Germany Under Kaiser William II, Book 1, Chapter four, the Army and the Navy

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Translated from the German.
Written to Celebrate 100 years since the battle of Leipzig,
and 25 years of the rule of Kaiser William the second,
Germany under Kaiser William II was published just months before WW1.
It includes chapters on the Army and the Navy.
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Fourth book.

The German Wehrmacht.

The Army.
From Von Bernhardi, general of the cavalry z. D.

Geographical position and economic development of Germany.

The fate of Germany is largely determined by its geographic location. In the east the flood of the Slavic peoples surges against its open border. In the north of the Baltic Sea is the Scandinavian peninsula, the North Sea England. The exits to the ocean are ruled by foreign peoples. In the west the enemy France, in the northwest Holland and Belgium border the German Reich; in the south it is separated from the Mediterranean by high mountain ranges and in the south-east it joins Austria-Hungary, which in turn is oppressed by the South Slavic peoples who at the same time live in large numbers within its borders. As long as there has been a real Germany since the collapse of the Carolingian Empire, the German people have continued to fight in various directions in order to defend themselves against enemy attacks and to expand their borders. This is how today's German Empire came into being amidst the blows of the sword and the turmoil of battle, after heavy defeats and brilliant victories; but even today it is influenced by its geographical position. When Kaiser Wilhelm the second ascended the throne, however, Bismarck's statecraft had succeeded in substantially mitigating the dangers it opposed. Germany was united with Austria and Italy by an alliance aimed at joint defense in the event of an enemy attack, and there was an agreement with Russia under which both states assured each other of neutrality if one of them were attacked. At the same time relations with England were friendly. It was thus possible to temporarily isolate France. However, this did not remove the deep national differences between Germans and Slavs. Russia's distrust of German politics had at times assumed dubious forms, and only too soon did the opposition between the two empires find its political expression. In any case, it was clear that Germany's position of power rested primarily on its military strength, which made it valuable to its allies and terrible to its enemies.

At the same time, the development of the German people in cultural and economic terms had taken a powerful upswing since the Wars of Unification and justified the proud endeavor not only to maintain the position of power that had been achieved, but also to gain an expanded sphere of influence and, with it, increasing world renown. This striving became a necessity after the foundations of a colonial policy had been laid, and the rapid population growth suggested the desire to gain settlement areas and to further increase exports in order to create employment opportunities for the growing masses; it pointed out to sea and showed the need for strong armaments at sea to protect trade and colonial activity.
Army development, the main task of the state.

From the beginning of the government of Wilhelm the second, two enormous tasks arose: the expansion of the army to maintain the position within Europe and the construction of a fleet to assert the necessary world power aspirations. Both tasks complemented each other. World politics was inconceivable without strong naval armament; but on the other hand even the strongest navy would have to be unsuccessful if the opponents of Germany succeeded in wrestling it in the country and robbing it of its European position of power. So the most important task of the state was the development of the army, which would ensure the superiority of Germany under all circumstances.

At first the emperor found little understanding for these lines of thought among the people. The realization that Germany needed a navy only gradually broke through, and the people's representatives put up stubborn resistance to the expansion of the land army, with complete political ineptitude and mundane mischief. The struggle against the views of the Reichstag marked the gradual development of the army during almost the entire reign of Wilhelm the second. Later, the high demands for sea armament were often disadvantageous to her, and sometimes it seemed as though there was a lack of understanding for the fact that a sufficiently strong land army formed the necessary basis for all political activity, but especially for Germany's overseas policy.

Army submission 1890.

When Kaiser Wilhelm the second took office, the army numbered 468,409 men, excluding officers, civil servants, doctors and one-year volunteers. It was divided into 15 army corps and 2 Bavarian corps and consisted of 534 infantry battalions, 465 squadrons, 364 batteries, 31 foot artillery, 19 engineers, 5 railway and 18 and a third train battalions. In the spring of 1888, when a war seemed imminent, compulsory service in the Landwehr was extended to the age of 39 and the army was strengthened by around 700,000 men. But these conditions in no way corresponded to the principle of general conscription and justice. Numerous young men fit for duty could not be employed, in the event of war the old men had to be led against the enemy, while many young men had to be trained. The crews drafted as substitute reservists only served ten weeks, so they enjoyed a substantial preferential treatment.
These were untenable conditions. An army reinforcement of around 80,000 men was therefore planned, to be brought in during the spring of 1890. Prince Bismarck declared himself ready to represent such a proposal before the Reichstag and to enforce it. Some changes had been made earlier. The sixteenth and seventeenth Corps were formed from excess troops; the field artillery was subordinated to the general commands after the general inspection was abolished; a brigade of two regiments was formed from the 4 railway battalions. The artillery training school was separated into the field and the foot artillery training schools; two cavalry inspections were established.

In the meantime, however, a profound contradiction had developed between the Kaiser and the Reich Chancellor, which led to Bismarck's resignation on March 18 and his leaving Berlin immediately afterwards. His successor, General von Caprivi believed that he would not be able to push through the planned military bill with the existing composition of the Reichstag. It was therefore limited to the essentials and reduced to a reinforcement of the army by 18,574 men. According to the law of July 15, the army was to have 468,983 men and 538 battalions of infantry, 465 squadrons, and 434 batteries by the end of the existing septnate (March 31, 1894), 31 foot artillery, 20 engineer, 5 railway and 21 train battalions would exist.

This of course did not fulfill the original purpose of the bill, and the political situation soon developed in such a way that further reinforcement of the army seemed absolutely necessary in the interests of national defense.

Army submission 1892.
Two years of service.

The treaty with Russia, which ensured neutrality in the event of an enemy attack against us, had expired in 1890. It was not renewed on the German side. In Russia, with which strong tensions had already arisen, this aroused a deep distrust of German politics and opened the way for a Russian-French alliance. The political rapprochement between the two states took place very soon. In July 1891 a French squadron arrived in Kronstadt and was greeted with lavish celebrations, and in the autumn of 1892 the conclusion of a Russian-French treaty was announced. This gave rise to the possibility of war on two fronts, which made significantly increased armaments an absolute necessity. However, the government did not believe that it would be able to enforce this by maintaining the three-year period of service at the Reichstag; it was therefore decided, under the pressure of circumstances, to transition to two years of service at least for foot troops and field artillery. For this, the strength of the peace presence should be increased by more than 80,000 men, meaning increased to 492,000 common, the artillery increased significantly and some reinforcements were also planned for the cavalry, the engineers and the transport troops. Cadet corps, non-commissioned officers 'and non-commissioned officers' pre-schools should expand.
Target practice funds were increased and funds were made available for the training of officers on leave of absence in the field and for foot artillery.

