three who
had been involved in the preliminary planning. There is no other significance to
the order of listing.

"Arthur Able" is an historian and political theorist, who has served in
government.

"Bernard Baker: is a professor of international law and a consultant on
government operations.

"Charles Cox" is an economist, social critic, and biographer.
"John Doe."

"Edward Ellis" is a sociologist often involved in public affairs.

12

"Frank Fox" is a cultural anthropologist.

"George Green" is a psychologist, educator, and developer of personnel testing
systems.

"Harold Hill" is a psychiatrist, who has conducted extensive studies of the
relationship between individual and group behavior.

"John Jones" is a scholar and literary critic.

"Martin Miller" is a physical chemist, whose work has received inter- national
recognition at the highest level.

"Paul Peters" is a biochemist, who has made important discoveries bearing on
reproductive processes.

"Richard Roe" is a mathematician affiliated with an independent West Coast
research institution.

"Samuel Smith" is an astronomer, physicist, and communications theorist.

"Thomas Taylor" is a systems analyst and war planner, who has written
extensively on war, peace, and international relations.

"William White" is an industrialist, who has undertaken many special
government assignments.]

HOW DID THE GROUP OPERATE? I MEAN, WHERE AND WHEN
DID YOU MEET, AND SO FORTH?

We met on the average of once a month. Usually it was on weekends, and
usually for two days. We had a few longer sessions, and one that lasted only

four hours We met all over the country, always at a different place, except

for the first and last times, which were at Iron Mountain. It was like a traveling
seminar.... Sometimes at hotels, sometimes at universities. Twice we met at
summer camps, and once at a private estate, in Virginia. We used a business
place in Pittsburgh, and another in Poughkeepsie, [New York].... We never met
in Washington, or on government property any where.... Able would announce
the times and places two meetings ahead. They were never changed

We didn't divide into subcommittees, or anything else that formal. But we all
took individual assignments between meetings. A lot of it involved getting

13

information from other people.... Among the fifteen of us, I don't thing there
was anybody in the academic or professional world we couldn't call on if we

wanted to, and we took advantage of it We were paid a very modest per

diem. All of it was called "expenses" on the vouchers. We were told not to
report it on our tax returns.... The checks were drawn on a special account of
Abie's at a New York bank. He signed them.... I don't know what the study cost.
So far as our time and travel were concerned, it couldn't have come to more
than the low six-figure range. But the big item must have been computer time,
and I have no idea how high this ran

YOU SAY THAT YOU DON'T THINK YOUR WORK WAS AFFECTED
BY PROFESSIONAL BIAS. WHAT ABOUT POLITICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL BIAS? IS IT POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH
QUESTIONS OF WAR AND PEACE WITHOUT REFLECTING
PERSONAL VALUES?

Yes, it is. I can understand your skepticism. But if you had been at any of our
meetings you'd have had a very hard time figuring out who were the liberals and
who were the conservatives, or who were hawks and who were doves. There IS
such a thing as objectivity, and I think we had it... I don't say no one had any
emotional reaction to what we were doing. We all did, to some extent. As a
matter of fact, two members had heart attacks after we were finished, and I'll be
the first to admit it probably wasn't a coincidence.

YOU SAID YOU MADE UP YOUR OWN GROUND RULES. WHAT
WERE THESE GROUND RULES?

The most important were informality and unanimity . By informality I mean
that our discussions were open-ended. We went as far afield as any one of us
thought we had to. For instance, we spent a lot of time on the relationship
between military recruitment policies and industrial employment. Before we
were finished with it, we'd gone through the history of western penal codes and
any number of comparative psychiatric studies [of draftees and volunteers]. We
looked over the organization of the Inca empire. We determined the effects of
automation on underdeveloped societies.... It was all relevant....

