Roe et al versus wade, district attorney of Dallas county. A Puke (TM) Audiopaper

Roe et al versus wade, district attorney of Dallas county.
Reformatted for readability. See the original text for the complete references.
What was the ruling? Read and find out.
https://web.stanford.edu/~mrosenfe/Roe_v_Wade_US_1973.pdf
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/76255/17-01j-spring-2006/contents/readings/roe.pdf
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep410/usrep410113/usrep410113.pdf

SUMMARY:
An unmarried pregnant woman who wished to terminate her pregnancy by abortion instituted an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes, which prohibited abortions except with respect to those procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother, were unconstitutional. She also sought an injunction against their continued enforcement. A physician, who alleged that he had been previously arrested for violations of the Texas statutes and that two prosecutions were presently pending against him in the state courts, sought and was granted permission to intervene. A separate action, similar to that filed by the unmarried, pregnant woman, was filed by a married, childless couple, who alleged that should the wife become pregnant at some future date, they would wish to terminate the pregnancy by abortion. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a three-judge District Court, which held that:
(1) the unmarried, pregnant woman and the physician had standing to sue,
(2) the married, childless couple's complaint should be dismissed because they lacked standing to sue, (3) abstention was not warranted with respect to a declaratory judgment,
(4) the right to choose whether to have children was protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment,
(5) the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face, because they were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and
(6) the application for injunctive relief should be denied under the abstention doctrine (314 F Supplement 1217).
All parties took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision on the appeal taken by all parties to the United States Supreme Court, pursuant to 28 USCS 1253, from the District Court's denial of injunctive relief. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the District Court's judgment as to the physician-intervenor, dismissing his complaint in intervention, but affirmed the District Court's judgment in all other respects.
In an opinion by Blackmun, J, expressing the views of seven members of the court, it was held that:
(1) the pregnant, unmarried woman had standing to sue,
(2) the complaint of the childless, married couple presented no actual justiciable case or controversy, and had been properly dismissed,
(3) states have legitimate interests in seeing to it that abortions are performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient,
(4) the right to privacy encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,
(5) a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is not absolute, and may to some extent be limited by the state's legitimate interests in safeguarding the woman's health, in maintaining proper medical standards, and in protecting potential human life,
(6) the unborn are not included within the definition of "person" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
(7) prior to the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, the state may not interfere with or regulate an attending physician's decision, reached in consultation with his patient, that the patient's pregnancy should be terminated,
(8) from and after the end of the first trimester, and until the point in time when the fetus becomes viable, the state may regulate the abortion procedure only to the extent that such regulation relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health,
(9) from and after the point in time when the fetus becomes viable, the state may prohibit abortions altogether, except those necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother, and
(10) the state may proscribe the performance of all abortions except those performed by physicians currently licensed by the state; and expressing the view of six members of the court, it was held that the physician's complaint should be dismissed and he should be remitted to his remedies in the pending state court proceedings.

Burger, J, concurring, agreed that under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Texas criminal abortion statutes impermissibly limited the performance of abortions necessary to protect the health of pregnant women, but added that he would allow a state to require the certification of two physicians to support an abortion, saying that such a procedure would not be unduly burdensome.
Douglas, J, concurring in the court's opinion except as to the dismissal of the physician's complaint, agreed that endangering the life of a woman or seriously and permanently injuring her health are standards too narrow for the right of privacy that is at stake.
Stewart, J, concurring, agreed that the Texas abortion statute directly infringed the right asserted by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy, which right was within the personal liberty protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
White, J, joined by Rehnquist, J, dissented, saying that nothing in the language or history of the Constitution supported the court's judgment, and that the court had simply fashioned and announced a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, had invested that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes, whereas the issue of abortion should actually have been left with the people and the political processes they have devised to govern their affairs.
Rehnquist, J, dissented, saying that:
(1) the record, which did not indicate that the appellant was in her first trimester of pregnancy at some time during the pendency of her lawsuit, did not establish the appellant's standing to litigate the issues involved,
(2) even if it did, the court, eschewing the Fourteenth Amendment's history, had mistakenly relied on the "compelling state interest" test,
(3) the decision to break the term of pregnancy into three distinct terms partook of judicial legislation, (4) the fact that a majority of the states have had abortion statutes for at least a century indicated that a right to an abortion was not so rooted in the traditions and consciences of the people as to be ranked "fundamental," and
(5) the statute should have been declared unconstitutional, if at all, only as applied to the appellant's particular fact situation rather than in toto.

LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES:
Head Note 1. APPEAL AND ERROR. Section 327 RULES OF COURT Section 3 petition for certiorari, granting declaratory but not injunctive relief, review.
Headnote:
1. It is preferable if a defendant, pursuant to Rule 20, United States Supreme Court Rules, which provides that a writ of certiorari to review a case pending in a United States Court of Appeals, before judgment is given in such court, will be granted only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviating from normal appellate procedure, presents to the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals with respect to the granting of a plaintiff's prayer for declaratory relief, since 28 USCS 1253, which authorizes direct appeals from decisions of three-judge District Courts, does not authorize an appeal to the Supreme Court from a grant or denial of declaratory relief alone. Nevertheless, review by the Supreme Court of both the injunctive and the declaratory aspects of such a case is not foreclosed where the case is properly before the Supreme Court on appeal under 28 USCS 1253 from a specific denial of injunctive relief by the three-judge District Court, and where the arguments as to both the declaratory and injunctive aspects of the case are necessarily identical.
Head Note 2, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS.
Section 8 state criminal abortion laws, pregnant woman, challenge.
A justiciable case or controversy is presented by an action for a declaratory judgment, challenging the constitutionality of a state's criminal abortion laws, which action is brought by a pregnant single woman whose desire to have an abortion has been thwarted by such laws.

Head Note 3 STATUTES.
Section 26 state criminal abortion statute, pregnant woman, standing to challenge.
A pregnant single woman, thwarted by her state's criminal abortion laws from obtaining an abortion which she desired, has standing to challenge those laws, since the logical nexus between her asserted status and the claim she seeks to have adjudicated, and the necessary degree of contentiousness, are both present to insure that the dispute will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.

Head Note 4. APPEAL AND ERROR.
Section 1656 COURTS Section 762 mootness, appellate or certiorari review.
With regard to the question of a case's mootness, the usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated.
Head Note 5. APPEAL AND ERROR Section 1662 COURTS Section 763 litigation, pregnancy as significant fact nonmootness.
With regard to the question of a case's mootness, where pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete; and therefore pregnancy, coming as it often does more than once to the same woman and being always with us if man is to survive, provides a classic justification for nonmootness, because otherwise, if termination of a pregnancy would make a case moot, pregnancy litigation would seldom survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review would be effectively denied.
Head Note 6 COURTS.
Section 680 pending state criminal proceedings, raising federal question.
Absent harassment and bad faith, a defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot affirmatively challenge in a federal court the state statutes under which the state is prosecuting him.
Head Note 7. STATUTES.
Section 26 physician, state criminal abortion statute, standing to challenge.
A physician who, as a plaintiff-intervenor in a suit brought in a federal court by a pregnant single woman challenging a state's criminal abortion laws, alleges that he has been arrested for violating such laws and that he stands charged by indictment with violating such laws, has no standing to seek, in a federal court, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the state statutes under which he stands charged in criminal prosecutions simultaneously pending in a state court; and any attempt on the physician's part to distinguish his status as a present state defendant from his status as a "potential future defendant" so as to assert only the latter status for purposes of determining his standing to sue in a federal court has no merit.
Head Note 8. APPEAL AND ERROR.
Section 1682 challenge to abortion laws, intervention by physician, remitting to state court.
The complaint in intervention of a physician who, as a plaintiff-intervenor in a suit brought in a Federal District Court by a pregnant single woman challenging a state's criminal abortion laws, alleges, on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, that he has been arrested for violating such laws and that he stands charged by indictment with violating such laws, is to be dismissed, and the physician is to be remitted to his defenses in the state criminal proceedings against him where he makes no allegation of any substantial and immediate threat to any federally protected right that cannot be asserted in the state courts in his defense against the state prosecutions.
Head Note 9. COURTS.
Section 236.5 childless married couple, state abortion laws, standing to challenge.
In a suit challenging a state's criminal abortion laws, the bare allegation by a childless married couple, the woman not being pregnant, that they presently have no desire to have children because of their having received medical advice that the woman should avoid pregnancy and because of other personal reasons, but that they fear the prospect of becoming parents, and if pregnancy ensues, they would wish to terminate it by abortion, is too speculative in character and too indirect in injury to be sufficient to present an actual case or controversy justiciable in the federal courts.

