Operation Meeting-House: The Bombing Deadlier Than The Atomic Bomb

By early 1945, the outcome of the Second World War was obvious to anyone. Italy had been knocked out, Germany was retreating on all fronts, and the Americans were within striking distance of the Japanese mainland.

The question the Allies faced was how to end the war as quickly, and with as few casualties, as possible. This thinking would lead to one of the most controversial Allied actions of the war: the fire-bombing of Tokyo, codenamed Operation Meetinghouse.

In this video, we’ll explore what Operation Meetinghouse was and ask whether it was the right call. If you enjoy this video, don’t forget to like and subscribe for more videos like this one.

Lead-Up

With the conquest of Guam and the Marianas in early 1945, American bombers could now reliably strike Japan itself. Allied leadership began to consider how they might undertake an invasion of Japan once Germany had been defeated in Europe. Certainly, Japan would have to be weakened first. Its industrial capacity had to be crippled and its population demoralized to pave the way for a full-scale invasion.

This was the issue faced by Major General Curtis LeMay, Commander of the 21st Bomber Command in the Pacific. LeMay addressed this problem the same way the Allies had solved the issue in Europe, with the most American solution of all: bombs.

LeMay and the US military leadership knew that a strategic bombing campaign on Japanese cities would cripple their industry and demoralize the population, much as it had done in Germany. These bombing campaigns would inevitably target civilians, but this didn’t phase LeMay or any of the US leadership. After all, the entire conflict had seen atrocity upon atrocity inflicted on non-combatants, and, ultimately, the US believed that the civilian costs were worth the potential saving of military lives.