12. PzD

SUPPORT THE CHANNEL www.Patreon.com/Military1945 Today we’re embedded with the 12. PzD which was part of that formation, and we’ll see the important part it played as one of the spearheads in the initial race to cross the strategically important Neman River. Although the importance of mobility in modern warfare was by the time of Barbarossa widely accepted in the Wehrmacht, there were important differences of opinion as to how the tank formations should be used during the opening phase of the operation against the Soviet Union. It was accepted by all that the attack must be sudden and violent and that at the end of the first day the 3 bridges over the Neman River must be taken before the enemy could set up defensive positions on the eastern bank. Each bridge was assigned to a different panzer division, the 20th, the 7th and the 12th. Should they be blown then they would be repaired by engineers on the night of the 22nd. Hoth, aggressively minded, wanted the panzers to surge forwards as quickly as possible and discounted completely the need to maintain contact with the following foot soldiers. General von Brauchitsch was the Wehrmacht’s Commander-in-Chief and therefor Hoth’s superior. He was a more conservative tactician and argued that the Soviets would resist effectively and that the lead German units would suffer considerable casualties from the start. He wanted the normal infantry divisions from the 9th Army to be close by in order to engage and overwhelm the defenders. Then, he argued, the panzer divisions could surge forward. ​ Experience in the western campaign had shown that having non motorized units in close proximity caused congestion and opportunities to penetrate and exploit weaknesses in the enemy lines would be lost. After hours of heated discussion a compromise was reached. The ordinary infantry divisions would be nearby but under direct order to stay off of specified roads that belonged to the mobile units. The 20th and 7th PzDs would combine their force and attack towards Olita together. In order to reinforce the the spearhead of the 12th PzD as it advanced on Merkine, the 18. mot ID was tasked with protecting its right flank. There was considerable concern that significant enemy armored formations positioned to the south would engage but that didn’t materialize. There was no indication that the Neman River was adequately defended. As stated by Hoth, the plan of PzGr. 3 was not the encounter the enemy’s main strength, but to penetrate by assault through weakly occupied parts of the enemy front. As the mobile units advanced on the morning of June 22, General von Brauchitsch nervously watched their progress from his Fiesler Storch above the front. Here’s an example of lead elements of the 12th PzD using its insignia to mark the way. To reach Mekine the 12th needed to advance 45 km through wooded and lake-rich terrain that was believed to be the border between the Central and Northern Russian fronts. On a few occasions they encountered well defended positions which slowed the division down but that were eventually over run. Here we se medics from the 12th attending to soldiers who were wounded in one of such engagements. All in all the day had gone extremely well for PzGr 3. Having the two PzDs advance up the same road to Olita resulted in a terrible traffic jam which cost the spearhead of the attack precious time but at least the situation wasn’t made worse by the presence of marching foot soldiers. By afternoon the bridge at Merkine over the Neman River was taken. In fact, all three of the bridges had been captured before they could be destroyed. Here we’re looking at the situational map for June 22 and can see the extent that PzGr 3 had been able to advance. Note how the 12 PzD has the tactical marking of an arrow with wheels which represents a motorized march column. In this formation the unit was organized to travel at maximum speed but meant that it was more vulnerable to attack. This was likely possible with the 18. mot ID covering its exposed right flank. Finally, this is the map for June 22, 1941 that has been uploaded to www.military1945.com. The blue markings you see link the units to videos on my youtube channel that cover the specific dates. This way if you are interested in seeing more in PzGr 3, for example, there’s links to the 7 PzD, the 20. PzD and the 20. mot. ID. The brown markings link to Order of Battle charts, for example here is the OOB for PzGr 3. As you can see there’s a lot of information packed in there including the unit’s name, its commander, and the types of weaponry it was outfitted with. Go to military1945.com and take a look. Let me know below what you think and what additional sources you’d like to see associated to this system.