However, the bill was rejected by the Reichstag, although the army administration had tried to arrange everything as cheaply as possible. The newly elected then accepted it with a small majority, but not without having made considerable compromises. On August 3, 1893, it became law.

The increase of the cavalry had been refused, an engineer battalion was canceled, the number of men was fixed at only 479,229. The posts of officers, medical officers, civil servants and NCOs were to be subject to the determination of the Reich budget. The exercises in the reserve were discontinued in order to prevent the training staff from becoming overburdened. From now on the army was to consist of 538 battalions of infantry and 173 similar half battalions, which were to be supplemented to form whole battalions in the event of war, 465 squadrons, 494 field batteries, 37 foot artillery, 23 engineer, 7 railroad and 21 train battalions. The cavalry and mounted artillery men, who remained with the flag for three years, were only to belong to the Landwehr's first contingent for three years. The law was to be valid until March 31, 1899. This marked the transition from the septnate to the quinquennate. The duration of the determination was made the same as that of the legislative periods of the Reichstag.

The new law did not overload the people. In spite of the fact that 97,028 men were transferred to the Landsturm in 1893 and 80,352 to the reserve, there were still 8,350 men, and in 1894 even 14,022 fully capable men remained as surplus. The expenditures for the army and the navy after the implementation of the army bill amounted to 13.8 marks per head of population, compared to 18.8 marks in France.

In the following years only minor changes occurred. The foot artillery was divided into two inspections and four brigades in 1895. In the same year the Guard, first and fifteenth Corps rider detachments formed from charges of the cavalry, in 1896 one with the second Bavarian Corps. At the train two stringing departments (heavy horses) were set up for the foot artillery, as two of which had existed on a trial basis since 1891. On April 1, 1897, 86 full battalions were formed from the 173 half battalions, which were generally formed into regiments of 2 battalions and brigades of 2 regiments. These brigades were usually attached to the corps in question as the fifth. On the other hand, this measure, which made training easier, had the disadvantage that the framework available for accommodating the mobilization teams was considerably reduced. In the event of mobilization, this made it necessary to recruit more troops, but it could not be avoided. In 1897 and 1898 the independent rider detachments, now referred to as hunters on horseback, were increased by three and were given the strength of squadrons. In 1897 three new clothing departments were set up. In 1898 the position of General Inspector of the Cavalry was created and the number of inspectors increased to four.

At the end of 1898 the army consisted of 624 battalions of infantry, 472 squadrons, 448 mobile and 46 mounted batteries, 37 foot artillery and 23 pioneer, 7 railroad battalions with an operations division, a telegraph test company, 2 airship divisions and 21 train battalions with 7 clothing departments. The airship department in Prussia had become an independent unit in 1895; the other belonged to the Bavarian army. The total strength, excluding 9,000 one-year volunteers, was 23,176 officers, 557,436 men, 98,038 horses and 2,542 artillery pieces.

At the same time there were 934,360 reservists, 759,240 for the Landwehr, 759,240 for the first and 751,500 for the second, for a total of 2,495,100 men, who gradually had to reach 3,246,000 as a result of the reinforcement of the army.

The further development of the army took place amid continued struggles with the Reichstag, which, guided by party interests and electoral considerations, pettily nagged at the proposals of the government without understanding the major political questions, which for its part believed that it was faced with a negative attitude of the people's representatives in having to be content with temporary and half measures. The great demands that had to be made for the expansion of the fleet naturally had a restrictive influence on the willingness of the Reichstag to approve the expenditures for the army.

Army template 1898.

As the current quinquennat neared its end, very important permits for the fleet had been made in 1897 and 1898. They seemed necessary as Germany was drawn ever deeper into overseas politics through the lease of Kiautschou and its colonial aspirations. It was also evident that the naval law that was enacted at the time would not end the expansion of the navy. It is true that the government declared in January 1899 that an extension of the enacted naval law was not being considered for the time being: after all, it is reasonable to assume that consideration for the construction of the navy had a major influence on the new demands for the army.

The government demanded an increase in army strength by 23,277 men, mainly to increase the budget of the infantry, a strong increase in artillery and some new formations of the other weapons, especially the transport troops. She declared her readiness to keep the two-year period of service, if the training personnel were constantly able to cope with the increased demands and the establishment of large training areas was accelerated, and at the same time called for a change in the organization of the field artillery, which should now be directly subordinate to the divisions in peacetime. Three new army corps were also to be formed; one each in Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria.

The Reichstag approved the main points of the bill, but cut 7,000 men of the required strength, approved the required 10 squadrons only in the form of detachments of mounted hunters without regimental association and looked away from an increase in the number of NCOs. It was expected that they could be replaced by teams who would volunteer for a third year and who were to remain in the Landwehr's first contingent for only three years.

On March 25, 1899, after fierce parliamentary struggles that almost led to the dissolution of the Reichstag, the submission of these resolutions became law, which was to remain in force for five years until March 31, 1904. After that the army should be strong: 625 battalions, which were increased by only one, 482 squadrons, 574 batteries, 38 foot artillery, 26 pioneer, 11 traffic and 23 train battalions, a total of 495,500 common. The propagation should take place until 1903.

The eighteenth Corps was established in Frankfurt, the nineteenth in Leipzig, the third Bavarian in Nuremberg. In spite of this, eight army corps retained fifth brigades, while two divisions had no cavalry. On the other hand, 16 machine gun sections were formed over the next few years to be assigned to the army cavalry. From now on, each division received a brigade of two regiments of field artillery, two divisions had to be content with one regiment for the time being. The heavy artillery of the field army to be formed from the foot artillery battalions consisted of howitzer and mortar batteries, four of them and six of them. The clothing departments were increased to ten; the traffic troops were subject to an inspection. In the railway brigade, which consisted of three regiments and two battalions, the operations department of the military railroad was reinforced. Then three telegraph battalions with clothing detachments were formed, with the loss of the telegraph test company; the military telegraph school was converted into a cavalry telegraph school with a clothing department. Furthermore, in 1901 the airship division was reinforced with a battalion of two companies with a clothing department. The teams required for these new formations were obtained through budget reductions. To speed up the mobilization, 1900 district officers and horse prototype inspectors were employed.