By unanimity, I don't mean that we kept taking votes, like a jury. I mean that we
stayed with every issue until we had what the Quakers call a "sense of the
meeting." It was time-consuming. But in the long run it saved time. Eventually
we all got on the same wavelength, so to speak

14

Of course we had differences, and big ones, especially in the beginning... For
instance, in Section I you might think we were merely clarifying our
instructions. Not so; it took a long time before we all agreed to a strict
interpretation.... Roe and Taylor deserve most of the credit for this... There are
many things in the Report that look obvious now, but didn't seem so obvious
then. For instance, on the relationship of war to social systems. The original

premise was conventional, from Clausewitz That war was an "instrument"

of broader political values. Able was the only one who challenged this, at first.
Fox called his position "perverse." Yet it was Fox who furnished most of the
data that led us all to agree with Able eventually. I mention this be- cause I
think it's a good example of the way we worked. A triumph of method over

cliche I certainly don't intend to go into details about who took what side

about what, and when. But I will say, to give credit where due, that only Roe,
Able, Hill and Taylor were able to see, at the beginning, where our method was
taking us.

BUT YOU ALWAYS REACHED AGREEMENT, EVENTUALLY?

Yes. It's a unanimous report... I don't mean that our sessions were always
harmonious. Some of them were rough. The last six months there was a lot of
quibbling about small points... We'd been under pressure for a long time, we'd

been working together too long. It was natural that we got on each other's

nerves. For a while Able and Taylor weren't speaking to each other. Miller
threatened to quit. But this all passed. There were no important differences...

HOW WAS THE REPORT ACTUALLY WRITTEN? WHO DID THE
WRITING?

We all had a hand in the first draft. Jones and Able put it together, and then
mailed it around for review before working out a final version... The only
problems were the form it should take and whom we were writing it for. And, of
course, the question of disclosure.... [Doe's comments on this point are
summarized in the introduction.]

YOU MENTIONED A "PEACE GAMES ' MANUAL. WHAT ARE
PEACE GAMES?

I wanted to say something about that. The Report barely mentions it. "Peace
games" is a method we developed during the course of the study. It's a
forecasting technique, an information system. I'm very excited about it. Even if
nothing is done about our recommendations— which is conceivable—this is
something that can't be ignored. It will revolutionize the study of social

15

problems. It's a by-product of the study. We needed a fast, dependable
procedure to approximate the effects of disparate social phenomena on other
social phenomena. We got it. It's in a primitive phase, but it works.

HOW ARE PEACE GAMES PLAYED? ARE THEY LIKE RAND'S WAR
GAMES?

You don't "play" peace games, like chess or Monopoly, any more than you play
war games with toy soldiers. You use computers. It's a programming system. A
computer "language," like Fortran, or Algol, or Jovial.... Its advantage is its
superior capacity to interrelate data with no apparent common points of
reference.... A simple analogy is likely to be misleading. But I can give you
some examples. For instance, supposing I asked you to figure out what effect a
moon landing by U.S. astronauts would have on an election in, say, Sweden. Or
what effect a change in the draft law~a specific change—would have on the
value of real estate in downtown Manhattan? Or a certain change in college
entrance requirements in the United States on the British shipping industry?

You would probably say, first, that there would be no effect to speak of, and
second, that there would be no way of telling. But you'd be wrong on both
counts. In each case there would be an effect, and the peace games method
could tell you what it would be, quantitatively. I didn't take these examples out
of the air. We used them in working out the method.... Essentially, it's an
elaborate high-speed trial-and-error system for determining working algorithms.
Like most sophisticated types of computer problem-solving...

A lot of the "games" of this kind you read about are just glorified and
conversational exercises. They really are games, and nothing more. I just saw
one reported in the Canadian Computer Society Bulletin, called a "Vietnam
Peace Game." They use simulation techniques, but the programming hypotheses
are speculative....

The idea of a problem-solving system like this is not original with us. ARPA
(the Advanced Research Projects Agency, of the Department of Defense DoD.)
has been working on something like it. So has General Electric, in California.

There are others We were successful not because we know more than they

do about programming, which we don't, but because we leaned how to
formulate the problems accurately. It goes back to the old saw. You can always
find the answer if you know the right question

SUPPOSING YOU HADN'T DEVELOPED THIS METHOD. WOULD
YOU HAVE COME TO THE SAME CONCLUSIONS IN THE REPORT?