Head Note 10. APPEAL AND ERROR.
Section 1682 STATUTES Section 26 childless married couple, state's criminal abortion laws, dismissal of complaint.
A childless married couple, the woman not being pregnant, who presently have no desire to have children because of their having received medical advice that the woman should avoid pregnancy and because of other personal reasons, who fear the prospect of becoming parents, and who would wish to terminate by abortion any pregnancy which might ensue, but who assert on appeal an inability to obtain an abortion legally in the state in which they reside because of their state's criminal abortion laws, are not appropriate plaintiffs in litigation brought by a pregnant single woman to test the validity of the same state's abortion laws, and their complaint should be dismissed.
Head Note 11. ABORTION.
Section 1 protection of pregnant women, state's interest.
In view of modern medical techniques which have rendered abortions in early pregnancies relatively safe, and which have lowered mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the procedure is legal, to rates as low as, or lower than, the mortality rates for normal childbirth, states, which formerly were justified in enacting criminal abortion laws to protect pregnant women and to restrain them from submitting to procedures which placed their lives in serious jeopardy, no longer have an interest in protecting women from what were formerly inherently hazardous procedures, except in those instances when it would be equally dangerous for women to forgo them.
Head Note 12. ABORTION.
Section 1 state's legitimate interest, patient's safety.
The state has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient.
Head Note 13. ABORTION.
Section 1 regulation of physicians and facilities, state's interest.
The state's legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortions are performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for patients extends to the performing physician and his staff, to the facilities involved, to the availability of aftercare, and to adequate provision for any complication or emergency that might arise.
Head Note 14. ABORTION.
Section 1 risk, state's interest.
Because the risk to a woman undergoing an abortion increases as her pregnancy continues, the state retains a definite interest in protecting the woman's own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy.
Head Note 15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Section 101 right of privacy, origins.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, the United States Supreme Court recognizes that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution, and that the roots of that right may be found in the First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment, and in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Head Note 16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Section 525 right to privacy, personal and fundamental rights. Only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are included in the guarantee of a right of personal privacy.
Head Note 17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Section 525 right to privacy, activities protected.
The right to privacy to some extent extends to activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Section 525 right to privacy, termination of pregnancy.
Headnote 18 The right to privacy, founded upon the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Head Note 19 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Section 526 right to terminate pregnancy, not absolute.
A woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is not absolute, and she is not entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses.
Head Note 20. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Section 526 termination of pregnancy, regulation, state's interest.
A state has a valid, though limited, interest in regulating a woman's decision to have an abortion, and it has an interest, limited but sufficiently strong enough, to support some limitation upon a woman's sole determination to terminate her pregnancy.
Head Note 21. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Section 101 right to privacy, state regulation.
Some state regulation in areas protected by the right to privacy is appropriate.
Head Note 22. ABORTION.
Section 1 safeguarding health and potential life, abortion, state regulation.
A state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life; and at some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern a woman's decision to have an abortion.
Head Note 23. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Section 101 right to privacy, nature.
The right to privacy is not absolute.
Head Note 24. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Section 101 one's own body, limitations on use.
The United States Supreme Court does not recognize the existence of an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases.

Head Note 25. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Section 101 fundamental rights, limitations, compelling state interest.
Where "fundamental rights" are involved, any regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a "compelling state interest," and legislative enactments regulating such rights must be narrowly drawn so as to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.
Head Note 26. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Section 521 person as including unborn.
As used in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the word "person" does not include the unborn.
Head Note 27. ABORTION.
Section 1 right to privacy, health of mother, state regulation.
Because a pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy, carrying, as she does, an embryo and later a fetus, it is reasonable and appropriate for a state to decide that, at some point in time, another interest, such as the health of the mother or the interest in potential human life, becomes significantly involved, that the woman's right to privacy is no longer sole, and that any right to privacy which she possesses must be accordingly measured against such other interests.
Head Note 28. ABORTION.
Section 1 theory of life, state statute.
A state, by adopting one particular theory of life, may not override the rights of pregnant women to terminate their pregnancies.
Head Note 29. ABORTION.
Section 1 safeguarding health, pregnant women, state's interest.
With respect to a state's important and legitimate interest in safeguarding the health of a pregnant woman, the point at which its interest becomes compelling, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester of pregnancy.
Head Note 30. ABORTION.
Section 1 state regulation.
From and after the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, a state may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.
Head Note 31. ABORTION.
Section 1 first trimester of pregnancy, physician's judgment.
Prior to the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, an attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the state, that in his medical judgment the patient's pregnancy should be terminated; and if such a decision is reached, the physician's judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the state.