SUPPORT THE CHANNEL www.Patreon.com/Military1945 Having captured all three bridges across the Neman River undamaged on June 22, things had gone well for PzG 3. The following day would be more problematic. A combination of poor road conditions, bad coordination between advancing units and a lack of security had slowed the progress of the advancing column to a crawl. It also neutralized the air superiority that PzGr. 3 should have enjoyed. Having successfully crossed the Neman River at Merkine, as the 12. PzD approached the Rudnicke Forrest on the morning of June 23 everyone was optimistic. The enemy’s resistance in the border region was largely broken and only occasional contact with stragglers was expected. On the service maps, clear roads leading from east to west through the forrest were delineated. But these turned out to be nothing more than dirt trails made up of dust and sand with often extremely limited lateral clearance which left the columns vulnerable to ambushes Attacks by small groups or even individual soldiers could bring the column to a halt. Stationary targets were easy targets and precious time was being lost. Adding to the complications, the trucks and confiscated French city cars continually bogged down. Soldiers and crews worked frantically to dig them out and keep them moving. Here we see a wagon being taken from some Russians. The metal frame the soldier is holding is worn like a backpack and carries signal corps communication cable. These poles were used to place the cable in elevated positions, for example among tree branches. This is the 12. PzD’s commander Major General Josef Harpe on his command vehicle. He would be awarded the Knight's Cross on 13 August 1941. The 12. PzD’s slow, almost single file, progress through the forrest on June 23rd caused terrible congestion all the way back to the Neman river. This is the situational map for June 23, 1941. We’re looking at Army Group Center, PzGrp. 3. We can see the advance the 12. has been able to make throughout the day arriving to the outskirts of Woronowo. The 18. mot. ID continues covering the right flank of the advance. Elements of the division have lagged behind maintaining a defensive posture to counter Soviet forces that are in the area. Due to the traffic jam up ahead, the 19. PzD has remained in an easily defensible position on the west bank of the Neman river for hours, waiting until things clear up. Directly behind the armor are around 2000 trucks belonging to the Luftwaffe. Rather than waiting, the trucks begin to push on, crossing the bridge and immediately get bogged down on the soft sandy trail. Chaotic hours are spent digging the trucks out, bringing them back across the bridge and moving them out of the way. The incident with the 19. PzD not only slowed down that armored formation but it also kept the Luftwaffe from establishing forward bases to the East of the Neman River. This meant that communication between the squadrons and lead elements of the German advance could not be established. This situation was not seen as critical because most of the Soviet planes positioned near the border had already largely been destroyed which had been the Luftwaffe’s primary objective. What had been lost was the Luftwaffe’s opportunity to fully cooperate with German ground forces causing further damage to Soviet formations that were already in disarray. Under constant pressure from additional air attacks how many Soviet units that were retreating might have instead surrendered? There were other logistical reasons for the traffic jams that were happening. The leadership of the 9. Army had instructed the corps to do everything in their power to keep up with the PzDs. They even created ad hoch motorized elements and somehow were given permission to use the designated “tank roads”. The complete lack of logistical coordination between these motorized groups and the panzer formations caused plenty of confusion. Not until early in the morning of June 24, is the 19 PzD able to begin advancing again. In spite of these frustrating delays, the first two days of the invasion really couldn’t have gone much better. Colonel General Hoth who was commander of PzGr 3 intended that on June 24 the 20. and 7. PzDs should be able to take Vilnus quickly, although the city wasn’t really considered important objective. More important was their continued race to the north-east in the general direction of Glebukie. Facing little resistance, the 12. PzD would continue heading north east towards the city of Dokszyce. The difficulties caused by the fog of war were making some in the German High Command nervous and there were disagreements as to how the operations should proceed. In the next video in this series we’ll take a look at the different options and see what was actually done.

SUPPORT THE CHANNEL www.Patreon.com/Military1945 COME AND SEE During those first days the Panzer Groups panzer division sliced through the Soviet lines, the only thing that seemed to slow them down much was their own logistical problems and the primitive Russian road network. The original plan had envisioned massive battles of annihilation taking place in the border region that would lead to a quick end to the war. If the Soviets were allowed to successfully retreat to the East they might could allow them to regroup and organize an effective defense. Although things had gone well during the first few days of the attack, In the German High Command there was a lack of consensus regarding to how to proceed. And the decisions made would have a material effect the outcome of the war. Here we see Major General Josef Harpe, the commander of the 12th PzD, getting out of his command vehicle at a field HQ during the first few days of Barbarossa. With the surprise attack, in close cooperation with the 18th (mot.) ID, the 12th was ordered to penetrate a vulnerable area between two Soviet Army groupings. Here we can see an original German High Command document which designates the different Corps and divisions to the 3. Panzer Group for the Russian campaign. This HH logo, stands for Hermann Hoth, the groups commander can often be seen on vehicles from the 3rd. This document was probably produced in early 1942 because that’s when the name of the formation was changed from the 3. PzG to the 3. Pz-Army On page 8 of this report we see the actions of the 12. PzD for June 22 of 1941. They were… Vorstoss über die Grenze und über den Njemen bei Merkine. The 12. PzD was part of the 57 Army Corps. It was equipped with 8 of the light Pz 1s, 32 Pz 2s, 109 of the Czech built Pz 38ts, and 30 of the more modern Pz 4s. As we talked about in Part 1 in this series, all-in-all June 22 had gone well for PzG 3. The only issues had been the logistical problems which had kept the 19th PzD from advancing and the lack of adequate communications with Luftwaffe units which would have allowed them to take full advantage of their air superiority. The armored spearheads were advancing through Soviet opposition as expected. On the evening of June 23, Hoth had prepared the order that would continue his Panzer divisions advancing to the east. He was only waiting for the expected confirmation from headquarters to issue them. For the following morning, after quickly taking Vilnius the 20th and 7th PzDs would advance towards Michalischki and the 12th would move on Oschmiana. For Hoth these prepared orders were simply following the original plan that seemed to be coming together rather nicely. Advancing generally towards Glebokie they were outpacing the Soviet units that were attempting to retreat to the East. But the fact that there were large Soviet formations retreating East was disquieting to von Brauchitsch the Commander-in-Chief of the German Wehrmacht. It had been widely accepted that the Soviet units in the border region would stand and fight to the last man. This was the figurative rotten door that simply needed to be kicked in to bring down the entire house. Concerned that too many Soviets units might now escape, Von Braukitsch’s decided to spring the trap and ordered the lead panzer divisions of the 3rd Panzer Group, after taking Vilnius, to advance to the South East. General Hoth tried to have the orders reversed however the decision had been made. At the time it was considered the more conservative course. There was concern that having the armor continue advancing east could result in them getting cut off and lost. On the other hand, General Guderian who was in charge of Panzer Group 2, believed that their advance East should continue and that they would cause havoc to the Soviet rear by disrupting supply lines. This would cause the Soviet formations positioned farther to the West to wither and die. As an interesting side note, it was the Soviet commissars that often forced the units to stay and fight which at this stage in the war lead to their complete annihilation. In order to be able to retreat and possibly survive, in some instances these commissars were murdered by their own troops. As much as the Germans hated these commissars, much of what they did was unknowingly helping the German cause. This is the situational map that shows the positioning of the units on the evening of June 24. The units of the 3rd PzGr. have made quick progress and make up the left pincher of the envelopment maneuver. To the South, Guderian and his 2nd PzGr was also advancing towards Minsk and would be the right pincher.