16

Certainly. But it would have taken many times longer. But please don't
misunderstand my enthusiasm [about the peace games method]. With all due
respect to the effects of computer technology on modern thinking, basic
judgments must still be made by human beings. The peace games technique isn't
responsible for our Report. We are.

17

STATEMENT BY "JOHN DOE"

Contrary to the decision of the Special Study Group, of which I was a member,
I have arranged for the general release of our Report. I am grateful to Mr.
Leonard C. Lewin for his invaluable assistance in making this possible, and to
The Dial Press for accepting the challenge of publication. Responsibility for
taking this step, however, is mine and mine alone.

I am well aware that my action may be taken as a breach of faith by some of my
former colleagues. But in my view my responsibility to the society for which I
am a part supersedes any self-assumed obligation on the part of fifteen
individual men. Since our Report can be considered on its merits, it is not
necessary for me to disclose their identity to accomplish my purpose. Yet I
gladly abandon my own anonymity it is were possible to do so without at the
same time comprising theirs, to defend our work publicly if and when they
release me from this personal bond.

But this is secondary. What is needed now, and needed badly, is widespread
public discussion and debate about the elements of war and the problems of
peace. I hope that publication of this Report will serve to initiate it.

18

THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY GROUP
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the convener of this Group:

Attached is the Report of the Special Study Group estabUshed by you in
August, 1963, 1) to consider the problems involved in the contingency of a
transition to a general condition of peace, and 2) to recommend procedures for
dealing with this contingency. For the convenience of nontechnical readers we
have elected to submit our statistical supporting data, totaling 604 exhibits,
separately, as well as a preliminary manual of the "peace games" method
devised during the course of our study.

We have completed our assignment to the best of our ability, subject to the
limitations of time and resources available to us. Our conclusions of fact and
our recommendations are unanimous; those of use who differ in certain
secondary respects from the findings set forth herein do not consider these
differences sufficient to warrant the filing of a minority report. It is our earnest
hope that the fruits of our deliberations will be of value to our government in its
efforts to provide leadership to the nation in solving the complex and far-
reaching problems we have examined, and that our recommendations for
subsequent Presidential action in this area will be adopted.

Because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the establishment of this
Group, and in view of the nature of its findings, we do not recommend that this
Report be released for publication. It is our affirmative judgment that such
action would not be in the public interest. The uncertain advantages of public
discussion of our conclusions and recommendations are, in our opinion, greatly
outweighed by the clear and predictable danger of a crisis in public confidence
which untimely publication of this Report might be expected to provoke. The
likelihood that a lay reader, unexposed to the exigencies of higher political or
military responsibility, will misconstrue the purpose of this project, and the
intent of its participants, seems obvious. We urge that circulation of this Report
be closely restricted to those whose responsibilities require that they be apprised
of its contents.

We deeply regret that the necessity of anonymity, a prerequisite to our Group's
unhindered pursuit of its objectives, precludes proper acknowledgment of our
gratitude to the many persons in and out of government who contributed so
greatly to our work.

19

FOR THE SPECIAL STUDY GROUP
[signature withheld for publication]
30 SEPTEMBER, 1966
INTRODUCTION

The Report which follows summarizes the results of a two-and-a-half-year
study of the broad problems to be anticipated in the event of general trans-
formation of American society to a condition lacking its most critical current
characteristics: its capability and readiness to make war when doing so is
judged necessary or desirable by its political leadership.

Our work has been predicated on the belief that some kind of general peace may
soon be negotiable. The de facto admission of Communist China into the United
Nations now appears to be only a few years away at most. It has become
increasingly manifest that conflicts of American national interest with those of
China and the Soviet Union are susceptible of political solution, despite the
superficial contraindications of the current Vietnam war, of the threats of an
attack on China, and of the necessarily hostile tenor of day-to-day foreign
policy statements. It is also obvious that differences involving other nations can
be readily resolved by the three great powers whenever they arrive at a stable
peace among themselves. It is not necessary, for the purposes of our study, to
assume that a general detente of this sort will come about — and we make no
such argument—but only that it may.