According to the permits, the army counted 24,374 officers, 81,954 NCOs, 495,500 common, 105,885 horses and 3,126 guns on March 31, 1904, excluding the medical officers, civil servants and one-year volunteers.

The annual contingent of recruits had increased to 243,621 men; Nevertheless, 98,992 men had to be transferred to the Landsturm and 82,786 to the reserve, a large number of which could undoubtedly be described as fit for service. The implementation of general conscription was far from being carried out. On the other hand, a naval bill had been approved in 1900, which provided for a planned expansion of the fleet within 16 years up to the strength of 38 ships of the line and 51 cruisers. This required very substantial expenses, and since the expedition to China, 1900-1901, had also devoured significant sums, the government temporarily waived the introduction of a new military bill and contented itself with the expiry of the law on March 31, 1904 for one year to be extended.

Law of April 1905.

It was not until the winter of 1904–1905, when the Anglo-French colonial agreement of 1905 also made the political rapprochement between the two states known and the Moroccan dispute with France loomed, that a further small reinforcement of the army for a further five years was required, the two-year service period was permanently fixed for the foot troops, the artillery and the train.

According to the new law, by the end of the new quinquennate, the strength of the peace presence was to be gradually increased to 505,839 congregations without annual volunteers, but 12,000 economic craftsmen who had to be replaced by civilian craftsmen should not count towards this. In addition, the reorganization of 8 battalions, 9 cavalry regiments, 2 foot artillery, 3 engineer battalions and 1 telegraph battalion was approved. The existing 17 squadrons of fighters on horseback and 6 companies of foot artillery should be taken into account.

The approved battalions were provisionally set up in ones or twos in the years up to 1909, but 48 machine gun companies in the latter year, since after the experience of the Russo-Japanese war it seemed desirable to equip the infantry with this weapon as well.

In the cavalry, 5 hunter regiments, 1 (Saxon) Uhlan regiment and 2 Bavarian Chevaulegers regiments were established by 1909; the Bavarian cavalry then numbered 12 regiments, of which 5 were only 4 squadrons strong. For this purpose, one (Saxon) hussar regiment and a sixth hunter regiment were set up in 1910.

In the field artillery, observation cars were introduced, which caused an increase in the horse budget.

In the foot artillery, the training battalion of the shooting school was assigned to 4 companies. In addition, this weapon was formed in such a way that there were 14 regiments of 2 battalions (8, 9 and 10 companies each) and 4 regiments of 3 battalions and 12 companies each; also 1 training battalion and 1 experimental company. The number of clothing departments was increased to 14. The companies were renamed batteries in 1908.

Among the pioneers, the guard battalion received one experimental company in 1905, and from 1907–1909 a pioneer command and one battalion were newly set up in the seventeenth, seventh and eighteenth corps. In 1907, a fourth telegraph battalion with a clothing department was formed for the transport forces. All telegraph battalions received radio operator departments up to that year. In Bavaria the telegraph company was reduced to 1 detachment of 2 companies with a radio operator. 1 inspection of the field telegraph was newly formed, to which 2 inspections by the telegraph troops were subordinate. The transport troops were increased by one test company, which was joined in 1907 as the second company by 1 motor vehicle division. Such was also set up in Bavaria. The third Bavarian Train Battalion received a third company.

Army strength and crew 1910.

On October 1, 1910, the army counted 633 battalions, 510 squadrons, 574 batteries, 40 foot artillery, 29 pioneer, 12 traffic and 23 training battalions, not counting the teaching and experimental troops, etc. Officials, annual volunteers and craftsmen 25,494 officers, 87,350 NCOs, 505,839 common, 114,162 horses, 3,126 artillery pieces and 384 machine guns.

How little the army reinforcement brought about by this law corresponded to the actual number of crews available is shown by the fact that although the recruiting contingent in 1910 without 13,145 one-year volunteers was 252,462, in the same year 144,737 men were considered unfit for the Landsturm and 80,262 as future suitable had to be transferred to the replacement reserve.

On the other hand, the training was promoted by the fact that the teams on the leave of absence were increasingly drawn on for service. In Prussia alone the number of people called for exercises grew to 375,659 by 1911. The reservists were mostly used to reinforce the companies and to set up missing third battalions, but special formations were formed from the soldiers who were first called up; and from reserve regiments that met at the military training areas towards the end of the quinquennate.
The train represented an obvious weakness of the organization. The formations to be set up in the event of mobilization could only be formed by calling on cavalry reservists and had to have the character of improvisations. The number of these formations was in no relation to the strength of the train battalions and the existing train officers. Each train battalion had to set up: provisions, vehicle fleet and field bakery columns, field hospitals, the trains of the field administration authorities; also 1 appropriately composed reserve battalion, 1 replacement battalion and the extensive stage formations. The train battalions also had to help set up the bridge trains and the trains of the transport troops. Accordingly, they had a huge task to cope with, and it seemed quite questionable whether the peace organization provided for this would be sufficient in an emergency. In spite of this, no improvements were sought in this direction, probably for the sake of savings.

Development of the political situation from 1905–1911.

In the meantime the political situation had not developed favorably. After England had failed to involve Germany in an anti-Russian policy with regard to Manchuria through the Yangtze Agreement, England approached France and concluded the aforementioned agreement with Morocco by ceding Morocco to that country without affecting its rights and showing consideration for German interests. At the same time it offered France the prospect of its active participation in the event of a war over the Moroccan question. In Germany, people initially felt that France had gained against the country. At the same time in the course of the Japanese war and the revolution that broke out as a result, Russia was deeply shaken but on the other hand the lack of sufficient sea defense was clearly evident in relations with England, it was believed that the development of the navy should be taken into account in the first place. This seemed all the more necessary since the Russo-Japanese war had clearly shown under certain circumstances that cooperation between the army and the navy could gain great importance. The consequence of such considerations was initially the scant military bill of 1905; they then found further expression in the naval laws of 1906 and 1908, which not only brought a further increase in the fleet and the transition to the construction of capital ships, but also the lowering of the age of the liners and thus an acceleration of shipbuilding. The resulting costs were very significant, and it therefore seems understandable that the greatest possible restriction was imposed on army expenditures, all the more since the conclusion of the Algeciras Act and the Franco-German Agreement of 1909 ruled out an immediate danger of war. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had brought the possibility of Russian military intervention close, also passed without a European shock. Thus, in spite of the grave dangers inherent in the European situation, a new military bill was not tabled until the beginning of 1911, which was kept within the most modest limits due to financial concerns.