Head Note 32. ABORTION.
Section 1 potential human life, protection, state's interest.
With respect to a state's important and legitimate interest in potential human life, the point at which its interest becomes compelling is at viability, because the fetus is then presumably capable of meaningful life outside the mother's womb.
Head Note 33. ABORTION.
Section 1 protection of fetal life, state regulation.
State regulation protective of fetal life after viability has both logical and biological justifications; and if a state is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may proscribe abortion during that period except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
Head Note 34. ABORTION.
Section 1 restrictions, failure to distinguish degrees.
A state statute which restricts legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother" sweeps too broadly to withstand constitutional attack, because it makes no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and because it limits the legal justification for the procedure to a single reason, namely, "saving" the mother's life.
Head Note 35. ABORTION.
Section 1 state statute, violation of due process clause.
A state criminal abortion statute that excepts from criminality only a life saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Head Note 36. ABORTION.
Section 1 statute defining "physician", abortion statutes.
In state statutes regulating abortion, a state may define the term "physician" to mean only a physician currently licensed by the state, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined.
SYLLABUS:
A pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. A licensed physician (Hallford), who had two state abortion prosecutions pending against him, was permitted to intervene. A childless married couple, the Does, the wife not being pregnant, separately attacked the laws, basing alleged injury on the future possibilities of contraceptive failure, pregnancy, unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of the wife's health. A three-judge District Court, which consolidated the actions, held that Roe and Hallford, and members of their classes, had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. Ruling that declaratory, though not injunctive, relief was warranted, the court declared the abortion statutes void as vague and overbroadly infringing those plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled the Does' complaint not justiciable. Appellants directly appealed to this Court on the injunctive rulings, and appellee cross-appealed from the District Court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford.
Held:
1. While 28 U S C Section 1253 authorizes no direct appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone, review is not foreclosed when the case is properly before the Court on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments as to both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical.
2. Roe has standing to sue; the Does and Hallford do not.
(a) Contrary to appellee's contention, the natural termination of Roe's pregnancy did not moot her suit. Litigation involving pregnancy, which is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," is an exception to the usual federal rule that an actual controversy must exist at review stages and not simply when the action is initiated.
(b) The District Court correctly refused injunctive, but erred in granting declaratory, relief to Hallford, who alleged no federally protected right not assertable as a defense against the good-faith state prosecutions pending against him.

(c) The Does' complaint, based as it is on contingencies, any one or more of which may not occur, is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy.
3. State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Though the State cannot override that right, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a "compelling" point at various stages of the woman's approach to term.
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
4. The State may define the term "physician" to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined.
5. It is unnecessary to decide the injunctive relief issue since the Texas authorities will doubtless fully recognize the Court's ruling that the Texas criminal abortion statutes are unconstitutional.
COUNSEL: Sarah Weddington reargued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Roy Lucas, Fred Bruner, Roy L Merrill Junior, and Norman Dorsen. Robert C Flowers, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellee on the reargument. Jay Floyd, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellee on the original argument.
With them on the brief were Crawford C Martin, Attorney General, Nola White, First Assistant Attorney General, Alfred Walker, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Henry Wade, and John B Tolle.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Gary K Nelson, et al, as recited in the original text.
JUDGES: Blackmun, J, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, and Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, joined. Burger, C J, Douglas, J, and Stewart, J, filed concurring opinions. White, J. filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, J, joined. Rehnquist, J, filed a dissenting opinion.
OPINION BY:
BLACKMUN OPINION:
Mister JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, Doe versus Bolton, post, Page 179, present constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas statutes under attack here are typical of those that have been in effect in many States for approximately a century. The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a modern cast and are a legislative product that, to an extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and of new thinking about an old issue.

We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion.
In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem. Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection.
We seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do, we have inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries. We bear in mind, too, Mister Justice Holmes' admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner versus New York, 1905:
"The Constitution is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States."
The Texas statutes that concern us here are Articles 1191 to 1194 and 1196 of the State's Penal Code. These make it a crime to "procure an abortion," as therein defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to "an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of the States.
Article 1191.
Abortion. "If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By “abortion” is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a premature birth thereof be caused.
Article 1192.
Furnishing the means. "Whoever furnishes the means for procuring an abortion knowing the purpose intended is guilty as an accomplice.
Article 1193.
Attempt at abortion. "If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offender is nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce abortion, provided it be shown that such means were calculated to produce that result, and shall be fined not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.
Article 1194.
Murder in producing abortion "If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so produced or by an attempt to effect the same it is murder."
Article 1196. By medical advice:
"Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." The foregoing Articles, together with Article 1195, compose Chapter 9 of Title 15 of the Penal Code.
Article 1195, not attached here, reads:
"Destroying unborn child "Whoever shall during parturition of the mother destroy the vitality or life in a child in a state of being born and before actual birth, which child would otherwise have been born alive, shall be confined in the penitentiary for life or for not less than five years."

Note two in the text has a list of states with laws similar to Texas regarding procuring abortion.

Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in 1854. Texas Laws 1854, set forth in 3 H Gammel, Laws of Texas 1898. This was soon modified into language that has remained substantially unchanged to the present time. See Texas Penal Code of notes in original text.
The final article in each of these compilations provided the same exception, as does the present Article 1196, for an abortion by "medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother."