It is surely no exaggeration to say that a condition of general world peace would
lead to changes in the social structures of the nations of the world of
unparalleled and revolutionary magnitude. The economic impact of general
disarmament, to name only the most obvious consequence of peace, would
revise the production and distribution patterns of the globe to a degree that
would make changes of the past fifty years seem insignificant. Political,
sociological, cultural, and ecological changes would be equally far-reaching.
What has motivated our study of these contingencies has been the growing
sense of thoughtful men in and out of government that the world is totally
unprepared to meet the demands of such a situation.

We had originally planned, when our study was initiated, to address ourselves
to these two broad questions and their components: What can be expected if
peace comes? What should we be prepared to do about it? But as our
investigation proceeded, it became apparent that certain other questions had to

20

be faced. What, for instance, are the real functions of war in modem societies,
beyond the ostensible ones of defending and advancing the "national interests"
of nations? In the absence of war, what other institutions exist or might be
devised to fulfill these functions? Granting that a "peaceful" settlement of
disputes is within the range of current international relationships, is the
abolition of war, in the broad sense, really possible? If so, is it necessarily
desirable, in terms of social stability? If not, what can be done to improve the
operation of our social system in respect to its war-readiness?

The word peace, as we have used it in the following pages, describes a
permanent, or quasi-permanent, condition entirely free from the national
exercise, or contemplation, of any form of the organized social violence, or
threat of violence, generally known as war. It implies total and general
disarmament. It is not used to describe the more familiar condition of "cold
war," "armed peace," or other mere respite, long or short, from armed conflict.
Nor is it used simply as a synonym for the political settlement of international
differences. The magnitude of modem means of mass destmction and the speed
of modem communications require the unqualified working definition given
above; only a generation ago such an absolute description would have seemed
Utopian rather than pragmatic. Today, any modification of this definition would
render it almost worthless for our purpose. By the same standard, we have used
the work war to apply interchangeably to conventional ("hot") war, to the
general condition of war preparation or war readiness, and to the general "war
system. " The sense intended is made clear in context.

The first section of our Report deals with its scope and with the assumptions on
which our study was based. The second considers the effects of disarmament on
the economy, the subject of most peace research to date. The third takes up so-
called "disarmament scenarios" which have been proposed. The fourth, fifth,
and sixth examine the nonmilitary functions of war and the problems they raise
for a viable transition to peace; here will be found some indications of the true
dimensions of the problem, not previously coordinated in any other study. In the
seventh section we summarize our findings, and in the eight we set forth our
recommendations for what we believe to be a practical and necessary course of
action.

21

SECTION 1 - SCOPE OF THE STUDY

When The Special Study Group was estabHshed in August, 1963, its members
were instructed to govern their deliberations in accordance with three principal
criteria. Briefly stated, they were these: 1) military-style objectivity; 2)
avoidance of preconceived value assumptions; 3) inclusion of all relevant areas
of theory and data.

These guideposts are by no means as obvious as they may appear at first glance,
and we believe it necessary to indicate clearly how they were to inform our
work. For they express succinctly the limitations of previous "peace studies,"
and imply the nature of both government and unofficial dissatisfaction with
these earlier efforts. It is not our intention here to minimize the significance of
the work of our predecessors, or to belittle the quality of their contributions.
What we have tried to do, and believe we have done, is extend their scope. We
hope that our conclusions may serve in turn as a starting point for still broader
and more detailed examinations of every aspect of the problems of transition to
peace and of the questions which must be answer- ed before such a transition
can be allowed to get under way.