The Army situation in 1911.

According to the law passed on this basis on March 27, 1911, the army was to be reinforced by 9,482 men by March 31, 1916. At this point in time it should consist of 634 battalions, 510 squadrons, 592 batteries, 48 foot artillery, 29 engineer, 17 traffic and 23 train battalions. The number of clothing departments should be increased to 24. In addition, 112 machine gun companies were to be set up among the infantry, taking into account the 48 provisional and 5 machine gun divisions that were available from which companies were to be formed. In the future, each infantry brigade should be assigned 1 machine gun company. In the field of field artillery, 2 regiments and 6 Bavarian batteries were to be rebuilt, taking into account 20 mounted batteries, which had to be converted into mobile ones. A new company was to be formed for each of the 21 train battalions, and the organization of the higher train authorities was also to be reorganized. Major changes were planned for the transport forces. As early as April 1, 1911, the inspection was converted into a general inspection of transport and an inspection of military aviation and motor vehicles was established. On October 1st, radio companies were formed from the radio operators' departments; in the case of the airships, two new battalions of two companies were set up with the dissolution of the experimental company; the motor vehicle department was converted into 1 motor vehicle battalion with 3 companies. The railway troops should in future consist of 1 inspection, 2 brigades, 3 regiments to 2 battalions, 1 new battalion, the Bavarian railway battalion and the operations department of the military railroad consist of 3 companies. However, this organization and the other measures provided for by the law were only partially carried out on October 1st. The following remained to be formed: 1 infantry battalion, 4 machine gun companies from 4 similar departments, 38 mobile batteries using 20 mounted, 7 foot artillery battalions, taking into account 3 already existing provisional battalions that had been set up in the spring of 1911, 10 clothing departments, 1 (Bavarian) Pioneer company, 1 railway battalion, 1 telegraph battalion and 22 trainer companies. That was equivalent to a head count of 460 officers, 1,300 non-commissioned officers and 8,068 men. The strength of the army was therefore without medical and veterinary officers, civil servants, annual volunteers and craftsmen: 25,880 officers, 88,292 non-commissioned officers, 507,253 common men, 118,246 horses, 738 machine guns and 3,072 artillery pieces.

The Political crisis of 1911.

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1911, a serious political crisis had arisen. Since France disregarded the existing treaties with regard to Morocco, Germany sent a warship to Agadir to safeguard its rights and thereby put the jealousy of England in its place, which was now threatening Germany. The German nation unanimously demanded a powerful rejection of the opposing arrogance; the government, however, did not want to allow war over Morocco and concluded an agreement with France, to which, in return for moderate compensation in the French Congo and a few trade guarantees, it left the Sherif Empire and with it a tremendous increase in power.

At least the threatened danger of war had led to the realization that the army reinforcement stipulated by the 1911 law did not correspond to the danger of the situation and that a further increase in the armed forces was necessary. Greater reparteeism also seemed desirable for the fleet. So the demands for the army and the navy entered into competition again and had a paralyzing effect in both directions. The naval bill, however, was essentially an organizational change; but another ship of the line was required and the number of submarines to be built was legally stipulated. A considerable increase in staff was the necessary consequence.

Army template 1912.

In spite of the fact that the resulting financial claims were relatively modest, and in spite of the war threats from superior enemies that had shaped the summer of 1911, the army administration once again believed that it could be satisfied with relatively low demands, which the Minister of War as the Minister of War was adequately labeled.

Initially, two new Prussian army corps were to be established from mostly existing troop units and also newly formed: 17 infantry battalions, 6 squadrons, 41 batteries, 4 engineer, 1 traffic and 2 train battalions. The strength of the peace presence would be increased by about 29,000 men by March 31, 1916 and amount to 544,211 men. The number of machine gun companies was to be doubled so that each infantry regiment could have one. The engineer battalions were to receive floodlights, and the traffic troops were to be expanded by setting up an air force. The posts of staff officers and captains were to be increased with consideration for new mobilization formations and 22 new Landwehr inspections were to be established.

In the light of the events of 1911, this bill was essentially approved by the Reichstag and passed into law on June 14, 1912. Only 15 Landwehr inspections were canceled, of which there were now 10, and there was the requested increase in staff officers in the small infantry regiments.

Some of these permits were issued on October 1, 1912. The twentieth corps was established in Allenstein, the twenty-first in Saarbrücken. In the infantry, 1 regiment of 3 battalions and 11 third battalions were formed; 2 machine gun departments were converted into companies. 2 Prussian field artillery regiments with 6 batteries each were set up, and 6 Bavarian regiments received one new battery each. The foot artillery formed 5 new regiments using the overflowing battalions and batteries. The training battalion of the foot artillery shooting school was expanded to 1 regiment with 2 battalions; 10 clothing departments were reorganized. The pioneers were increased by 3 new battalions and 15 floodlights, the traffic troops by 1 Prussian telegraph battalion and 1 air force. In Bavaria, the telegraph detachment, as well as the aviation and motor vehicle departments, were expanded to include 1 battalion each and 1 air force was set up. Two new Prussian battalions of three companies were set up on the train, and one company that was still missing in Bavaria.

At the beginning of 1913 the army consisted of: 647 infantry battalions and 1 training battalion, 109 machine gun companies, 13 machine gun divisions, 510 squadrons, 616 field batteries, 47 foot artillery battalions with 183 batteries and 22 clothing departments, 32 engineer, 18 traffic and 25 train battalions of 3 companies; 1 Prussian and 1 Bavarian infantry and 1 field artillery and 1 foot artillery shooting school.