Long ago, a suggestion was made that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague because of definitional deficiencies. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disposed of that suggestion peremptorily, saying only, "It is also insisted in the motion in arrest of judgment that the statute is unconstitutional and void in that it does not sufficiently define or describe the offense of abortion. We do not concur in respect to this question."
The same court recently has held again that the State's abortion statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, reference in text.
The court held that "the State of Texas has a compelling interest to protect fetal life"; that Article 1191 "is designed to protect fetal life."
That the Texas homicide statutes, particularly Article 1205 of the Penal Code, are intended to protect a person "in existence by actual birth" and thereby implicitly recognize other human life that is not "in existence by actual birth."
That the definition of human life is for the legislature and not the courts; that Article 1196 "is more definite than the District of Columbia statute upheld in United States versus Vuitch".
And that the Texas statute "is not vague and indefinite or overbroad." A physician's abortion conviction was affirmed. In Thompson, the court observed that any issue as to the burden of proof under the exemption of Article 1196 "is not before us." But see references in footnotes three in text.

Two.
Jane Roe, The name is a pseudonym, a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted this federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes.

Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion "performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions."
That she was unable to get a "legal" abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint Roe purported to sue "on behalf of herself and all other women" similarly situated.

James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes and that two such prosecutions were pending against him. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and his patients' rights to privacy in the doctor-patient relationship and his own right to practice medicine, rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. John and Mary Doe, These names are pseudonyms, a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that of Roe. They also named the District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitutional deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Does alleged that they were a childless couple, that Missus Doe was suffering from a "neural-chemical" disorder.
That her physician had "advised her to avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition has materially improved", although a pregnancy at the present time would not present "a serious risk" to her life.
That, pursuant to medical advice, she had discontinued use of birth control pills; and that if she should become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician under safe, clinical conditions. By an amendment to their complaint, the Does purported to sue "on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly situated."
The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court. The suits thus presented the situations of the pregnant single woman, the childless couple, with the wife not pregnant, and the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the attack on the Texas criminal abortion statutes. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class, and Doctor Hallford, had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies, but that the Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that, with respect to the requests for a declaratory judgment, abstention was not warranted.
On the merits, the District Court held that the "fundamental right of single women and married persons to choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because they were both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment rights. The court then held that abstention was warranted with respect to the requests for an injunction. It therefore dismissed the Does' complaint, declared the abortion statutes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive relief.
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford, pursuant to 28 U S C Section 1253, have appealed to this Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney has purported to cross-appeal, pursuant to the same statute, from the court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Both sides also have taken protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision here. We postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits.

Three.
It might have been preferable if the defendant, pursuant to our Rule 20, had presented to us a petition for certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals with respect to the granting of the plaintiffs' prayer for declaratory relief. Our decisions in Mitchell versus Donovan, and Gunn versus University Committee, are to the effect that Section 1253 does not authorize an appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone. We conclude, nevertheless, that those decisions do not foreclose our review of both the injunctive and the declaratory aspects of a case of this kind when it is properly here, as this one is, on appeal under Section 1253 from specific denial of injunctive relief, and the arguments as to both aspects are necessarily identical.

See References in text.
It would be destructive of time and energy for all concerned were we to rule otherwise
Four.
We are next confronted with issues of justiciability, standing, and abstention. Have Roe and the Does established that "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy," that insures that “the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution?”
And what effect did the pendency of criminal abortion charges against Doctor Hallford in state court have upon the propriety of the federal court's granting relief to him as a plaintiff-intervenor?
A. Jane Roe. Despite the use of the pseudonym, no suggestion is made that Roe is a fictitious person. For purposes of her case, we accept as true, and as established, her existence; her pregnant state, as of the inception of her suit in March 1970 and as late as May 21 of that year when she filed an alias affidavit with the District Court; and her inability to obtain a legal abortion in Texas.
Viewing Roe's case as of the time of its filing and thereafter until as late as May, there can be little dispute that it then presented a case or controversy and that, wholly apart from the class aspects, she, as a pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws, had standing to challenge those statutes. Cases referenced in text.
Indeed, we do not read the appellee's brief as really asserting anything to the contrary. The "logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated," Flast versus Cohen, and the necessary degree of contentiousness, Golden versus Zwickler (1969), are both present. The appellee notes, however, that the record does not disclose that Roe was pregnant at the time of the District Court hearing on May 22, 1970, or on the following June 17 when the court's opinion and judgment were filed. And he suggests that Roe's case must now be moot because she and all other members of her class are no longer subject to any 1970 pregnancy.

