Anatoliy Golitsyn – New Lies for Old – 19.1 – "Democratization" in Czechoslovakia in 1968

Chapter 19: The Seventh Disinformation Operation: "Democratization" in
Czechoslovakia in 1968

http://www.doomedsoldiers.com/pdfs/new_lies_for_old_golitsyn.pdf

208 — The Western Interpretation
209— Western Errors
210 — A Reinterpretation of Czechoslovak "Democratization"
211 — The Role of Historians and Economists in "Democratization"
212 — The Roles of Barak and Sik
214 — The Role of Writers in "Democratization"

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Notes

1. The Soviet leaders contributed to the promotion of this analogy. For instance, while visiting Sweden in the summer of 1968, Kosygin three times made a slip of the tongue confusing Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
2. CSE (1962), p. 458.

3. CSE (1962), p. 16.

4. GSE (1963), p. 18.

5. See Prague Notebook: The Strangled Revolution (Boston. Little, Brown & Co., 1971), p. 30. M. Salomon, however, misinterpreted this evidence attributing Khrushchev's proposal not to long-range bloc policy, but to the example of President Kennedy's "brain trust."

6. Ibid., p. 30, note 1. Salomon overlooked the significance of the close relations between Barak and Sik.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., pp. 101-10.

9. Ibid., p. 69.

10. Ibid., p. 229.

11. See the following extract from the Czechoslovak communist party letter to the five Warsaw Pact powers, dated July 20, 1968, quoted in [Salomon], Prague Notebook, p. 121. "The manoeuvres of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty on Czechoslovakian territory constitute a concrete proof of our faithful ulfilment of commitments of alliance. In order to assure the success of these manoeuvres, we have, on our side, taken all necessary steps. Our people as well as the members of our army have welcomed the Soviet army and the allied armies to our territory in a friendly way. The supreme leaders of the party and the government, by their presence, have testified to the importance we attach to these manoeuvres and the interest we take in them. The confusion and certain doubts expressed in our public opinion appeared only after the reiterated changes in the date of departure of the allied armies from Czechoslovakia at the end of the manoeuvres."

12. See the Czechoslovak party's letter of July 20, 1968, quoted [Salomon], in Prague Notebook, pp. 120-21: "We will never accept that the historic achievements of socialism and the security of the nations of our country should be threatened or that imperialism, in a peaceful manner or by violence, should shatter the socialist system and modify the balance of power in Europe in its favour. The principal content of our evolution after January is just this tendency to increase the internal strength and the stability of the socialist regime and thus that of our relationships of alliance."

13. Prague Notebook, Michel Salomon, p. 243.

14. See the Czechoslovak party letter dated July 20, 1968, quoted in Prague Notebook, pp. 118-19: "Our alliance and our friendship with the USSR and the other socialist countries are deeply rooted in the social regime, in the traditions and the historical experiences of our nations, in their interests, their sentiments and their thoughts. . . . We behave in such a way that friendly relationships with our allies, the countries of the world's socialist community, will deepen on a basis of mutual respect, sovereignty and equality of rights, and international solidarity. In this sense, we contribute more actively to the common activity of [Comecon] and the Warsaw treaty."

15. Here, while maintaining that "democratization" was on the whole controlled, one can allow for the existence of genuine antiregime individuals either inside or outside the country, who, without realizing what was really going on, acted completely independently during the last months of the crisis, thereby revealing themselves to the regime as counterrevolutionary elements. No doubt they were registered as such

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