On the other hand, the authorized troops still had to form: 4 battalions and 109 machine gun companies, 6 squadrons (5 Prussian, 1 Bavarian), 17 batteries, 9 foot artillery battalions, 1 engineer battalion, 1 pioneer command, 6 floodlight trains, 1 railway battalion, 1 motor vehicle company, 21 train companies and 2 train commands. A part of these troops was to be formed in 1913 by increasing the number of floodlights to 11.

How little it was possible to achieve the implementation of compulsory service is evident from the fact that in 1905 0.849 percent, in 1910, on the other hand, only 0.838 percent of the rapidly growing population were employed. Even bringing the organization of the army to a certain conclusion had not yet been successful. The army corps should normally consist of 2 divisions of 2 infantry, 1 cavalry and 1 artillery brigade, 1 hunter, 1 engineer and 1 train battalion. However, even after the 1912 law was implemented, 6 army corps retained the 5th Infantry Brigades; the 3rd battalions were missing from 18 regiments; 4 Bavarian cavalry regiments the 5th squadrons. There were also too few cavalry regiments and there were only 18 battalions of hunters. Clothing offices were not set up in several corps. There were also some other gaps to be closed. The train remained inadequately organized, and many engineer battalions lacked floodlights. Even a more or less uniform formation of the foot artillery was not achieved.

So if in some respects the army had to be described as unfinished at the time, on the other hand it was at the height of modern requirements in terms of equipment and armament. That is still the case today.

Armament.

The infantry is armed with a Model 98 rifle, which can be considered a major improvement on the 88 rifle. With a caliber of 7.9 mm and an appropriate pack charge, it carries a pointed S-bullet and reaches an initial speed of 885 meters per second, which was achieved partly by the shape and lightness of the bullet, partly by a relatively strong charge and an improved smokeless powder. No rifle of any other army is superior to this weapon. Cavalry and foot artillery are equipped with a carbine of the same construction and almost the same efficiency; the cavalry is also armed with tubular steel lances; the field artillery received a self-loading pistol with a nine-cartridge magazine in the handle and a range of 1500 meters with a length of only 21.7 cm. The introduced machine gun, based on the Maxim system, is designed as a self-loading machine and allows a rate of fire of 600 rounds per minute.

In the area of field artillery, after the introduction of the low-smoke powder in 1889, some improvements were made to the existing material. The double fuze was introduced for shrapnel, and soon afterwards the high-explosive grenade, which, however, did not prove very useful; In 1892 an automatic rope brake and the aiming surface were added, which made shooting from hidden positions easier, and in 1893 a new, more powerful shrapnel. In the meantime the question of the rapid-fire gun had become a burning one; it was primarily a matter of eliminating the return flow. This purpose could either be achieved in that the return of the mount was inhibited by a spur or by a device by means of which the tube could slide back on the lower mount when fired and be automatically brought forward again. The latter system was chosen in France, and the former in Germany. An appropriately designed gun, Model 1896, was introduced.
The directional means have also been significantly improved. Soon, however, it was felt compelling to go over to the second system, and at the same time as France had stepped forward, to introduce protective shields for the service teams and to change the gun in 1896 in this sense. The new gun, which met all modern requirements, was introduced by 1907. The rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute. In addition to the field cannon, the army wields the field howitzer, a rapid fire gun of 10.5 cm caliber, which is designed to be effective against field-like coverings and targets behind cover with significant penetrating power and a steep angle of incidence. In addition, however, it provides a useful and, because of the larger caliber, very effective flat track section and is therefore versatile. In 1907 this howitzer was modified for return pipe and provided with protective shields. The "Feldhaubitzgeschoß 05" was also introduced with her, which can be used as shrapnel and grenade due to its peculiar detonator design. Each division is now to receive a howitzer division. A further acceleration of the fire was achieved by the unit cartridge, in which the projectile and cartridge are connected. In 1909, observation cars and telephones were introduced to the artillery.

The heavy artillery of the field army had already received some new material in 1899. It was made up of howitzer and mortar battalions, those with 24 guns in 4, these with 8 guns in 2 batteries. As a flat-track gun, it carried a 12 cm cannon. The mortar had a caliber of 21 cm, the howitzer was 15 cm. In 1907 it also received very modern recoil guns, the heavy field howitzer 02 (caliber 14.97 cm) and the 10 cm cannon 04. With the introduction of wheel belts, the bedding was eliminated.

The two mentioned guns were also used in the siege artillery, which in 1909 received a 13 cm gun instead of the outdated 15 cm cannon. It also carries 15 cm ring cannons, 21 cm and 28 cm mortars and 5 cm rapid fire cannons. The fortress artillery has a wide variety of material, as all cannons that can still be used are used here, which have been discarded elsewhere, including in the navy. Particularly heavy artillery - cannons and howitzers - are used in the coastal artillery, as these must take up combat with the enemy ironclad, so in some cases they must at least have an armor-piercing effect. Anti-balloon guns have also recently been introduced. In terms of artillery, Germany is probably at the forefront of all major military states.
Fortress construction.

The tremendous development of the artillery also had a decisive influence on fortress construction. Since the mid-1880s, concrete and steel cladding had to be used to protect against the effects of artillery. The profiles were reduced in order to hide the works from view, artillery and infantry positions were separated and finally the large forts were replaced by connected groups of several smaller works in new installations. Only the armored domes for assault guns and observation posts are now on the parapet, those of the combat guns inside the batteries are under the parapet, with howitzers raised above them.

In the case of the large fortresses, the defense is completely placed in the fort belt, so city walls are no longer used. It remains to be seen whether the latter measure will prove successful. Only the future can teach us that. In addition, the most varied of views have been authoritative in recent years. Many fortresses have been closed, numerous new works have been built; Only recently has it been possible to introduce a solid principle into the land and coastal fortifications.

Military transportation.

The military transport system has experienced a tremendous upswing in recent years. The railway network has been expanded according to strategic considerations, and the latest technological inventions have been made available to the army. The main means of sending messages is the electric telegraph, which recently has no longer been tied to lines, but works wirelessly. Radio operators' departments are attached to the higher authorities and the advanced cavalry; You can also keep in touch with the airships by radio. In addition, the line telegraph remains in use, and telephones are also used in the army. Light signals are used under favorable conditions.