The appellee twice states in his brief that the hearing before the District Court was held on July 22, 1970. Brief for Appellee 13. The docket entries, and the transcript, reveal this to be an error. The July date appears to be the time of the reporter's transcription.
The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated.
But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
We, therefore, agree with the District Court that Jane Roe had standing to undertake this litigation, that she presented a justiciable controversy, and that the termination of her 1970 pregnancy has not rendered her case moot.

B. Doctor Hallford.
The doctor's position is different. He entered Roe's litigation as a plaintiff-intervenor, alleging in his complaint that he:
"In the past has been arrested for violating the Texas Abortion Laws and at the present time stands charged by indictment with violating said laws in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County, Texas to-wit:
(1) The State of Texas versus James H Hallford, and
(2) The State of Texas versus James H Hallford, In both cases the defendant is charged with abortion."
In his application for leave to intervene, the doctor made like representations as to the abortion charges pending in the state court. These representations were also repeated in the affidavit he executed and filed in support of his motion for summary judgment.
Doctor Hallford is, therefore, in the position of seeking, in a federal court, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the same statutes under which he stands charged in criminal prosecutions simultaneously pending in state court. Although he stated that he has been arrested in the past for violating the State's abortion laws, he makes no allegation of any substantial and immediate threat to any federally protected right that cannot be asserted in his defense against the state prosecutions. Neither is there any allegation of harassment or bad-faith prosecution. In order to escape the rule articulated in the cases cited in the next paragraph of this opinion that, absent harassment and bad faith, a defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot affirmatively challenge in federal court the statutes under which the State is prosecuting him, Doctor Hallford seeks to distinguish his status as a present state defendant from his status as a "potential future defendant" and to assert only the latter for standing purposes here.
We see no merit in that distinction. Our decision in Samuels versus Mackell, (1971), compels the conclusion that the District Court erred when it granted declaratory relief to Doctor Hallford instead of refraining from so doing. The court, of course, was correct in refusing to grant injunctive relief to the doctor. The reasons supportive of that action, however, are those expressed in Samuels versus Mackell, supra, and in Younger versus Harris, (1971), and other references in the text.
We note, in passing, that Younger and its companion cases were decided after the three-judge District Court decision in this case.
Doctor Hallford's complaint in intervention, therefore, is to be dismissed.
He is remitted to his defenses in the state criminal proceedings against him. We reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it granted Doctor Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in intervention.
We need not consider what different result, if any, would follow if Doctor Hallford's intervention were on behalf of a class. His complaint in intervention does not purport to assert a class suit and makes no reference to any class apart from an allegation that he "and others similarly situated" must necessarily guess at the meaning of Article 1196. His application for leave to intervene goes somewhat further, for it asserts that plaintiff Roe does not adequately protect the interest of the doctor "and the class of people who are physicians and the class of people who are patients." The leave application, however, is not the complaint. Despite the District Court's statement to the contrary at 1225, we fail to perceive the essentials of a class suit in the Hallford complaint.

C. The Does.
In view of our ruling as to Roe's standing in her case, the issue of the Does' standing in their case has little significance. The claims they assert are essentially the same as those of Roe, and they attack the same statutes. Nevertheless, we briefly note the Does' posture.
Their pleadings present them as a childless married couple, the woman not being pregnant, who have no desire to have children at this time because of their having received medical advice that Missus Doe should avoid pregnancy, and for "other highly personal reasons." But they "fear they may face the prospect of becoming parents."
And if pregnancy ensues, they "would want to terminate" it by an abortion. They assert an inability to obtain an abortion legally in Texas and, consequently, the prospect of obtaining an illegal abortion there or of going outside Texas to some place where the procedure could be obtained legally and competently.

We thus have as plaintiffs a married couple who have, as their asserted immediate and present injury, only an alleged "detrimental effect upon their marital happiness" because they are forced to "the choice of refraining from normal sexual relations or of endangering Mary Doe's health through a possible pregnancy." Their claim is that sometime in the future Missus Doe might become pregnant because of possible failure of contraceptive measures, and at that time in the future she might want an abortion that might then be illegal under the Texas statutes.
This very phrasing of the Does' position reveals its speculative character. Their alleged injury rests on possible future contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy, possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, and possible future impairment of health. Any one or more of these several possibilities may not take place and all may not combine. In the Does' estimation, these possibilities might have some real or imagined impact upon their marital happiness.
But we are not prepared to say that the bare allegation of so indirect an injury is sufficient to present an actual case or controversy, see the cases cited in original text.
The Does therefore are not appropriate plaintiffs in this litigation. Their complaint was properly dismissed by the District Court, and we affirm that dismissal.