It is a truism that objectivity is more often an intention expressed than an
attitude achieved, but the intention — conscious, unambiguous, and constantly
self-critical ~ is a precondition to its achievement. We believe it no accident
that we were charged to use a "military contingency" model for our study, and
we owe a considerable debt to the civilian war planning agencies for their
pioneering work in the objective examination of the contingencies of nuclear
war. There is no such precedent in the peace studies. Much of the usefulness of
even the most elaborate and carefully reasoned programs for economic
conversion to peace, for example, has been vitiated by a wishful eagerness to
demonstrate that peace is not only possible, but even cheap or easy. One official
report is replete with references to the critical role of "dynamic optimism" on
economic developments, and goes on to submit, as evidence, that it "would be
hard to imagine that the American people would not respond very positively to
an agreed and safeguarded program to substitute an international rule of law and
order," etc. Another line of argument frequently taken is that disarmament
would entail comparatively little disruption of the economy, since it need only
be partial; we will deal with this approach later. Yet genuine objectivity in war
studies is often critized as inhuman. As Herman Kahn, the writer on strategic
studies best known to the general public, put it: "Critics frequently object to the
icy rationality of the Hudson Institute, the Rand Corporation, and other such
organizations. I'm always tempted to ask in reply, 'Would you prefer a warm,
human error? Do you feel better with a nice emotional mistake.'" And, as

22

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has pointed out, in reference to
facing up to the possibihty of nuclear war, "Some people are afraid even to look
over the edge. But in a thermonuclear war we cannot afford any political
acrophobia. " Surely it would be self-evident that this applies equally to the
opposite prospect, but so far no one has taken more than a timid glance over the
brink of peace.

An intention to avoid preconceived value judgments is if anything even more
productive of self-delusion. We claim no immunity, as individuals, from this
type of bias, but we have made a continuously self-conscious effort to deal with
the problems of peace without, for example, considering that a condition of
peace is per se "good" or "bad." This has not been easy, but it has been
obligatory; to our knowledge, it has not been done before. Previous studies have
taken the desirability of peace, the importance of human life, the superiority of
democratic institutions, the greatest "good" for the greatest number, the
"dignity" of the individual, the desirability of maximum health and longevity,
and other such wishful premises as axiomatic values necessary for the
justification of a study of peace issues. We have not found them so. We have
attempted to apply the standards of physical science to our thinking, the
principal characteristic of which is not quantification, as is popularly believed,
but that, in Whitehead's words, "...it ignores all judgments of value; for instance,
all aesthetic and moral judgments." Yet it is obvious that any serious
investigation of a problem, however "pure," must be informed by some
normative standard. In this case it has been simply the survival of human
society in general, of American society in particular, and, as a corollary to
survival, the stability of this society.

It is interesting, we believe, to note that the most dispassionate planners of
nuclear strategy also recognize that the stability of society is the one bedrock
value that cannot be avoided. Secretary McNamara has defended the need for
American nuclear superiority on the grounds that it "makes possible a strategy
designed to preserve the fabric of our societies if war should occur. " A former
member of the Department of State policy planning staff goes further. "A more
precise word for peace, in terms of the practical world, is stability. ... Today the
great nuclear panoplies are essential elements in such stability as exists. Our
present purpose must be to continue the process of learning how to live with
them." We, of course, do not equate stability with peace, but we accept it as the
one common assumed objective of both peace and war.

The third criterion-breadth-has taken us still farther afield from peace studies
made to date. It is obvious to any layman that the economic patterns of a
warless world will be drastically different from those we live with today, and it

23

is equally obvious that the political relationships of nations will not be those we
have learned to take for granted, sometimes described as a global version of the
adversary system of our common law. But the social implications of peace
extend far beyond its putative effects on national economics and international
relations. As we shall show, the relevance of peace and war to the internal
political organization of societies, to the sociological relationships of their
members, to psychological motivations, to ecological processes, and to cultural
values is equally profound. More important, it is equally critical in assaying the
consequences of a transition to peace, and in deter- mining the feasibility of any
transition at all.