Motor vehicles are also of great importance for the army, both for passenger transport and for replenishing the needs of the army. Truck trains were constructed for the latter purpose. For a premium they are maintained by industrial and trading companies in peacetime and are available in war. The bicycle and motorcycle are also used in the intelligence service. Aviation has at last experienced an extraordinary development. Either large dirigible airships or flying machines are used. They are mainly used for exploratory purposes, but can also be used to hurl explosive projectiles. The flying machines are monoplane or biplane; the airships are partly constructed according to the rigid principle of Count Zeppelin, partly as semi-rigid, partly as non-rigid Parsevall airships. Each of these systems has its advantages and disadvantages. Recently, airships like flying machines have been equipped with weapons for defense and attack. This development is still in its infancy, but it can already be overlooked that battles will take place in the air and that aviation will play an important role in the wars of the future.

Clothing and equipment.

Substantial progress has also been made in the clothing and equipment of the troops. Above all, the introduction of gray field uniforms is important in order to ensure that the troops in combat stand out as little as possible from the terrain. Vehicles and artillery have also been given field-gray paint. The men’s luggage and equipment were relieved. The bare weapons were also changed several times. In addition, all units received bicycles for the reporting service; the Infantry and the pioneers were equipped with kitchen wagons, one of which is to be given to each company. A new army saddle was introduced for the cavalry; Furthermore, each regiment now has two light bridge wagons and a telegraph wagon with them, after the cumbersome folding boat wagons that were initially introduced have been abolished. Smaller uniform changes and the introduction of various badges cannot be touched upon here.

The room also did not allow the various budget changes, the increase and distribution of ammunition columns, as well as the organization of the authorities and preparations for mobilization to go into more detail. A few essential points should only be briefly pointed out.

The number of army inspections had been increased to 7 and that of engineer inspections to 4. The number of district commands gradually increased to 303.

Organization of the authorities.

Various changes had also occurred within the organization of the War Ministry. The most important one can be described as the establishment of a Feldzeugmeisterei in 1898, which, in place of the general war department, took over the supervision of the procurement, manufacture and administration of the controversial means as well as of the personnel employed in this process, thereby relieving the ministry significantly; This was left with the provision on the introduction of new weapons. The Feldzeugmeisterei was responsible for the inspection of the technical institutes of the infantry and artillery, the artillery depot inspections with 4 artillery depot directorates, the train depot inspection with initially 4, now 2 train directions and the train depots, and finally the inspectors of the weapons and the artillery material. Similar orders were issued in Bavaria and Saxony. The remont system was regulated and expanded throughout the empire; NCO schools and NCO cadet schools were increased. Finally, of particular importance for the entire training was the procurement of large military training areas, 24 of which are currently available in the German Reich; they also serve as artillery firing ranges. The military justice system was completely redesigned. The medical and veterinary system also experienced various fundamental changes. Space forbids going into all these things in more detail. On the other hand, we must at least briefly mention the development of the General Staff, in which, alongside the War Ministry, the entire life of the Army is concentrated as if in a focal point in which the intellectual forces of the Army are trained for practical military activity. In the last 25 years it has undergone a significant expansion, partly due to the new formations, but partly also due to the great changes and new achievements in the war system that characterize the period mentioned, and due to the sometimes great development of the armies of other states.

As early as 1889, three senior quartermasters were appointed instead of the quartermaster general, and in 1894 the head of the regional administration was added as the fourth has been. The number of departments was gradually increased - apart from two war history units - to ten. In addition, there was the trigonometric, topographical and cartographical department, which is subordinate to the head of the land survey. To facilitate the deployment, railway commissioners were created and the lines increased to 26. In 1898 the secondary budget was eliminated, and most of the officers belonging to it were transferred to the main budget in order to be able to cover the additional need for general staff officers in the event of mobilization. Since the senior quartermaster positions were also increased, the existence of the general staff in autumn 1912 was as follows: Under the chief of the general staff of the army with 2 adjutants, 6 senior quartermasters, 39 chiefs and 217 other officers of the general staff, 1 chief and 18 officers were assigned to the general staff, 19 officers in the railway department who are not general staff officers, 124 officers who are part of the general staff and 11 who are commanded to take up the country, 10 inactive officers and 22 line commanders.

Some of these and other officers belong to the General Staff. Preparatory training for the General Staff takes place at the War Academy, which has also been expanded, but has increasingly lost its character as a free academy and has become a professional General Staff preparatory school.

The Saxon and Bavarian General Staff developed in a similar way to the Prussian.

If in the foregoing the external growth and organization of the army were described in broad outline, its mode of struggle and intellectual development must now also be examined in order to obtain a more or less accurate picture of the nature of the army.

Fighting style and training.

The way of combat has undergone profound changes in all weapons, primarily as a result of modern weapons, which have been expressed in numerous new regulations.

With the infantry, one appeared as early as autumn 1888, which took modern conditions into account and was replaced by a new one in 1906 after the Manchurian War, which with numerous changes from 1909 is still in force today. The various successive firing regulations from the years 1889, 1893, 1899 and 1905 also tried to take account of the changed weapon conditions, especially after the introduction of the rifle in 1898 and the S ammunition, and to give combat shooting the necessary attention without questioning the careful training in individual shooting.

The essence of modern tactics is to reduce losses in relation to the increased performance of firearms by moving the troops within the fire zone only in lines of fire or in many small marching columns that can easily find cover in the terrain. It is therefore deployed from the marching column at an early stage and developed for combat. But of course there must be uniformity of tactical will are preserved in this resolution. One seeks to achieve this through a strictly implemented discipline of the rifle lines and through the fact that not only the lower ranks but also the teams are trained to act independently in the sense of the combat concept and to understand the combat tasks. Any modern tactic that is to promise success must be an individualistic one. The spiritually superior people will therefore always gain a certain superiority, and education in school thus forms the basis of later military training. We should take this into account to a greater extent than it is today.

Our regulations expect victory in attack and defense from fighting superiority by fire. Here it seems to me that there is a certain danger to our provisions, for history teaches that offensive victories have generally been achieved in spite of the defender's superiority by fire. Given the equality of weapons, it is quite natural that the defender lying covered and shooting calmly must achieve better results than the agile uncovered attacker. Attack victories are achieved partly through numerical superiority, partly and primarily through moral preponderance and the determined will to win despite all losses. But if the attacking infantry is asked to fight for superiority by fire, then the energy of the attack can be broken.