Five.
The principal thrust of appellant's attack on the Texas statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the concept of personal "liberty" embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, see Griswold versus Connecticut, 1965, and others in the text.
Or among those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold versus Connecticut, Goldberg, J, concurring. Before addressing this claim, we feel it desirable briefly to survey, in several aspects, the history of abortion, for such insight as that history may afford us, and then to examine the state purposes and interests behind the criminal abortion laws.
Six.
It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life, are not of ancient or even of common-law origin. Instead, they derive from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
1. Ancient attitudes. These are not capable of precise determination. We are told that at the time of the Persian Empire abortifacients were known and that criminal abortions were severely punished.
We are also told, however, that abortion was practiced in Greek times as well as in the Roman Era, and that "it was resorted to without scruple." The Ephesian, Soranos, often described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, appears to have been generally opposed to Rome's prevailing free-abortion practices. He found it necessary to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted to abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the procedure advisable. Greek and Roman law afforded little protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in some places, it seems to have been based on a concept of a violation of the father's right to his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar abortion.

2. The Hippocratic Oath. What then of the famous Oath that has stood so long as the ethical guide of the medical profession and that bears the name of the great Greek of 460 to 377 B C, who has been described as the Father of Medicine, the "wisest and the greatest practitioner of his art," and the "most important and most complete medical personality of antiquity," who dominated the medical schools of his time, and who typified the sum of the medical knowledge of the past?
The Oath varies somewhat according to the particular translation, but in any translation the content is clear:
"I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion," or "I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy."
Although the Oath is not mentioned in any of the principal briefs in this case or in Doe versus Bolton, post, it represents the apex of the development of strict ethical concepts in medicine, and its influence endures to this day. Why did not the authority of Hippocrates dissuade abortion practice in his time and that of Rome? The late Doctor Edelstein provides us with a theory: The Oath was not uncontested even in Hippocrates' day; only the Pythagorean school of philosophers frowned upon the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the other hand, commended abortion, at least prior to viability. See Plato, Republic, Book Five, 461; Aristotle, Politics, Book seven, 1335b 25. For the Pythagoreans, however, it was a matter of dogma. For them the embryo was animate from the moment of conception, and abortion meant destruction of a living being. The abortion clause of the Oath, therefore, "echoes Pythagorean doctrines," and "in no other stratum of Greek opinion were such views held or proposed in the same spirit of uncompromising austerity."
Doctor Edelstein then concludes that the Oath originated in a group representing only a small segment of Greek opinion and that it certainly was not accepted by all ancient physicians. He points out that medical writings down to Galen, A D 130 to 200, "give evidence of the violation of almost every one of its injunctions." But with the end of antiquity a decided change took place. Resistance against suicide and against abortion became common. The Oath came to be popular. The emerging teachings of Christianity were in agreement with the Pythagorean ethic. The Oath "became the nucleus of all medical ethics" and "was applauded as the embodiment of truth." Thus, suggests Doctor Edelstein, it is "a Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of an absolute standard of medical conduct."

This, it seems to us, is a satisfactory and acceptable explanation of the Hippocratic Oath's apparent rigidity. It enables us to understand, in historical context, a long-accepted and revered statement of medical ethics.
3. The common law. It is undisputed that at common law, abortion performed before "quickening", the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the sixteenth to the eighteenth week of pregnancy, Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, twenty fourth edition 1965, was not an indictable offense.
The absence of a common-law crime for pre-quickening abortion appears to have developed from a confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when life begins. These disciplines variously approached the question in terms of the point at which the embryo or fetus became "formed" or recognizably human, or in terms of when a "person" came into being, that is, infused with a "soul" or "animated." A loose consensus evolved in early English law that these events occurred at some point between conception and live birth.
This was "mediate animation." Although Christian theology and the canon law came to fix the point of animation at 40 days for a male and 80 days for a female, a view that persisted until the nineteenth century, there was otherwise little agreement about the precise time of formation or animation. There was agreement, however, that prior to this point the fetus was to be regarded as part of the mother, and its destruction, therefore, was not homicide. Due to continued uncertainty about the precise time when animation occurred, to the lack of any empirical basis for the 40 to 80 day view, and perhaps to Aquinas' definition of movement as one of the two first principles of life, Bracton focused upon quickening as the critical point. The significance of quickening was echoed by later common-law scholars and found its way into the received common law in this country.