It is not surprising that these less obvious factors have been generally ignored in
peace research. They have not lent themselves to systematic analysis. They have
been difficult, perhaps impossible, to measure with any degree of assurance that
estimates of their effects could be depended on. They are "intangibles," but only
in the sense that abstract concepts in mathematics are intangible compared to
those which can be quantified. Economic factors, on the other hand, can be
measured, at least superficially; and international relationships can be
verbalized, like law, into logical sequences.

We do not claim that we have discovered an infallible way of measuring these
other factors, or of assigning them precise weights in the equation of transition.
But we believe we have taken their relative importance into account to this
extent: we have removed them from the category of the "intangible," hence
scientifically suspect and therefore somehow of secondary importance, and
brought them out into the realm of the objective. The result, we believe,
provides a context of realism for the discussion of the issues relating to the
possible transition to peace which up to now has been missing.

This is not to say that we presume to have found the answers we were seeking.
But we believe that our emphasis on breadth of scope has made it at least
possible to begin to understand the questions.

24

SECTION 2 - DISARMAMENT AND THE ECONOMY

In this section we shall briefly examine some of the common features of the
studies that have been published dealing with one or another aspect of the
expected impact of disarmament on the American economy. Whether
disarmament is considered as a by-product of peace or as its precondition, its
effect on the national economy will in either case be the most immediately felt
of its consequences. The quasi-mensurable quality of economic manifestations
has given rise to more detailed speculation in this area than in any other.

General agreement prevails in respect to the more important economic problems
that general disarmament would raise. A short survey of these problems, rather
than a detailed critique of their comparative significance, is sufficient for our
purposes in this Report.

The first factor is that of size. The "world war industry," as one writer has aptly
called it, accounts for approximately a tenth of the output of the world's total
economy. Although this figure is subject to fluctuation, the causes of which are
themselves subject to regional variation, it tends to hold fairly steady. The
United States, as the world's richest nation, not only accounts for the largest
single share of this expense, currently upward of $60 billion a year, but also
"...has devoted a higher proportion [emphasis added] of its gross national
product to its military establishment than any other major free world nation.
This was true even before our increased expenditures in Southeast Asia." Plans
for economic conversion that minimize the economic magnitude of the problem
do so only by rationalizing, however persuasively, the maintenance of a
substantial residual military budget under some euphemized classification.

Conversion of military expenditures to other purposes entails a number of
difficulties. The most serious stems from the degree of rigid specialization that
characterizes modem war production, best exemplified in nuclear and missile
technology. This constituted no fundamental problem after World War II, nor
did the question of free -market consumer demand for "conventional" items of
consumption — those good and services consumers had already been
conditioned to require. Today's situation is qualitatively different in both
respects.

This inflexibility is geographical and occupational, as well as industrial, a fact
which has led most analysts of the economic impact of disarmament to focus
their attention on phased plans for the relocation of war industry personnel and
capital installations as much as on proposals for developing new patterns of
consumption. One serious flaw common to such plans is the kind called in the

25

natural sciences the "macroscopic error." An implicit presumption is made that
a total national plan for conversion differs from a community program to cope
with the shutting down of a "defense facility" only in degree. We find no reason
to believe that this is the case, nor that a general enlargement of such local
programs, however well thought out in terms of housing, occupational
retraining, and the like, can be applied on a national scale. A national economy
can absorb almost any number of subsidiary reorganizations within its total
limits, providing there is no basic change in its own structure. General
disarmament, which would require such basic changes, lends itself to no valid
smaller-scale analogy.

Even more questionable are the models proposed for the retaining labor for
nonarmaments occupations. Putting aside for the moment the unsolved
questions dealing with the nature of new distribution patterns — retraining for
what?-- the increasingly specialized job skills associated with war industry
production are further depreciated by the accelerating inroads of the industrial
techniques loosely described as "automation." It is not too much to say that
general disarmament would require the scrapping of a critical proportion of the
most highly developed occupational specialties in the economy. The political
difficulties inherent in such an "adjustment" would make the outcries resulting
from the closing of a few obsolete military and naval installations in 1964 sound
like a whisper.