It is all the more correct that our regulations place the greatest emphasis on the cooperation of the artillery with the infantry.

A rich tactical development has also taken place in this weapon. The newly introduced guns, propellants, projectiles and aiming devices repeatedly forced new regulations and firing rules to be issued. Furthermore, efforts were made to simplify the tactical forms as much as possible, to improve the shooting method and to make the composition of the batteries as expedient and combat-oriented as possible. In this regard, the elimination of the second squadron for the batteries and the introduction of light ammunition columns, which were directly attached to the troops, were particularly important. The mounted batteries have also recently been formed into 4 guns. Increasing importance was attached to the exploitation of shrapnel and indirect fire; tactically on the interaction with the infantry. The artillery duel as an end in itself faded more and more into the background; the main task was to fight the enemy infantry, which is intended to facilitate the advance of friendly infantry as far as possible. All corresponding improvements and changes are gradually being reflected in the regulations of 1889, 1892, 1899 and 1907, the latter being improved in 1911 as a result of several new introductions, as well as in various shooting regulations. Such were issued in 1890, 1899 and 1907; the latter was partially reworked in 1911.

The foot artillery has undergone a similar tactical development, and in 1908 received regulations that are still valid today. It has become the most essential task for heavy artillery in the army, in conjunction with the field artillery, to fight the enemy artillery down and to prepare for the infantry to break into the enemy positions. The agility that it has gradually acquired enables it to cope with this task.

Artillery training has also made considerable progress. The first step towards this was the separation of the shooting school into a field and foot artillery shooting school and its gradual expansion. All young officers and all officers suitable to be battery operators are now being trained here; furthermore, training courses for officers on leave of absence have been set up. The frequent change of firing ranges also promotes training, and finally, since 1895, field artillery exercises have been taking place as an introduction to the maneuvers.

The cavalry found it hardest to tear itself away from the old, glorious traditions and adapt to the demands of modern combat. The attack is no longer their main task; the focus today is on operational mobility; in combat, however, fighting on foot is completely on an equal footing with actual equestrian combat. This is due to the development of today's weapons system. It remains to be seen whether the cavalry divisions of 24 squadrons and, within their framework, the brigades provided for the case of war are strong enough. On the other hand, their efficiency is significantly increased by the allocation of engineers, mounted artillery and machine guns, as well as by equipping them with the excellent carbine 1898. For a long time the weapon suffered from the three-hit tactic, the unsuccessful attempt to adapt the misunderstood Frederickian tactics to modern conditions, and tactically moved in a dead formalism. The regulations of 1895 brought various practical simplifications, but no fundamental tactical change. The skirmish on foot was not given enough emphasis either, although a number of shooting regulations raised the shooting range significantly. It was not until 1909 that the meeting tactic for equestrian combat was eliminated, replaced by the use of command units on a wing-by-wing basis, and modern regulations were created, which admittedly still have many weaknesses. The training of the cavalry also suffers from the fact that larger exercises of independent cavalry bodies do not take place annually for the whole cavalry, while in war this activity is almost exclusively required. With the striving spirit that animates the weapon, it tries today to strip off the formalism even further and to let the operative element prevail in the leadership, regardless of tradition and personal inclination. The material and equipment are excellent and the riding training is at a high level. It is successfully cultivated at the military riding institute in Hanover and the riding school in Paderborn. Another riding school is to be established in Soltau in 1913. The new riding instruction from 1912 meets the most extensive requirements.

Field Service Regulations.

In the case of the other auxiliary weapons, too, a development guided by modern standards has taken place. The rules of engagement have been incorporated into the regulations everywhere; however, the provisions that are necessary for other conduct in the field, for march, rest, outpost, reconnaissance, veiling, conduct in front of and in fortresses and more are compiled in the "Field Service Regulations".

The regulations issued in this sense in 1887 had to be repeatedly changed and expanded with the gradual development of the army and the numerous new introductions, especially in the artillery, the transport troops, in the airship sector and in the pioneer service, until the currently valid field service regulations finally appeared in the spring of 1908. By simplifying the rules and eliminating everything that is schematic, this has given the personality more room to maneuver and has made purposeful and simple provisions, especially for outposts, reconnaissance, veiling, marching orders, baggage, ammunition columns and trains. A special section contains the rules for the maneuvers, in which the entire training culminates. They strive for a behavior of all parts that is as warlike as possible and, in addition to brigade, division, corps and imperial maneuvers, provide for special exercises in fortress wars, pioneer and intelligence services, etc. as well as for the cavalry. Above all, they encourage and raise the offensive spirit. Lately the main emphasis has been placed on the exercises of large numbers of troops.

Strategic military leadership.

If numerous far-reaching changes in the military system have taken place in the field of tactics and equipment, the enormous numerical growth of the armies and the many new aids in warfare must also influence strategic military command.

Moltke still reckoned that the army could essentially live on the means of the theater of war and therefore did not shy away from putting several army corps on one road in order to create versatile development possibilities and to be able to use large masses in narrow spaces. When he left office in 1888, Count Waldersee took his place, a brilliant soldier who, fully aware of his own abilities, refused to engage in a scientific systematization of strategy, but molded the judgment of his subordinates by constantly changing tasks and procedures everywhere and sought to emphasize what was expedient, which could be different in every situation. It was not until Count Schlieffen, who replaced him in his high position in 1891, that it was decided to develop a certain strategic system for the modern mass armies; he has the undeniable merit of having clarified this in the most varied of directions.