Early philosophers believed that the embryo or fetus did not become formed and begin to live until at least 40 days after conception for a male, and 80 to 90 days for a female. See, for example, Aristotle and Hippocrates. Aristotle's thinking derived from his three-stage theory of life: vegetable, animal, rational. The vegetable stage was reached at conception, the animal at "animation," and the rational soon after live birth. This theory, together with the 40-80 day view, came to be accepted by early Christian thinkers. The theological debate was reflected in the writings of Saint Augustine, who made a distinction between embryo inanimatus, not yet endowed with a soul, and embryo animatus. He may have drawn upon Exodus Chapter 21 verse 22. At one point, however, he expressed the view that human powers cannot determine the point during fetal development at which the critical change occurs.
Galen, in three treatises related to embryology, accepted the thinking of Aristotle and his followers. Later, Augustine on abortion was incorporated by Gratian into the Decretum, published about 1140. Decretum Magistri Gratiani. This Decretal and the Decretals that followed were recognized as the definitive body of canon law until the new Code of 1917.

Whether abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at common law, or even a lesser crime, is still disputed. Bracton, writing early in the thirteenth century, thought it homicide. Bracton took the position that abortion by blow or poison was homicide "if the foetus be already formed and animated, and particularly if it be animated." But the later and predominant view, following the great common-law scholars, has been that it was, at most, a lesser offense. In a frequently cited passage, Coke took the position that abortion of a woman "quick with child" is "a great misprision, and no murder." Blackstone followed, saying that while abortion after quickening had once been considered manslaughter, though not murder, "modern law" took a less severe view. A recent review of the common-law precedents argues, however, that those precedents contradict Coke and that even post-quickening abortion was never established as a common-law crime, see Cyril C Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?
The author examines the two principal precedents cited marginally by Coke, both contrary to his dictum, and traces the treatment of these and other cases by earlier commentators. He concludes that Coke, who himself participated as an advocate in an abortion case in sixteen oh one, may have intentionally misstated the law. The author even suggests a reason: Coke's strong feelings against abortion, coupled with his determination to assert common-law (secular) jurisdiction to assess penalties for an offense that traditionally had been an exclusively ecclesiastical or canon-law crime. Lader, who notes that some scholars doubt that the common law ever was applied to abortion. That the English ecclesiastical courts seem to have lost interest in the problem after fifteen twenty seven, and that the preamble to the English legislation of eighteen oh three, referred to in the text, states that "no adequate means have been hitherto provided for the prevention and punishment of such offenses."
This is of some importance because while most American courts ruled, in holding or dictum, that abortion of an unquickened fetus was not criminal under their received common law, others followed Coke in stating that abortion of a quick fetus was a "misprision," a term they translated to mean "misdemeanor." That their reliance on Coke on this aspect of the law was uncritical and, apparently in all the reported cases, dictum (due probably to the paucity of common-law prosecutions for post-quickening abortion), makes it now appear doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a common-law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus.
4. The English statutory law. England's first criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, Section 1, a capital crime, but in Section 2 it provided lesser penalties for the felony of abortion before quickening, and thus preserved the "quickening" distinction. This contrast was continued in the general revision of 1828. It disappeared, however, together with the death penalty, in 1837, and did not reappear in the Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, that formed the core of English anti-abortion law until the liberalizing reforms of 1967.

In 1929, the Infant Life Preservation Act, came into being. Its emphasis was upon the destruction of "the life of a child capable of being born alive." It made a willful act performed with the necessary intent a felony. It contained a proviso that one was not to be found guilty of the offense "unless it is proved that the act which caused the death of the child was not done in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother." A seemingly notable development in the English law was the case of Rex versus Bourne, 1939. This case apparently answered in the affirmative the question whether an abortion necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman was excepted from the criminal penalties of the 1861 Act. In his instructions to the jury, Judge Macnaghten referred to the 1929 Act, and observed that that Act related to "the case where a child is killed by a willful act at the time when it is being delivered in the ordinary course of nature." He concluded that the 1861 Act's use of the word "unlawfully," imported the same meaning expressed by the specific proviso in the 1929 Act, even though there was no mention of preserving the mother's life in the 1861 Act. He then construed the phrase "preserving the life of the mother" broadly, that is, "in a reasonable sense," to include a serious and permanent threat to the mother's health, and instructed the jury to acquit Doctor Bourne if it found he had acted in a good-faith belief that the abortion was necessary for this purpose. The jury did acquit.
Recently, Parliament enacted a new abortion law. This is the Abortion Act of 1967. The Act permits a licensed physician to perform an abortion where two other licensed physicians agree:
(a) "that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated," or,
(b) "that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped."
The Act also provides that, in making this determination, "account may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment." It also permits a physician, without the concurrence of others, to terminate a pregnancy where he is of the good-faith opinion that the abortion "is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman."
5. The American law. In this country, the law in effect in all but a few