In general, discussions of the problem of conversion have been characterized by
an unwillingness to recognize its special quality. This is best exemplified by the
1965 report of the Ackley Conmiittee. One critic has tellingly pointed out that it
blindly assumes that "...nothing in the arms economy-neither its size, nor its
geographical concentration, nor its highly specialized nature, nor the
peculiarities of its market, nor the special nature of much of its labor force —
endows it with any uniqueness when the necessary time of adjustment comes."

Let us assume, however, despite the lack of evidence that a viable program for
conversion can be developed in the framework of the existing economy, that the
problems noted above can be solved. What proposals have been offered for
utilizing the productive capabilities that disarmament would presumably
release?

The most common held theory is simply that general economic reinvestment
would absorb the greater part of these capabilities. Even though it is now
largely taken for granted (and even by today's equivalent of traditional laissez-
faire economists) that unprecedented government assistance (and concomitant
government control) will be needed to solve the "structural" problems of

26

transition, a general attitude of confidence prevails that new consumption
patterns will take up the slack. What is less clear is the nature of these patterns.

One school of economists has it that these patterns will develop on their own. It
envisages the equivalent of the arms budget being returned, under careful
control, to the consumer, in the form of tax cuts. Another, recognizing the
undeniable need for increased "consumption" in what is generally considered
the public sector of the economy, stresses vastly increased government spending
in such areas of national concern as health, education, mass transportation, low-
cost housing, water supply, control of the physical environment, and, stated
generally, "poverty."

The mechanisms proposed for controlling the transition to an arms-free
economy are also traditional—changes in both sides of the federal budget,
manipulation of interest rates, etc. We acknowledge the undeniable value of
fiscal tools in a normal cyclical economy, where they provide leverage to
accelerate or brake an existing trend. Their more committed proponents,
however, tend to lose sight of the fact that there is a limit to the power of these
devices to influence fundamental economic forces. They can provide new
incentives in the economy, but they cannot in themselves transform the
production of a billion dollars' worth of missiles a year to the equivalent in food,
clothing, prefabricated houses, or television sets. At bottom, they reflect the
economy; they do not motivate it.

More sophisticated, and less sanguine, analysts contemplate the diversion of the
arms budget to a non-military system equally remote from the market economy.
What the "pyramid-builders" frequently suggest is the expansion of space-
research programs to the dollar level of current expenditures. This approach has
the superficial merit of reducing the size of the problem of transferability of
resources, but introduces other difficulties, which we will take up in section 6.

Without singling out any one of the several major studies of the expected
impact of disarmament on the economy for special criticism, we can summarize
our objections to them in general terms as follows:

No proposed program for economic conversion to disarmament sufficiently
takes into account the unique magnitude of the required adjustments it would
entail.

27

Proposals to transform arms production into a beneficent scheme of public
works are more the products of wishful thinking than of realistic understanding
of the limits of our existing economic system.

Fiscal and monetary measures are inadequate as controls for the process of
transition to an arms -free economy.

Insufficient attention has been paid to the political acceptability of the
objectives of the proposed conversion models, as well as of the political means
to be employed in effectuating a transition.

No serious consideration has been given, in any proposed conversion plan, to
the fundamental nonmilitary function of war and armaments in modern society,
nor has any explicit attempt been made to devise a viable substitute for it. This
criticism will be developed in sections 5 and 6.

28

SECTION 3 - DISARMAMENT SCENARIOS

SCENARIOS, as they have come to be called, are hypothetical constructions of
future events. Inevitably, they are composed of varying proportions of
established fact, reasonable inference, and more or less inspired guesswork.
Those which have been suggested as model procedures for effectuating
international arms control and eventual disarmament are necessarily
imaginative, although closely reasoned; in this respect they resemble the "war
games" analyses of the Rand Corporation, with which they share a common
conceptual origin.