Proceeding from the idea that all troops marching on one road would have to march into battle in one day and be fed daily from the rear, he set up the principle with the great depth of march of modern army corps that one should only have one corps on each marching road. At the same time, however, he was anxious to have the will to destroy the enemy in battle the clearest expression. He found the solution to this problem in enclosing the enemy wings while attacking the front. With the perfection of the weapons he believed that there would be an opportunity to save forces in the front in order to strengthen the decision-seeking wing. In all his theoretical and practical war exercises and also as a critic of historical events, he kept this point of view. This conception has gained a foothold in wide circles of the army. Against this, voices are also asserting themselves which, despite all recognition of the truths that Schlieffen taught, warn against the exclusive application of his principles. They point out that simultaneous attack in the front and flank presupposes superiority and thus the weaker army is deprived of the possibility of attacking. Even the victorious encirclement only guaranteed victory if its success could assert itself along the entire line of battle before a decision was made in the front, which apparently would not always be the case on very long fronts. One must therefore have more arrows in one's quiver than just the idea of embracing. Whether these concerns are given a certain justification or not, it is certain that Count Schlieffen significantly promoted the theory of operations and, in a certain sense, created the basis for the further development of modern strategy.

Work in the army.

In the army itself, free scientific activity suffers from the increased burden of practical service and from the abundance of technical knowledge required. They paralyze the creative power of one's own thought, as it can only result from a deep general education. In spite of this, the spirit of striving forwards, initiative and offensive thought has remained strong and lively in the army and forms the unshakable basis for great future achievements. Perhaps there has never been more work in the army than in the last 25 years, and there is a blessing power in this work itself.

The greatest devotion and sacrifice can, however, in politics as on the battlefield only ever replace real power to a certain extent, and so no one who saw clearly could ignore the knowledge that the political situation and the means of power of our presumed opponents in no way corresponded to the development of the army as it was shaped under the pressure of the Reichstag.

Change in public opinion.

Meanwhile, there had also been a significant shift in public opinion. The course of the Moroccan dispute and the eventual agreement with France in 1911 had profoundly offended the pride of the German people. It was now recognized that the existing means of power were not sufficient to give the states of the hostile Triple Entente force against German policy. Now it was public opinion that returned to general Called for conscription and sharply criticized the army drafts of 1911 and 1912.

In this mood the German people found the Balkan crisis of 1912. The collapse of European Turkey and the enormous growth of the Slavic Balkan states showed that in a European war Austria, allied to us, would never be able to use all its forces against Russia, but troops will always have to be left standing on the Balkan border. As a result, the balance of power between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente was completely shifted to the disadvantage of the former, and under the pressure of these relations the government decided not only to strengthen the army, but also to further expand the fortifications, especially on the eastern border.

The Army template of 1913.

In the spring of 1913, 100 years after Prussia's glorious uprising against the Napoleonic tyranny and in the 25th year of the government of Kaiser Wilhelm the second, a new military bill was introduced and essentially accepted by the Reichstag, which at least to some extent closed the gaps in the army organization and which should make the nation's human resources more subservient to the development of military strength.

The new law stipulates that the permits issued in 1911 and 1912, which were to come into force gradually over a number of years, would be carried out as early as October 1, 1913. In addition, 63,000 more recruits are to be hired each year, mainly to increase the budget for all weapons. There are also to be newly formed: In 18 infantry regiments the missing 3rd battalions, cyclist and machine gun companies in the 18 hunter battalions, 6 cavalry regiments and four squadrons still missing in Bavaria, 3 new regiments of foot artillery and 1 Wuerttemberg battalion, 11 engineer battalions, whereby the separation is made possible in field and fortress pioneers, 13 new transport troop battalions, among which 5 aviation and 2 new airship battalions are to be located, finally for the train 1 battalion and 20 companies. New clothing departments for the heavy batteries of the field army are also to be formed. In order to secure the replacement of non-commissioned officers, the non-commissioned officers are to be placed in a much better position, two new non-commissioned officers 'schools are to be created, and the non-commissioned officers' schools and cadet schools are to be strengthened in Prussia and Saxony. Even in peacetime a large number of officers were made available for the reserve formations. In view of the increased need for officers, the cadet schools are to be enlarged and a new war school is to be built. It is necessary to increase the number of civil servants for general and special administrative purposes, administration of justice and pastoral care. The medical facilities and practice areas are to be expanded. In total the increase amounts to 4,000 officers, 15,000 NCOs, 117,000 common and 27,000 horses, and in the future there should be 669 battalions of infantry, 550 squadrons, 633 batteries, 55 foot artillery, 44 pioneer, 31 traffic troop and 26 train battalions with 661 176 common. All of these measures are to be carried out as early as October 1, 1913; only in the case of special weapons will they have to be spread over a number of years. The procurement of war material is also to be accelerated, and Königsberg and Graudenz are to be converted into large arsenals. Significant funds are being made available for the expansion of the air fleet. The exercises of the leave status are increased.

The military law of 1913 provides for a generous reinforcement of the army and tries successfully to make up for the omissions of earlier years. At least the guiding idea of the whole proposal, to expand general conscription according to the status of the population, has not yet been fulfilled, because even now a considerable percentage of those fit for military service are still absent from armed service. Above all, the train, whose importance for modern warfare is still underestimated, is not sufficiently reinforced. The overall organization cannot be described as complete either, as the higher formations for numerous excess troops are missing. It will not be possible to avoid reorganization of these in the future, since an excessively large increase in the peace budget during the two-year service period is a double-edged measure in that it increases the percentage of recruits in the war troops too much.

Outlook into the future.

Thus the law does not form a conclusion to the development of the army, but it does form a sound basis for the further development of the future and a strong and powerful expression of the state's political will to power. To a great extent, contrary to the previous situation, it increases the tactical strength of the army and will have a beneficial effect on the life of the army in the most varied of areas. It is particularly gratifying that the German people have finally convinced themselves of the need to develop military power and will hopefully be ready in the future to provide the means for further armaments.

Then we can hope with confidence that the German army, when called to draw the sword for Germany's political will, will fight worthy of its old glory and fight for the German people's future as a world power and the world's first cultural power.

Sea power and the navy.
By Vice Admiral a. D. Baron von Maltzahn.

Introduction and history.
Explanation of terms.

If they are protected by a sufficiently strong navy, trade and shipping, which connect a state across the ocean with the purchasing and sales markets of its industry, own colonies, capital invested overseas, profitable activities of nationals living there, not least the political reputation that the state has from energetic representation of these overseas relations, will create a position of maritime power. Thus, in the military-political sense, the navy becomes the carrier and representative of the sea power of a state. Without it, all maritime interests would form an element of weakness. For a continental state like the German Reich, of course, the continental position of power protected by the army was

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