All such scenarios that have been seriously put forth imply a dependence on
bilateral or multilateral agreement between the great powers. In general, they
call for a progressive phasing out of gross armaments, military forces, weapons,
and weapons technology, coordinated with elaborate matching procedures of
verification, inspection, and machinery for the settlement of international
disputes. It should be noted that even proponents of unilateral disarmament
qualify their proposals with an implied requirement of reciprocity, very much in
the manner of a scenario of graduated response in nuclear war. The advantage
of unilateral initiative lies in its political value as an expression of good faith, as
well as in its diplomatic function as a catalyst for formal disarmament
negotiations.

The READ model for disarmament (developed by the Research Program on
Economic Adjustments to Disarmament) is typical of these scenarios. It is a
twelve-year program, divided into three -year stages. Each stage includes a
separate phase of: reduction of armed forces; cutbacks of weapons production,
inventories, and foreign military bases; development of international inspection
procedures and control conventions; and the building up of a sovereign
international disarmament organization. It anticipates a net matching decline in
U.S. defense expenditures of only somewhat more than half the 1965 level, but
a necessary redeployment of some five-sixths of the defense-dependent labor
force.

The economic implications assigned by their authors to various disarmament
scenarios diverge widely. The more conservative models, like that cited above,
emphasize economic as well as military prudence in postulating elaborate fail-
safe disarmament agencies, which themselves require expenditures substantially
substituting for those of the displaced war industries. Such programs stress the
advantages of the smaller economic adjustment entailed. Others emphasize, on
the contrary, the magnitude (and the opposite advantages) of the savings to be
achieved from disarmament. One widely read analysis estimates the annual cost

29

of the inspection function of general disarmament throughout the world as only
between two and three percent of current military expenditures. Both types of
plan tend to deal with the anticipated problem of economic reinvestment only in
the aggregate. We have seen no proposed disarmament sequence that correlates
the phasing out of specific kinds of military spending with specific new forms
of substitute spending.

Without examining disarmament scenarios in greater detail, we may
characterize them with these general comments:

Given genuine agreement of intent among the great powers, the scheduling of
arms control and elimination presents no inherently insurmountable procedural
problems. Any of several proposed sequences might serve as the basis for
multilateral agreement or for the first step in unilateral arms reduction.

No major power can proceed with such a program, however, until it has
developed an economic conversion plan fully integrated with each phase of
disarmament. No such plan has yet been developed in the United States.

Furthermore, disarmament scenarios, like proposals for economic conversion,
make no allowance for the non-military functions of war in modem societies,
and offer no surrogate for these necessary functions. One partial exception is a
proposal for the "unarmed forces of the United States," which we will consider
in section 6.

30

SECTION 4 - WAR AND PEACE AS SOCIAL SYSTEMS

We have dealt only sketchily with proposed disarmament scenarios and
economic analyses, but the reason for our seemingly casual dismissal of so
much serious and sophisticated work lies in no disrespect for its competence. It
is rather a question of relevance. To put it plainly, all these programs, however
detailed and well developed, are abstractions. The most carefully reasoned
disarmament sequence inevitably reads more like the rules of a game or a
classroom exercise in logic than like a prognosis of real events in the real world.
This is as true of today's complex proposals as it was of the Abbe de St. Pierre's
"Plan for Perpetual Peace in Europe" 250 years ago.

Some essential element has clearly been lacking in all these schemes. One of
our first tasks was to try to bring this missing quality into definable focus, and
we believe we have succeeded in doing so. We find that at the heart of every
peace study we have examined—from the modest technological proposal (e.g.,
to convert a poison gas plant to the production of "socially useful" equivalents)
to the most elaborate scenario for universal peace in out time-lies one common
fundamental misconception. It is the source of the miasma of unreality
surrounding such plans. It is the incorrect assumption that war, as an institution,
is subordinate to the social systems it is believed to serve.

This misconception, although profound and far-reaching, is entirely
comprehensible. Few social cliches are so unquestioningly accepted as the
notion that war is an extension of diplomacy (or of politics, or of the pursuit of
economic objectives). If this were true, it would be wholly appropriate for
economists and political theorists to look on the problems of transition to peace
as essentially mechanical or procedural — as indeed they do, treating them as
logistic corollaries of the settlement of national conflicts of inter

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